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Abstract
This thesis contains three self-contained studies on firm bahaviour during a period
of trade liberalisation and export boom in China.
In Chapter 1, we describe the general institutional background of the Chinese
export boom from 2000 to 2007, look into the structure of this growth by examining
the sources of the changes in export value, and give the outline of each core chapter.
In Chapter 2, we use a new linked firm-product data to measure the domestic
value-added and technology intensity of Chinese exports over the period 2000-
2007. We re-evaluate the extent of value-added in China’s exports, using a modifi-
cation of a method proposed by Hummels et al. (2001) which takes into account the
prevalence of processing firms. In addition, we provide new estimates of the skill-
and technology-intensity of China’s exports. Our estimates of value-added sug-
gest that, in 2006, the domestic content of China’s exports was below 50%, much
lower than previously estimated. We also show that Chinese exports have become
increasingly skill- and technology-intensive, but this intensity is lower when the
exports are evaluated by domestic value-added than by final value.
Chapter 3 looks into the effect of the elimination of the Multifibre Arrangement
(MFA) quotas in 2005 on prices of products exported by Chinese firms to the U.S..
Using transaction-level customs data from China over the period 2000-2006, we
find that the MFA quota removal reduced average export prices by about 30%,
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which is compatible with other findings in the literature. A distinguishing feature of
this study is that our data allows us to examine the sources of the price reductions.
Evidence also shows that more than half of the price drop was due to firm entry and
that the MFA had a smaller effect on the pricing behaviour of state-owned firms.
As an extension of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 presents evidence on how multi-
product firms adjusted their product structure as triggered by the MFA quota e-
limination. We find that the removal of MFA quotas induced firms to abruptly
expand their product scope by as much as one third, and meanwhile caused firms
to reduce the share of their core product in export sales by nearly 10 percentage
points as a result of a more diversified export product mix. While these effects are
obvious for private and foreign-owned firms, they are very insignificant for state-
owned firms, probably due to the fact that the latter were not constrained as much
by the quotas because of their closer political connections to the quota allocation
authorities. Our evidence also suggests that an increased weight was placed on the
U.S. market relative to the Japanese market within exporting firms after the quotas
were lifted, highlighting the trade barriers created by U.S. quotas.
Chapter 5 summarises the main findings of the thesis and discusses our future
research directions.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
“[W]hile China acts as a manufacturing base for firms worldwide, its
sheer size and rapid growth also creates challenges for many coun-
tries[. . . ]On the export side, China is a formidable competitor in many
markets, overlapping in its export composition with other countries
such as India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thai-
land. These countries often attribute declines in their own export de-
mand to competition from China. And on the import side, too, China’s
impact is felt worldwide. Its demand for raw materials, especially to
fuel the investment boom of recent years (including the 2008 Olympic-
s), creates market pressure and higher prices for building material-
s[. . . ]So the challenges created by China’s rapid growth and expand-
ing trade are both domestic and international in scope.”
— Feenstra and Wei (2010, pp. 1-2)
The recent wave of globalisation has been dominated by the trade liberalisation
of the People’s Republic of China. A direct and observable result is the reshuffling
of powers in the global trade community, largely due to the rise of China in the
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
world economy. However, the growing importance of China has influences far be-
yond just changing the ranking of countries in the trade league table. On the one
hand, China’s rising role is the consequence of its own reform and “open-door”
policy in the past three decades; on the other hand, it is also the cause of wide-
ranging changes in other countries’ economies. Such reasoning is grounded on the
fact that China has grown to be the world’s biggest supplier of manufactures while
at the same time also exerting a huge demand for merchandise goods second to
the U.S. (World Trade Organisation, 2011), a phenomenon that has attracted at-
tentions globally from both politics and academia. The multi-dimensional impacts
brought out by the rise of China have been made quite clear in a recent book edit-
ed by the National Bureau of Economic Research (Feenstra and Wei, 2010), with
contributions from some of the most influential trade economists, as quoted in the
beginning.
This chapter lays out the foundation and sketches the outline for the whole
thesis. It proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 describes the general institutional back-
ground of the period under this thesis study, Section 1.2 reviews and depicts the
patterns of the recent Chinese export boom, in Section 1.3 we analyse the sources
of the export growth using decomposition methods, and in Section 1.4 we introduce
the motivations and summarise the key findings of each core chapter.
1.1 General Institutional Background
1.1.1 WTO accession
An important event that took place during this period is China’s entry into theWorld
Trade Organisation (WTO) at the end of 2001.1 Roughly speaking, the WTO ac-
1The basic facts regarding China’s WTO accession stated below are mainly from Rumbaugh and
Blancher (2004).
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
cession has a two-folded effect on China. On the one hand, according to China’s
commitments to the WTO, trade barriers of various kinds would be removed grad-
ually to create a fairer and freer environment for investment and trade. All import
tariffs were eliminated or reduced mostly by 2004, and the import quotas of in-
dustrial goods were removed by 2005. As a result, the unweighted average tariff
rate had decreased from 16.4% in 2000 to below 10% by 2007. Figure 1.1 shows
that all broadly defined products (two-digit industries) had experienced reductions
in tariffs after 2000, especially after 2001. Some labour-intensive goods, such as
beverages, tobacco, textile, furniture and so on, had larger tariff cuts than others.
At the same time, restrictions on trade rights and discriminations against foreign
investment which were inconsistent with WTO rules were also eliminated. For ex-
ample, within three years of theWTO entry, all firms would have the right to import
and export directly except for some special goods (for example, energy and natural
resources), and within five years, foreign firms would be allowed to distribute most
of their products in China’s domestic market.
On the other hand, having become a member country of the WTO, China al-
so began to benefit from easier access to the overseas markets by enjoying the
permanent status as a most-favoured-nation (MFN). By MFN treatment, Chinese
exports would no longer meet discriminative tariffs and quotas relative to export-
s from other countries, although for some specific products (for example, textiles
and apparels) safeguards provisions and surveillance strategies would continue to
operate for certain periods. Altogether, these changes not only brought about a cli-
mate which was increasingly favourable for the influx of foreign capital and goods,
but also encouraged indigenous firms to engage more in export activities targeted
towards other countries.
3
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Fig 1.1. Average tariffs by two-digit industry
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1.1.2 Changes in trade policies on textiles and apparel
For three decades after 1974, the dominant system regulating the global trade in
textiles and apparel was the Multifibre arrangement (MFA). The MFA was in fact a
series of bilateral agreements between major import and export countries of textiles
and apparel and it worked via implementation of the agreed bilateral quotas. In
1995, however, the MFA was replaced by a new agreement named the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) as a conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
According to the major treaties of the ATC, all quota restrictions imposed by the
WTO member countries on textile and clothing products were to be phased out
through four stages (1 January of 1995, 1998, 2002, and 2005) and eventually the
quotas would be completely eliminated on 1 January, 2005. At each stage of this
period, quotas were progressively enlarged by agreed annual growth rates.
Although China was initially not a member of the WTO when the ATC came
into effect, it was automatically integrated into the quota phaseout programme after
it achieved its WTO membership in the end of 2001. For instance, in the fist half
of 2002, the Unite States implemented the first three of the four stages of the ATC
quota elimination programme for imports of textile and apparel from China (Har-
rigan and Barrows, 2009). Despite the gradual removal of quota restrictions, the
ATC also established a new special safeguard mechanism to deal with new cases of
damage or threat to domestic market arising from imports. As part of China’s WTO
accession negotiations, China also agreed to this special safeguard mechanism to
be imposed on its exports of textiles and clothing.
As expected, textiles and apparel products from China surged in the U.S. mar-
ket after the beginning of 2005 when quotas were abruptly eliminated overnight. In
view of this, the United States was under extraordinary pressure from its domestic
producers to restart negotiations with China and finally a bilateral memorandum
was signed on 8 November, 2005. This memorandum reimposed quotas and an-
5
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nual growth rates on major categories of exports of textile and clothing products
from China over the three-year period of 2006 to 2008 as a safeguard strategy in
accordance with the ATC agreements.
At the same time, Chinese exports of textiles and clothing also swamped many
of the European ports immediately after the quota restrictions by the MFA came
to an end in January, 2005. The safeguard mechanism was launched by the Euro-
pean Union and negotiations were restarted which were finally concluded by a new
E.U.-China bilateral agreement on 10 June, 2005, which reimposed quota restric-
tions on main product categories over the period from 2005 until the end of 2007.
Because of the sudden imposition of the new import limits, a large inventory of tex-
tile and clothing products, most of which were ordered before the new restrictions
came into effect, were piled up in E.U. ports, causing a potential shortage of relat-
ed manufactured goods in the coming Christmas season in the European market.
As a result, another E.U.-China agreement was signed on 5 September, 2005 to
increase the import quantity limits on those products from China and consequently
the inventory was finally released to the European market.2
1.2 The Chinese Export Boom, 2000-2007: Overview
China’s export boom in the 21st century is phenomenal. For exports of manufac-
tures, the average annual growth rate between 2000 and 2007 is more than 30%, 10
percentage points higher than during the previous eight years (1993-2000). Mean-
while, China’s share in world’s trade in merchandise almost tripled, jumping from
4.7% in 2000 to 12% in 2007.
The export boom in this period is vividly shown in Figure 1.2. According to
2For more detailed account of Chinese exports of textiles and clothing in the U.S. and European
market after the elimination of the MFA, please refer to Dayaratna-Banda and Whalley (2007).
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China’s official statistics,3 China’s total value of exports (measured in Chinese yuan
(CNY) in 2000 price) almost quadrupled in the eight-year horizon. This extraordi-
narily high growth rate is also reflected in our full sample aggregate of individual
export values.4 It is worth noticing that the growth trajectory of our full sample
export value resembles closely to that of the official data and constantly constitutes
more than 70% of total exports (with the average being around 80%).
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Fig 1.2. Export values
While there is no doubt that the increase in Chinese exports is unusual, the
value of exports itself tells us nothing about the mechanism of how it has come
about. In the rest of this introduction, we provide some simple decompositions of
how this export growth has been achieved, as well as considering the contribution
of different industries, regions and firm types to the phenomenal growth in exports.
The first phenomenon is the uneven export growth across industries in terms of
their share in total exports. The reshuffling of the export bundle towards relatively
more sophisticated final products is reflected in Table 1.1, where the shares of ex-
3See China Statistical Yearbooks published annually by National Bureau of Statistics of China.
4The full sample refers to the population of firms existing in the firm data to be used in this
chapter, while the balanced panel only contains those firms which exist in all years of the sample
period. Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 gives a formal description of the data.
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port value are calculated for each two-digit industry. In this table, we find that most
of the reductions in export share took place in those sectors usually regarded as
labour-intensive industries such as textile, clothing, and leather/fur/feather.5 On the
other hand, most of the increases in export share came from electronic, electrical,
and transport equipments. An even more remarkable fact is that the overwhelm-
ing increase in electronics exports alone bypasses all other products and dominates
the overall export growth with its share increased by 12 percentage points in to-
tal exports. Most of the industries that exhibit positive growth in export share are
regarded as those requiring more capital and more advanced technology. Com-
bined together, the evidence suggests that Chinese exports were experiencing a
reallocation from those traditionally labour-intensive industries towards those new
industries with high values in final products, which is highly consistent with the
findings of the recent literature (e.g. Amiti and Freund, 2010).
Meanwhile, export activities along two other dimensions, ownership types and
regions, are also distributed unevenly. Figure 1.3 plots the proportions of exporting
firms by type of ownership and geographical location. First, foreign firms and Hong
Kong/Macau/Taiwan (HMT) firms always had the highest ratios of exporters, far
higher than those of non-state and state-owned domestic firms. Second, the coastal
region had significantly higher proportions of exporting firms than inland region
across all ownership types and in all years. A closer examination of the figure
reveals that although the gaps in the fraction of exporters between regions were
reduced over time in each of the four ownership categories, the largest inter-region
gap is in HMT firms, followed by foreign, non-state domestic, and state-owned
firms. This difference in regional gaps is not surprising if we consider the fact
that in China foreign-invested firms are mainly located in the coastal provinces
while the ratio of state-owned firms is higher in the inland areas. An explanation
is that the trade cost is lower in the coastal region after economic openness and
5Despite the declining share, the absolute value of exports from these sectors grew enormously,
as shown in Chapters 3 and 4.
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Table 1.1. Reshuffling in the industrial structure of
export value (%)
Industry 2000 2007 Change
Textiles 12.36 6.04 -6.32
Clothing 8.44 4.80 -3.64
Leather/fur/feather 5.71 3.17 -2.54
Office equipments 3.05 1.83 -1.22
Processing of foods 3.30 2.33 -0.97
Plastics 3.06 2.43 -0.63
Petroleum/coking 1.05 0.44 -0.61
Metal products 4.47 3.88 -0.59
Medicines 1.43 0.93 -0.50
Raw chemical material 3.95 3.63 -0.32
Manufacturing of foods 0.87 0.76 -0.11
Measuring instruments 2.72 2.63 -0.09
Beverages 0.37 0.29 -0.08
Non-ferrous metals 1.76 1.72 -0.04
Paper products 0.87 0.80 -0.07
Rubber 1.35 1.28 -0.07
General machinery 3.52 3.47 -0.05
Non-metallic minerals 2.21 2.13 -0.08
Printing 0.23 0.32 0.09
Chemical fibers 0.27 0.36 0.09
Timber/wood 0.64 0.88 0.24
Furniture 1.08 1.43 0.35
Special machinery 1.23 1.74 0.51
Ferrous metals 2.74 3.96 1.22
Transport equipments 3.90 5.15 1.25
Electrical equipments 6.38 8.19 1.81
Electronic equipments 23.06 35.42 12.36
Notes. The industries are arranged in ascending order of percentage change in
export value share.
9
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China historically had most of its state investments in the inland region for national
security considerations.
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Fig 1.3. Proportions of exporting firms across ownership types and regions
The inequality of export participation across ownership types and regions is
even clearer in Figure 1.4, where the vertical axis is now replaced by export values
(deflated). Comparing the two panels in the figure reveals a sharp contrast. Over the
eight years’ period, there was little growth in export value in the interior provinces,
but the export value from the coastal region surged after 2001 across firms of all
ownership types except state-owned ones. Within the coastal region, the growth
from foreign firms was even more explosive than that of other firms – the export
value contributed by these firms increased sharply by more than seven times with
the average annual growth being higher than 35%. The export expansion of these
coastal firms further enlarged the gap between regions that had existed before and
strengthened the role of the coastal area as the major exporter within China, which
in 2007 accounted for as much as 93% of China’s manufacturing exports.
There are mainly two reasons for the inferior export performance of state-
owned firms across regions. The first is the government-directed reform which
10
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Fig 1.4. Export values across ownership types and regions
closed or restructured a large number of state-owned firms in order to enhance their
overall efficiency and to give more market access to other participants. Second,
the relatively low efficiency of the state-owned firms, as a legacy of the planned
economy, significantly accelerated their process of dying out in an increasingly
more competitive market. At the same time, the industrial policies introduced and
implemented by the central government encouraged more foreign investment and
domestic non-state firms to enter the market, making the invisible hand more effec-
tive by driving out less efficient firms. These factors collectively contribute to the
result that the (export) market share of state-owned firms shrank rapidly.
Since this was also a period when the manufacturing output increased substan-
tially, the export intensities (defined as the ratio of export value to output) across
different groups were fairly constant over time despite the export value boom. This
is illustrated in Figure 1.5. However, the gaps between regions and ownership types
were still substantial. The coastal region had much higher fractions of output ex-
ported than the inland region and so did the foreign and HMT firms compared to
the indigenous firms. Again, among all ownership types, the difference in the ex-
11
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port intensity of foreign firms across regions is most prominent, followed by HMT
firms, non-state domestic firms, and state-owned firms. These differences played
an important role in shaping inter-regional gaps in exports.6
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Fig 1.5. Export intensities across ownership types and regions
1.3 Decompositions of Export Growth
The driving forces behind the Chinese export boom described above are probably
different from developed countries such as the U.S. as we suspect that new firms’
entry could have played a much more important role here due to the significantly
lowered exporting barriers. A starting point of looking at the sources of the ex-
port boom is by investigating the dynamics of firm turnover in the export market.
Firm dynamics, including firm entry, firm exit, firm growth, and change in export
intensity, can all contribute to the aggregate growth of exports. Some theoretical
6The superior export performance either in terms of participation rate or in terms of export
intensity by foreign firms have been documented in some empirical studies, including Bernard and
Jensen (2004b) on the U.S. firms sample and Kneller et al. (2008) on the U.K. firms sample. Zhang
and Song (2001) and Zhang and Felmingham (2001) find that foreign firms in China are also more
intensively engaged in export activities, but their conclusions are from trade data sources either at
the national level or at the provincial level.
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work has modelled the role of entry cost in explaining export market dynamics
(e.g. Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Bernard et al., 2007). In these
models, all firms face fixed costs upon starting to export, for example, costs of
building initial business networks, advertising, learning about the new market, and
so on. Because these costs will be sunk once the firms have started exporting, only
those firms with higher productivity (or lower production cost per unit output) are
able to cover these costs as they earn higher revenue in the export market. Fur-
ther, when trade costs are reduced, the productivity cutoff that divides exporting
and non-exporting firms also decreases, thus inducing more firms to enter into the
export market.
Evidence from a large number of empirical work has confirmed the role of
sunk costs predicted in the theoretical models (e.g. Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Aw
et al., 2000, 2001; Bernard and Jensen, 2004a,b), and has also documented the
positive effect of trade liberalisation on aggregate industry productivity via reallo-
cation of resources from less efficient firms to more efficient firms (e.g. Pavcnik,
2002; Eslava et al., 2004; Amiti and Konings, 2007). However, their main focus
is on productivity and few of them have explicitly examined the sources of export
growth. The only exception is Bernard and Jensen (2004b) which decompose the
U.S. export boom from 1987-1992 to firm entry, firm expansion, and export inten-
sity. One of their key findings is that firm entry plays a relatively smaller role than
export intensity and this lends support to the importance of sunk entry costs in the
export market.
Compared to the U.S. case in Bernard and Jensen (2004a), there are at least
two reasons which make Chinese exports during the period 2000-2007 a different
setting for analysing the sources of export boom. First, in our sample period, China
underwent a much deeper liberalisation in trade environment than the U.S. from
1987 to 1992, where the main external drive was dollar depreciation (Bernard and
Jensen, 2004a). From the standpoint of China, because of the WTO accession,
13
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there were large cuts in import tariffs and in restrictions on foreign investment,
and there were substantial decreases in trade barriers to other countries as well.
More fundamentally, upon entry into the WTO, all trade began to be supervised
and regulated under uniform and transparent WTO rules, including those regarding
the resettlement of conflicts. For the first time in its history of opening up since the
early 1980s, China was formally and institutionally integrated into the world trade.
Second, as a developing country with abundant labour, one needs to be careful
in interpreting its rapidly growing export volume. The main reason is that many
developing countries are engaging increasingly more in labour-intensive segments
of the global production chain by taking advantage of their relatively cheap labour.
For those exports of sophisticated products, probably only a small part of the final
value is truly from these countries’ value-added. For China in this case, more than
half of its exports is from processing exports which are produced with extremely
intensive use of imported inputs. It is therefore important to bear this fact in mind
as the final value of goods could partly reflect the value created by other countries
than the exporting countries.
The above facts highlight the importance of considering the vertical specialisa-
tion when analysing the firm dynamics. For this purpose, we use three data sources
for the analysis in this section: (1) the firm-level data of the Chinese Annual Sur-
vey of Industrial Firms (CASIF) from the National Bureau of Statistics of China
(NBSC), (2) the transaction-level data from the database of the Chinese Customs
Trade Statistics (CCTS) which is compiled and maintained by the General Admin-
istration of Customs of China, and (3) a linked firm-transaction-level data between
the CASIF and the CCTS. See Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 for a more detailed de-
scription of these data sources. In the analysis below, we try to provide answers to
the questions of (1) what are the sources of the export boom in general? (2) did the
export growth come more from processing firms or non-processing firms?
14
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1.3.1 Methodology
To investigate the sources of the export boom both qualitatively and quantitative-
ly, we use a simple decomposition framework here. This framework allows us to
assess statistically the contributions of different factors to the growth by distin-
guishing intensive margins and extensive margins at different levels. As will be
clear below, the decomposition is essentially taking total differentials in a discrete
time context.
We start by defining Et as the aggregate export value, E¯
E
t as the mean export
value of exporting firms, and NEt as the total number of exporting firms at time t,
respectively. Since
Et = E¯
E
t N
E
t , (1.3.1)
it follows that
∆Et = Et−Et−1
= E¯Et N
E
t − E¯
E
t−1N
E
t−1
= E¯Et N
E
t − E¯
E
t−1N
E
t + E¯
E
t−1N
E
t − E¯
E
t−1N
E
t−1
= NEt ∆E¯
E
t + E¯
E
t−1∆N
E
t .
(1.3.2)
Alternatively, we have
∆Et = Et−Et−1
= E¯Et N
E
t − E¯
E
t−1N
E
t−1
= E¯Et N
E
t − E¯
E
t N
E
t−1+ E¯
E
t N
E
t−1− E¯
E
t−1N
E
t−1
= E¯Et ∆N
E
t +N
E
t−1∆E¯
E
t .
(1.3.3)
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Summing up (1.3.2) and (1.3.3) and dividing both sides of the equation by two
yields
∆Et =
NEt−1+N
E
t
2
∆E¯Et︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive margin
+
E¯Et−1+ E¯
E
t
2
∆NEt︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin
.
(1.3.4)
The first term of the right hand side of (1.3.4) is defined as the intensive mar-
gin of export growth, which measures the share of export growth arising from the
growth in exports per exporting firm. The second term is defined as the extensive
margin of export growth, which is the share of export growth due to the increase in
the number of exporting firms.
Further, because firms can be decomposed into several groups (denoted by sub-
script j), for example, coastal group and inland group, the growth in Et can be
written as
∆Et = ∑
j
∆E jt
= ∑
j
∆(E¯EjtN
E
jt)
= ∑
j
(
NEjt−1+N
E
jt
2
∆E¯Ejt +
E¯Ejt−1+ E¯
E
jt
2
∆NEjt
)
.
(1.3.5)
Therefore, the contribution of group j at the intensive margin (changes in the aver-
age export value) is
(NEjt−1+N
E
jt)∆E¯
E
jt
2∆Et
, (1.3.6)
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while the contribution at the extensive margin (changes in the number of exporting
firms) accounts for
(E¯Ejt−1+ E¯
E
jt)∆N
E
jt
2∆Et
. (1.3.7)
Because we have product-level data, we can then further decompose E¯Et and
NEt into sub-components separately. First, E¯
E
t can be expressed as the product of
two components for the sample of exporting firms: the mean export value of each
product variety and the number of product varieties per firm. That is,
E¯Et =
e¯t×nt
NEt
≡ e¯t× vt , (1.3.8)
where e¯t is the mean export value of each product variety, nt is the number of
product varieties, Nt is the number of exporting firms, and vt is the number of
product varieties per exporting firm, defined as nt/Nt . Then the contributions of
the two parts to the growth in E¯Et are
(vt−1+ vt)∆e¯t
2∆E¯Et
, (1.3.9)
(e¯t−1+ e¯t)∆vt
2∆E¯Et
. (1.3.10)
Lastly, we also decompose the number of exporting firms into two parts: the
change in the proportion of exporters and the change in the total number of firms.
If we use Nt to denote the total number of firms and P
E
t to denote the proportion of
exporting firms, the identity is now
NEt = P
E
t Nt . (1.3.11)
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Then the contributions from the two components of ∆NEt in sector j are
(N jt−1+N jt)∆P
E
jt
2∆NEt
, (1.3.12)
(PEjt−1+P
E
jt )∆N jt
2∆NEt
. (1.3.13)
1.3.2 A discussion on the identification of “new” exporters
The identification of “new” firms, especially “new” exporters, is crucial to our
assessment of export growth in terms of intensive and extensive margins. If our
firm sample represented the whole population of manufacturing firms, then the
identification would be quite straightforward – the “new” firms would be simply
those which appeared the first time in the sample after the initial year (2000), and
similarly the “new” exporters would be those which started exporting after the
initial year.
However, the above criteria is problematic when the sample is not the popula-
tion, as in our case. Since “below-scale” firms (with annual sales roughly below 5
million yuan) are not included in our sample by the nature of the survey, identifi-
cation by the above method could probably overestimate the firm entry rate. The
reason is that a firm that appears the first time in the sample might not necessarily
be newly established firm but could be from the “below-scale” cohort which is not
included in the sample. As a result, a firm identified as a “new” exporter can be (1)
a non-exporting firm that existed in the “above-scale” sample before, (2) a newly
established “above-scale” firm, (3) a previously “below-scale” non-exporting firm,
or (4) a previously “below-scale” exporting firm. The concern raised before comes
from the possibility of (4). If many “new” exporters fell in this last category, the
above identification would lead to biased result.
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One way to address this issue of potential misidentification is to look at the
firm ages, constructed by subtracting firms’ business starting years from the years
they operate in. By the firm age information, we can at least identify genuinely
new firms whose ages should be zero. To best utilise the age information, we first
classify “new” firms and “new” exporting firms by the above method. The latter is
further broken down into two subgroups: “new” firms and “existing” firms. Then
we look into the age distribution by each group, where age distribution is simplified
as three distributional sections – “age=0”, “1≤age≤5”, and “age>5”. The result is
shown in Table 1.2.
We have several observations from the age distribution. First, in column I, gen-
uinely new firms only account for 8.4% of all “new” firms, which in other words
means that 91.6% of the “new” firms are misclassified. There are probably two
sources for the misclassification of “new” firms: firms from the “below-scale” co-
hort or firms which had existed before but which somehow disappeared from the
sample for some time.7 Second, from column II.I, we see that 6.1% of “new” ex-
porting firms are actually genuinely new firms which started exporting right away
after their establishment. In contrast, 66.1% (44.17%+21.89%= 66.1%) of them
are misclassified as “new” firms, some of which could be previously “below-scale”
firms. However, unfortunately, we cannot tell howmany of them are really from the
“below-scale” cohort and whether they used to be “below-scale” non-exporters or
“below-scale” exporters. Third, the transition rate from non-exporters to exporter-
s in the “above-scale” sample is 27.8% (14.45%+ 13.34% = 27.8%), calculated
from column II.II.8 This transition rate is moderate and comparable with the cur-
rent studies such as Bernard and Jensen (2004b) (30% over eight years).
In the above analysis, we only pinned down part of the genuinely new exporting
7For example, some firms in some years could be dropped by the data cleaning.
8The 0.1% of firms in column II.II probably misreported their business starting years, because
they existed in the previous years in the sample but have ages of zero. However, their extremely
small amount makes them negligible.
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Table 1.2. Distribution of the ages of the “new” firms and the “new” exporting firms:
aggregated over all years
II. “New” exporting firmsb
I. “New” firmsa II.I “New” firmsc II.II “Existing” firmsd
age=0 1≤age≤5 age>5 age=0 1≤age≤5 age>5 age=0 1≤age≤5 age>5
8.39% 61.26% 30.36% 6.05% 44.17% 21.89% 0.10% 14.45% 13.34%
Notes.
aFirms that appeared for the first time in the CASIF data after 2000.
bFirms that appeared for the first time as an exporting firm in the CASIF data after 2000.
cFirms that appeared for the first time in the CASIF data and became an exporting firm in the same year after 2000.
dFirms that appeared for the first time as an exporting firm but existed in the previous years in the CASIF data after 2000.
2
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firms; they amount to 33.9% (6.1%+27.8%= 33.9%) of all “new” exporting firms
identified before. For the remaining 66.1% of the firms, nothing is known about
their previous activities as they could have anyhow disappeared from the sample,
could have been dropped by data cleaning, or could have been in the unobservable
“below-scale” cohort excluded from the firm survey. Ideally, a data with all firms
included would be helpful for clarifying this puzzling riddle. For this purpose, we
resort to an external data, the database of the First National Economic Census of
China from the NBSC. This census was conducted in the end of 2004 and was the
most comprehensive economic census ever in China. It is a cross-sectional data set
which covers all firms and other legal organisations registered in local authorities.
We extract the whole population of manufacturing firms from the database and then
compare them with the sample of firms of 2005 from the CASIF data.
It is now possible to trace precisely the statuses of the “above-scale” exporting
firms in 2005 back in 2004. The result is reported in Table 1.3. It is now clear
that only 1.7% of “new” exporting firms are misclassified as they did export in the
“below-scale” cohort in the previous year. According to the 2004 Census database,
37.4% of manufacturing exporters are “below-scale” manufacturing firms, but they
only account for 2.3% of total manufacturing exports. Therefore, only a very small
part of “below-scale” exporters switched to “above-scale” exporters in the next
year. On the contrary, about 93.3% (1.11%+92.15%=93.26%) of currently “new”
exporting firms are from non-exporting firms in the previous year, of which the
vast majority used to be non-exporting firms in the “above-scale” sample. All
together, the evidence from the comparison between our sample and the Census
data demonstrates that our identification of new exporting firms is 98.3% correct
on a year-to-year basis, or 88.7% ((98.3%)7=88.7%) correct on an eight-year basis.
We are therefore largely justified in using the CASIF data to identify new exporters.
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Table 1.3. Compositions of “new” exporting firms:
comparing year 2005 with year 2004
Existing firmsb
Genuinely
new firmsa
Below-scale
exporters
at (t-1)c
Below-scale
non-exporters
at (t-1)d
Above-scale
non-exporters
at (t-1)e
5.04% 1.69% 1.11% 92.15%
Notes.
aExporting firms in 2005 that did not exist in the 2004 Census.
bExporting firms in 2005 that existed in the 2004 Census.
cExporting firms in 2005 that existed as “below-scale” exporting firms in the 2004
Census.
dExporting firms in 2005 that existed as “below-scale” non-exporting firms in the
2004 Census.
eExporting firms in 2005 that existed as “above-scale” exporting firms in the 2004
Census.
1.3.3 Decomposition results
Table 1.4 presents the decomposition result of total export value growth obtained
by applying Eq. (1.3.4). We see that the intensive margin and the extensive mar-
gin are equally important in fuelling export growth. Half of the export growth was
from exporting firms increasing their exports, and half was from the net effect of
firms entering and exiting the export market.9 The contribution from the extensive
margin here is much higher than what is found for other countries. For example, in
a study of the U.S. export growth from 1987 to 1992, Bernard and Jensen (2004a)
find that only 13% of the growth is attributed to the net entry of firms. Bernard
and Jensen (2004a) take this finding as evidence of the importance of sunk costs in
firms’ decisions to export. In a setting where trade costs are reduced dramatically,
the role of the extensive margin should be larger as it is easier for firms to export.
Our result here, when compared with Bernard and Jensen (2004a), provides a dy-
namic version of evidence which lends support to the effect of reduced trade costs
predicted by heterogeneous firm models.
9As clarified in Section 1.3.2, about 11.3% of the identified “new” exporting firms may be
mislabeled genuinely new exporters in our sample. Therefore, we believe ignoring this problem is
unlikely to change our results qualitatively.
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The above result is obtained with the full CASIF sample. However, as ex-
plained in Section 1.3.2, relying on the full sample will overstate the role of firm
entry as some existing firms will be mistakenly classified as “genuine” new firms.
Although our evidence shows this type of misclassification is statistically unimpor-
tant, a feasible way to eliminate the influence of such misclassification is to rely
on the balanced panel where all firms existed for all years. Because the balanced
panel only keeps firms which were active in each year of the sample period, the
extensive margin now only contains those firms which were always in the sample
and which transited from non-exporting status to exporting status after 2001. It is
shown that when it comes to the balanced CASIF panel, the extensive margin is
reduced dramatically, and this pattern persists from Table 1.4 to Table 1.9. What
is lost in the extensive margin, compared to the full sample, is those firms who
started their business and began to export after 2001. The huge gap in the extensive
margin between the two samples now reveals that most of the extensive margin is
actually from those new firms10 rather than from the pre-existing non-exporting
firms entering into the export market. This could happen if the sunk costs associ-
ated with exporting were reduced to a considerably low level which allowed newly
established firms to export right away. As described before, this is probably the
case when most of the firms were entitled to export and import independently and
enjoy more favourable tariffs and quotas in other countries after China became a
WTO member.
The large growth of exports at the extensive margin raises the question of the
composition of new exporting firms. We are particularly interested in the propor-
tion of processing firms in the export growth, because processing firms rely heavily
on imported materials but contribute a high share in the final value of exports. The
firm-level CASIF data provides no infirmation for identifing whether an export-
ing firm is a processing firm or not. We therefore turn to the firm-product-level
10”New firms” here, of course, include genuine new entrants and firms which moved above the
size threshold, though the latter only account for a small proportion as indicated in Section 1.3.2.
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Table 1.4. Sources of export value growth
Full CASIF Balanced CASIF
Export value (2000) 1118.5 239.8
Export value (2007) 5825.8 837.0
Change (2000/2007) 4707.3 597.2
Intensive margin 0.500 (50.0%) 0.956 (95.6%)
Extensive margin 0.500 (50.0%) 0.044 (4.4%)
Notes. Export values and their change are measured in billion CNY in 2000 price.
Numbers in parentheses are shares of intensive margin or extensive margin within each
group.
matched CASIF-CCTS sample. While there are four broadly categorised customs
regimes, we define an exporting firm pertaining to a specific type if its exports of
that customs regime contribute more than 50% of its total exports. Then we ap-
ply the above decomposition method to the exporting firms in this sample and the
result is seen in Table 1.5.
As expected, processing firms dominate the export growth, especially in terms
of the extensive margin (7%+64.7%= 72% of export growth), which implies that
the entry of new processing firms is the principal reason for the growth. However,
what looks a bit odd is that almost all export growth from processing firms is from
processing firms which import materials rather than “processing and assembling”
firms. The former’s share in export growth is as high as 84%. To understand
this, it is important to note the difference between the two processing regimes.
When processing-and-assembling firms import materials from foreign suppliers,
the property rights of the materials still pertain to the foreign suppliers, and all
the assembled products go back to these suppliers; in other words, these firms are
like workshops of those foreign companies. By contrast, when processing-with-
imported-materials firms import materials, they gain the complete property rights
over these materials, and after the materials are processed into final or semi-final
goods, these firms can decide which foreign companies to export to; in other words,
these firms are sellers in the international market instead of merely workshops for
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foreign firms. This said, the difference in the contributions between the two types
of processing firms probably means that Chinese processing firms are choosing to
play a more influential role in the export market.
Table 1.5. Sources of export value growth
(matched CASIF-CCTS sample, by customs regime)
Ordinary-
trade firms
Processing-and-
assembling firms
Processing-with-
impt.-matls. firms Other firms
Export value (2003) 49.9 161.5 1042.0 4.2
Export value (2006) 94.0 363.1 2429.4 10.7
Change (2003/2006) 44.1 201.6 1387.4 6.5
Int. margin 0.011 (40.7%) 0.053 (43.1%) 0.199 (23.5%) 0.003 (75.0%)
Ext. margin 0.016 (59.3%) 0.070 (56.9%) 0.647 (76.5%) 0.001 (25.0%)
Notes. Export values and their change are measured in billion CNY in 2000 price. Numbers in parentheses are shares of
intensive margin or extensive margin within each group.
Table 1.6 gives the results of decomposition by region. We have two basic find-
ings here. First, it shows that almost all of the export value growth came from ex-
porting firms located in the coastal region, whether in the full sample or in the bal-
anced panel. Second, the coastal region had a higher proportion of export growth
from the extensive margin, compared to the inland provinces. These findings are
not surprising if we consider the substantial regional gaps in export activities in
China.
Table 1.6. Sources of export value growth (by region)
Full CASIF Balanced CASIF
Coast Inland Coast Inland
Export value (2000) 1022.4 96.1 222.0 17.8
Export value (2007) 5422.2 403.7 768.6 68.4
Change (2000/2007) 4399.8 307.6 546.6 50.6
Intensive margin 0.452 (48.3%) 0.041 (63.1%) 0.887 (96.9%) 0.072 (84.7%)
Extensive margin 0.483 (51.7%) 0.024 (36.9%) 0.028 (3.1%) 0.013 (15.3%)
Notes. Export values and their change are measured in billion CNY in 2000 price. Numbers in parentheses are shares of
intensive margin or extensive margin within each group.
The decomposition result for ownership type is in Table 1.7. Although foreign
firms were dominant in the export growth, the results of the breakdown of export
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growth are similar across the firm types except for state-owned firms. The fact that
more export growth is contributed by the extensive margin than by the intensive
margin applies to all firm types except state-owned firms. This again implies that
the net entry of firms into the export market is a more important factor than the
growth in exports per firm for the export boom. The large, negative role of the ex-
tensive margin for state-owned firms has its institutional reasons. Primarily due to
the state-initiated reshuffling, merging, ownership transformation, and closing-up
of state-owned enterprises, the state-owned sector contracted dramatically, reflect-
ed in the decreasing number of firms.
Table 1.7. Sources of export value growth (by ownership)
Full CASIF
Non-state State HMT Foreign
Export value (2000) 445.9 143.0 217.6 312.0
Export value (2007) 2016.6 218.0 1021.1 2570.1
Change (2000/2007) 1057.7 75.0 803.5 2258.1
Intensive margin 0.143 (42.8%) 0.088 (550.0%) 0.067 (39.2%) 0.211 (44.0%)
Extensive margin 0.191 (57.2%) -0.072 (-450%) 0.104 (60.8%) 0.269 (56.0%)
Balanced CASIF
Non-state State HMT Foreign
Export value (2000) 96.2 17.2 37.8 88.5
Export value (2007) 380.9 71.9 77.8 306.4
Change (2000/2007) 284.7 54.7 40 217.9
Intensive margin 0.453 (95.0%) 0.098 (107.7%) 0.067 (100%) 0.339 (92.9%)
Extensive margin 0.024 (5.0%) -0.007 (-7.7%) -0.000 (0.0%) 0.026 (7.1%)
Notes. Export values and their change are measured in billion CNY in 2000 price. Numbers in parentheses are shares of
intensive margin or extensive margin within each group.
To see how the two margins differ across industries, we present the decomposi-
tion results for each two-digit industry in Tables 1.8 and 1.9. Industries are ordered
in ascending order of the share of intensive margin. As has been found before, the
electronics industry is the largest source of export growth and its contribution is
even more pronounced in Table 1.9 where the extensive margin is significantly re-
duced due to the reason explained before. In the top part of Table 1.8, the industries
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have higher extensive margins than intensive margins, while in the bottom part the
relationship is reversed. A closer look at the industries reveals that the industries in
the top part are those typically labour-intensive industries while those in the bottom
part are mainly capital/technology-intensive ones. We interpret this as evidence of
the labour-intensive industries having a higher degree of net entry of new firms in
the export market than capital-intensive industries. An explanation is that since
the labour-intensive industries have lower entry costs, firms in these industries are
more responsive to changes in trade barriers, and more reductions in trade barriers
related to these products took place in overseas markets. For example, the termina-
tion of the quota restrictions imposed by the MFA in 2005 boosted an extraordinary
increase of Chinese textile exports to developed countries. In fact, it was indeed one
of China’s main motivations to join the WTO – to create a favourable environment
for its labour-intensive firms to export more easily to the world.
Another issue we are interested in is how the technology related to the exports
changed over time. Particularly, we want to know whether Chinese exports had
become more technology-intensive over time. A problem with the CASIF data set
is that it contains detailed technology information related to, for example, work-
ers’ educations, skills, R&D investment, and so on, but they are not available for
each year of the sample period. Because of this reason, we restrict our sample
to a balanced panel where each firm reported information on any of the technolo-
gy measures for at least one year. We are then able to track the technology level
of each firm by exploiting this information. We label two groups of firms within
each industry – higher technology group and lower technology group for each of
these technology measures. To extend firms’ technology information to other years
where the information is missing, we assume that firms in one technology group
do not transit to the other group over the sample period. For example, in respect of
education, we define the higher technology group as being those firms with their e-
ducation index rankings in the top 25% percentiles and the lower technology group
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Table 1.8. Sources of export value growth (full CASIF, by industry)
Industry
Exp. val.
(2000)
Exp. val.
(2007)
Change
(2000/2007)
Int.
margin
Ext.
margin
% Int.
margin
% Ext.
margin
Leather/fur/feather 63.8 168.4 104.5 0.0038 0.0184 17.3% 82.7%
Non-metallic minerals 24.7 67.5 42.7 0.0018 0.0073 19.6% 80.4%
Plastics 34.2 120.2 86.0 0.0037 0.0146 20.3% 79.7%
Metal products 50.0 166.0 116.0 0.0053 0.0193 21.7% 78.3%
Textiles 138.2 333.1 194.9 0.0117 0.0297 28.3% 71.7%
Furniture 12.1 79.9 67.8 0.0042 0.0102 29.2% 70.8%
Clothing 94.5 270.5 176.0 0.0131 0.0243 35.1% 64.9%
Office equipments 34.1 107.7 73.6 0.0055 0.0101 35.4% 64.6%
Non-ferrous metals 19.7 54.6 34.9 0.0029 0.0045 38.8% 61.2%
Timber/wood 7.2 46.7 39.5 0.0033 0.0051 39.4% 60.6%
Electrical equipments 71.3 470.0 398.6 0.0358 0.0488 42.3% 57.7%
Printing 2.6 19.5 16.9 0.0016 0.0020 43.5% 56.5%
Processing of foods 36.9 107.4 70.5 0.0065 0.0085 43.6% 56.4%
Rubber 15.1 60.5 45.4 0.0042 0.0054 43.9% 56.1%
General machinery 39.4 218.1 178.8 0.0172 0.0208 45.2% 54.8%
Transport equipments 43.6 330.2 286.5 0.0296 0.0312 48.7% 51.3%
Special machinery 13.7 108.4 94.7 0.0099 0.0102 49.2% 50.8%
Electronic equipments 257.9 2402.2 2144.3 0.2360 0.2195 51.8% 48.2%
Measuring instruments 30.4 171.0 140.6 0.0160 0.0139 53.6% 46.4%
Raw chemical materials 44.2 178.0 133.8 0.0156 0.0128 55.1% 44.9%
Chemical fibers 3.0 17.7 14.7 0.0018 0.0013 58.2% 41.8%
Manufacturing of foods 9.7 38.3 28.6 0.0035 0.0025 58.3% 41.7%
Paper products 9.8 45.3 35.5 0.0046 0.0029 61.4% 38.6%
Medicines 16.0 47.1 31.1 0.0043 0.0023 64.8% 35.2%
Ferrous metals 30.6 169.7 139.1 0.0192 0.0104 64.9% 35.1%
Beverages 4.1 14.8 10.7 0.0016 0.0006 71.7% 28.3%
Petroleum/coking 11.7 13.3 1.5 0.0003 0.0000 100.0% 0.0%
Notes. Export values and their change are measured in billion CNY in 2000 price. The industries are arranged in ascending
order of the share of intensive margin.
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Table 1.9. Sources of export value growth (balanced CASIF, by industry)
Industry
Exp. val.
(2000)
Exp. val.
(2007)
Change
(2000/2007)
Int.
margin
Ext.
margin
% Int.
margin
% Ext.
margin
Chemical fibers 0.3 1.9 1.6 0.0017 0.0009 63.9% 36.1%
Printing 1.0 4.0 3.1 0.0036 0.0015 70.2% 29.8%
Non-metallic minerals 6.2 10.5 4.3 0.0054 0.0018 74.6% 25.4%
Non-ferrous metals 3.2 7.6 4.3 0.0056 0.0017 76.6% 23.4%
Rubber 3.6 11.5 7.8 0.0103 0.0028 78.9% 21.1%
Ferrous metals 10.2 60.7 50.5 0.0685 0.0161 81.0% 19.0%
Timber/wood 2.1 8.3 6.2 0.0084 0.0020 81.0% 19.0%
Transport equipments 9.0 52.7 43.7 0.0622 0.0109 85.1% 14.9%
Plastics 6.1 11.9 5.8 0.0088 0.0009 91.1% 8.9%
Electrical equipments 18.2 72.9 54.6 0.0837 0.0078 91.5% 8.5%
Manufact. of foods 2.3 5.0 2.7 0.0041 0.0004 92.1% 7.9%
Medicines 3.4 7.5 4.1 0.0063 0.0005 92.5% 7.5%
Special machinery 4.1 16.0 11.9 0.0184 0.0015 92.6% 7.4%
Metal products 6.7 18.2 11.6 0.0179 0.0014 92.7% 7.3%
General machinery 7.2 25.3 18.1 0.0282 0.0021 93.1% 6.9%
Leather/fur/feather 10.3 20.5 10.2 0.0161 0.0010 94.2% 5.8%
Clothing 16.4 31.8 15.4 0.0246 0.0011 95.6% 4.4%
Electronic equipments 62.3 321.3 259.0 0.4154 0.0183 95.8% 4.2%
Beverages 0.7 1.2 0.5 0.0008 0.0000 96.1% 3.9%
Furniture 1.9 5.4 3.5 0.0058 0.0001 98.4% 1.6%
Measur. instruments 7.1 21.7 14.6 0.0242 0.0002 99.0% 1.0%
Raw chemical matls. 10.0 29.2 19.2 0.0320 0.0001 99.7% 0.3%
Textiles 27.8 51.6 23.8 0.0414 -0.0015 103.8% -3.8%
Office equipments 7.6 12.9 5.3 0.0104 -0.0014 116.0% -16.0%
Paper products 3.5 12.9 9.4 0.0188 -0.0031 119.9% -19.9%
Processing of foods 7.1 13.2 6.1 0.0122 -0.0021 120.1% -20.1%
Petroleum/coking 1.3 1.4 0.1 0.0006 -0.0005 475.6% -375.6%
Notes. Export values and their change are measured in billion CNY in 2000 price. The industries are arranged in the
ascending order of the share of intensive margin.
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as in the bottom 25% percentiles. Education index is defined as the proportion of
workers with higher-education degrees. It should be unlikely that firms with this
proportion in the bottom 25% could climb up to the top 25% in the industry, or vice
versa, in no more than eight years.
After these definitions, the shares of export value by these groups are calculated
and the changes in share are decomposed in the same way as above. The results
are given in Table 1.10. From this table, it is quite clear that all higher technology
groups had their share of export value increased over time while lower technology
groups exhibited the opposite trends. This is due to the disproportionately higher
growth of exports in the more technologically sophisticated groups. We see this as
evidence of increasing technology content of exports. Interestingly, the extensive
margin for the lower technology groups is either near zero or negative, indicating
that there was net exit among those firms. Although the decomposition by the
balanced panel does not capture the full picture of the contributions from the two
margins, the contrast between the relative sizes of the two margins offers further
evidence that the technology level of Chinese exports had been rising significantly.
1.3.4 Further decompositions of the intensive and extensivemar-
gins
With similar methodology, we also decompose E¯ and NE into two components, as
described in Equations (1.3.8) to (1.3.13). The decomposition results of E¯ are in
Table 1.11. The intensive margin (e¯) here represents the export value per product
and the extensive margin (v) represents the number of products exported per ex-
porting firm. We apply the decomposition both to the full CCTS sample and the
matched CASIF-CCTS sample. The results are similar. The intensive margin is
positive and the magnitude is large, while the extensive margin is negative and it-
s magnitude is also large. The fact that the two margins work in opposing ways
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Table 1.10. Sources of export value growth
(balanced CASIF, by technology group)
Share of
exp. val.
(2000)
Share of
exp. val.
(2007)
Contribution
to exp. val.
growth
Intensive
margin
Extensive
margin
Education ≥ 75% pctl. 31.2% 47.6% 54.1% 49.4% 4.7%
Education ≤ 25% pctl. 14.2% 9.9% 8.2% 8.4% -0.2%
Skill ≥ 75% pctl. 21.8% 34.7% 39.9% 38.3% 1.6%
Skill ≤ 25% pctl. 34.3% 25.7% 22.2% 22.0% 0.2%
R&D intensity ≥ 50% pctl. 16.1% 30.2% 35.9% 30.7% 5.2%
No R&D expenditure 49.2% 34.4% 28.5% 29.1% -0.6%
Worker-training ≥ 50% pctl. 38.9% 55.6% 62.3% 57.8% 4.5%
No worker-training 18.8% 11.8% 9.0% 9.1% -0.1%
New product intensity ≥ 50%
pctl.
16.9% 22.1% 24.4% 20.0% 4.4%
No new products 53.7% 33.6% 25.5% 26.0% -0.5%
Notes. The second and the third columns are the shares of different technology groups in the total export value of each year.
The fourth column is the share of export value growth of different technology groups in total export value growth. The last
two columns break down the fourth column into the intensive margin and the extensive margin.
has its implication. The number of firms entering into the export market was far
more than the increased number of product categories. This consequently leads to
an increasing export volume per product and a decreasing number of products per
exporting firm. New firms starting to export, among other factors, seems to have
been the key driving force of the Chinese export growth.
The decomposition results of NE are in Tables 1.13 to 1.15. Now the intensive
margin is the proportion of exporters in all firms, and the extensive margin is the
number of all firms. Since by construction the balanced panel excludes those firms
which entered or exited during the period, we focus on full sample results. These
tables give results by sector in various aspects. But all of them point to the same
finding. That is, the extensive margin dominates the intensive margin. It has large,
positive magnitudes as opposed to the intensive margin which is negative and low
in magnitude throughout the tables. This means that there were disproportionately
more new firms than new exporting firms during the period. All the sectors (d-
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ifferent regions, ownership types, and industries) grew faster than the exporting
firms within each sector in terms of the number of firms, and this highlights the
importance of sectoral expansion in the export boom.
Table 1.11. Sources of growth in the mean export value E¯
Full CCTS Matched CASIF-CCTS
E¯2003 4,575,147.4 6,200,965.5
E¯2006 5,661,913.7 7,637,733.1
∆E¯ = E¯2006− E¯2003 1,086,766.3 1,436,767.6
Intensive margin (e¯) 3.840 (384.0%) 3.961 (396.1%)
Extensive margin (v) -2.840 (-284.0%) -2.961 (-296.1%)
Notes. E¯Et =
e¯t×nt
NEt
≡ e¯t × vt . Export values are measured in thousand USD.
Table 1.12. Sources of growth in the number of exporters NE
Full CASIF Balanced CASIF
Number of exporters (2000) 27,864 4,980
Number of exporters (2007) 63,648 5,230
Change (2000/2007) 35,802 250
Intensive margin -.059 (-5.9%) 1.000 (100.0%)
Extensive margin 1.059 (105.9%) 0.000 (0.0%)
Notes. NEt = P
E
t Nt .
Table 1.13. Sources of growth in the number of exporters NE
(full CASIF, by region)
Coast Inland
Number of exporters (2000) 24,267 3,597
Number of exporters (2007) 57,620 6,029
Change (2000/2007) 33,353 2,432
Intensive margin -0.158 (-16.9%) -.008 (-11.8%)
Extensive margin 1.091 (116.9%) .076 (111.8%)
Notes. Numbers in parentheses are shares of intensive margin or extensive margin within
each group.
32
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Table 1.14. Sources of growth in the number of exporters NE
(full CASIF, by ownership)
Non-state State HMT Foreign
Number of exporters
(2000)
15,960 3,571 4,596 3,737
Number of exporters
(2007)
38,257 9,84 11,937 12,471
Change (2000/2007) 22,297 -2,587 7,341 8,734
Int. margin -0.175 (-28.1%) 0.011 (-15.3%) -0.011 (-5.4%) -0.014 (-5.7%)
Ext. margin 0.798 (128.1%) -0.083 (115.3%) 0.216 (105.4%) 0.258 (105.7%)
Notes. Numbers in parentheses are shares of intensive margin or extensive margin within each group.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis aims to address some important issues related to the behaviour of Chi-
nese manufacturing firms in international trade, some more policy relevant and
some others carrying more theoretical implications. Studying the production and
trade patterns of Chinese firms in a period of tremendous export growth is of special
interests for two main reasons.
First, given the increasing share of China in world trade, it is worth looking
into firms who contribute to China’s imports and exports to see how these produc-
tion and trade units has shaped the aggregate growth story. Particularly, revealing
how Chinese firms engage in production and trade will greatly help us better un-
derstand the nature and extent of the potential impacts of China’s unique economic
development path is having on the world economy.
Second, in the recent decade, China has taken a series of big steps towards trade
liberalisation, including, most notably, its entry into the World Trade Organisation
(WTO). China’s accession into the WTO (and its economic reforms in preparation
for the WTO entry) brought China much closer to the outside world: on the do-
mestic market side, it gradually dismantled protectionist policies towards foreign
investors and private firms, and on the trade side, it significantly reduced tariff bar-
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Table 1.15. Sources of growth in the number of exporters NE
(full CASIF, by industry)
Industry NE2000 N
E
2007 ∆N
E
Int.
margin
Ext.
margin
% Int.
margin
% Ext.
margin
Non-ferrous metals 328 616 288 -0.01 0.01 -81.9% 181.9%
Ferrous metals 254 450 196 0.00 0.01 -61.9% 161.9%
Textiles 3,797 7,172 3,375 -0.06 0.15 -59.9% 159.9%
Medicines 597 867 270 0.00 0.01 -52.7% 152.7%
Chemical fibres 87 180 93 0.00 0.00 -38.7% 138.7%
Clothing 3,435 6,844 3,409 -0.03 0.13 -36.1% 136.1%
Raw chemical materials 1,818 3,381 1,563 -0.01 0.06 -33.7% 133.7%
General machinery 1,721 4,441 2,720 -0.02 0.09 -25.0% 125.0%
Office equipments 1,061 2,249 1,188 -0.01 0.04 -24.1% 124.1%
Leather/fur/feather 1,473 3,306 1,833 -0.01 0.06 -22.9% 122.9%
Paper products 439 781 342 0.00 0.01 -17.8% 117.8%
Measuring instruments 565 1,250 685 0.00 0.02 -15.7% 115.7%
Beverages 260 368 108 0.00 0.00 -15.5% 115.5%
Metal products 1,584 4,107 2,523 -0.01 0.08 -14.1% 114.1%
Timber/wood 417 1,337 920 0.00 0.03 -11.1% 111.1%
Processing of foods 1,264 2,318 1,054 0.00 0.03 -8.4% 108.4%
Rubber 371 814 443 0.00 0.01 -7.9% 107.9%
Plastics 1,230 3,399 2,169 0.00 0.06 -4.3% 104.3%
Electronic equipments 1,502 4,363 2,861 0.00 0.08 -2.1% 102.1%
Manufacturing of foods 572 1,005 433 0.00 0.01 3.9% 96.1%
Electrical equipments 1,546 4,686 3,140 0.01 0.08 9.7% 90.3%
Special machinery 808 2,317 1,509 0.01 0.04 12.0% 88.0%
Transport equipments 881 2,502 1,621 0.01 0.04 19.8% 80.2%
Furniture 369 1,471 1,102 0.01 0.02 21.2% 78.8%
Non-metallic minerals 1,279 2,889 1,610 0.01 0.03 28.3% 71.7%
Printing 150 480 330 0.01 0.00 65.3% 34.7%
Petroleum/coking 56 56 0 0.00 0.00 n.a. n.a.
Notes. Export values and their change are measured in billion CNY in 2000 price. Numbers in parentheses are shares of
intensive margin or extensive margin within each group.
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riers for foreign goods. Such large scale and massive changes in policy, as China’s
key commitment to the WTO member states, result in a large reduction in trade
costs for firms doing business in and with China. Moreover, being part of the WTO
also means China automatically began to enjoy the “Most favoured Nation” (MFN)
status in other countries and thus becomes eligible for equal trade treatments.
Having this process of trade liberalisation as the general background, studies
presented in this thesis either look into some aspects of the globalisation explicit-
ly, or treat changes in external trade environment as a policy shock to investigate
the relationships between changing trade barriers and firm behaviour. This thesis
contains three core chapters, each addressing a specific topic. These chapters are
basically self contained, but exhibit a certain degree of inter-connections under the
big theme of trade liberalisation and behaviour of firms in Chinese manufacturing
sector.
Chapter 2, entitled “Weighing China’s Export Basket: An Account of the Chi-
nese Export Boom”, deals with one of the hottest contemporary topics regarding
the extent of China’s value-added in the global production chain. Given China’s
enormous volume of goods exported to the world, many scholars have their con-
cerns. A widely-accepted observation is that the product composition is becoming
more and more similar to that of high-income countries. If this is true, then Chi-
na’s exports are not only competing with those of developing countries in the world
market, but have also been moving to replacing products produced by developed
economies. In other words, according to this argument, there has been a significant
upgrade of export structure from China and that could be crowding out high-income
countries’ exports. These perceptions have been further influenced by some recent
studies showing that, given its low level of GDP per capita, the value distribution of
China’s export products is more similar to that of developed countries than would
be expected.
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However, one important fact that has been ignored by these evaluations is that
more than half of China’s exports is contributed by processing trade. Processing
trade is different from ordinary trade in that it heavily uses imported materials to
export; by some processing exports, all inputs, only except labour, are from other
countries. Thus, ignoring the prevalence of processing trade in China’s trade is like-
ly to largely overstate China’s real contribution to the export product value. In this
chapter, we explicitly consider the speciality with processing trade, and re-assess
two important questions: (a) how has the domestic value-added of Chinese exports
changed? (b) how has the technology intensity of Chinese exports changed? Ap-
plying a modified version of the method of Hummels et al. (2001) which estimates
domestic value-added of exports, we give a “corrected” valuation of China’s value-
added in its exports. Our answer in a nutshell is: previous results have indeed been
largely overestimated. By our estimates, less than half of China’s export value was
from its own value-added. Furthermore, we use a range of technology measures to
estimate the technology intensity of Chinese exports. Our finding is that China’s
technology intensity of exports is still very low as most of the technological im-
provement observed in final export value is from imported materials, a result that
seems to contrast some most popular views (e.g. Rodrik, 2006; Schott, 2008).
The integration of China with the world not only exerts immense impact on oth-
er countries, but also brings about a changing environment for firms in China. As
said, China’s WTO entry is a double-edged sword. In one respect, while the door of
China is open wider to foreign investors, Chinese firms have easier access to foreign
markets too. One example is the textile industry. For a long time, developed coun-
tries protected their domestic producers from imports of textiles and apparel from
developing countries, under the framework of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA)
which allows major importers (such as the U.S. and the E.U.) to impose quotas on
textile and apparel imports from labour-abundant exporters (such as China, India,
and Bangladesh). However, since China gained its membership to the free trade
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club of the WTO at the end of 2011, it automatically enjoyed the textile quota lib-
eralisation scheme laid out by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), a
succeeding agreement that replaced the MFA in 1995. According to the ATC, all
quantity restrictions on textiles and clothing should terminate on 1 January, 2005,
in accordance with the spirit of the WTO. Understandably, most importers retained
their quotas against developing countries right until the midnight of 31 December,
2004.
From a research point of view, the abrupt removal of quotas offers a unique
and fantastic opportunity to study the behaviour of firms in response to changes in
trade policy. On the one hand, it has been clear both in theory and from evidence
that quota does lead to quality upgrading via a shift in demand towards products of
higher costs/prices (e.g. Falvey, 1979; Feenstra, 2003). Yet, empirically nothing
is known about the quota effect on the supply side. Specifically, while we already
have convincing evidence on how quotas affect product quality at the product-level
in the market, we still lack information on how firms actually respond to quotas.
When a firm faces changes in the restrictiveness of quotas, it could respond by
entering/exiting the export market or by changing their product composition and
product shares. On the other hand, while recent emerging multi-product firm mod-
els could explain why and how firms respond to changing market environment, it
has been challenging to empirically test or evaluate these theories because in reality
trade policies are usually complicated and cannot be exclusively related to specific
firms or products.
However, the removal of MFA quotas created a policy shock that was massive
in scale, discrete in timing, and exogenous to firms and consumers in the textile
industry, and importantly, it could be linked to individual firms and products as we
are able to tell in data which products a firm exported and which products were
subject to quotas.
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Chapter 3, entitled “Quota Restrictions and Price Adjustments of Chinese Tex-
tile Exports to the U.S.”, studies the effect of the MFA quota termination in 2005 on
the prices of Chinese textile and clothing products exported to the U.S. by Chinese
firms. While Harrigan and Barrows (2009) have looked at the effect of the MFA
termination on product prices in the U.S. import market, ours focuses on the side of
the Chinese exports, thus supplementing their work by providing a mirror image of
the story. In addition, our data is at the firm-product-level, more disaggregated than
their product-level data, allowing further analysis regarding firm response. Since
the time of the MFA termination can be exactly identified and the quota removal
did not affect all textile products, we use a “difference-in-difference” approach to
estimate the causal effects of the lift of quotas. We document clear evidence that
firms lower their product prices by 30% on average in face of a sudden removal of
quotas, and also find this effect varies across products and firms: half of the fall in
price is due to firm entry in the export market, and state-firms were least affected
by the quota removal.
The removal of quotas could also trigger intra-firm reallocations, apart from
firm entry and exit. In this regard, Chapter 4, entitled “Quota Restrictions and
Intra-firm Reallocations: The Effect of the MFA Elimination”, extends the study of
Chapter 3 by looking into resource reallocations within exporting firms. We focus
on two aspects of intra-firm adjustments: (a) product scope, that is, the number
of products exported by firms, and (b) product concentration, that is, the value
share of best-sales product in total exports. Theories, with different assumptions on
market structure and looking from different angles, have ambiguous and sometimes
competing predictions on the effect on trade liberalisation on intra-firm reallocation
in the above two aspects (see, among others, Bernard et al. (2011), Eckel and Neary
(2010), and Mayer et al. (2011)). It is not entirely clear how changes in trade costs
would induce firms to change their product mix and product focus.
Instead of taking a general view, the objective of Chapter 4 is specific and clear:
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it only looks at existing exporting firms, and examines how an exporting firm would
alter the number of products it exports and how the distribution of its export sales
would be changed when all quota restrictions were dismantled. Our key findings
are that the liberalisation of MFA quotas induced firms to dramatically expand their
product scope by as much as one third, and meanwhile caused firms to reduce the
weight of their core product by nearly 10 percentage points in their total export
sales as a result of a more diversified product mix. Also interestingly, the analysis
reveals that firms tended to put more weight on the U.S. market compared to the
Japanese market after 2005, suggesting a within-firm cross-destination channel of
resource reallocation induced by quotas.
Another common feature of Chapters 3 and 4 is their explicit considerations
of the quota allocation system in China. Given the fact that the largest fraction of
quotas were allocated through administrative procedures, rather than by the market
(such as open bidding), there may be room for rent-seeking. One conjecture is that
quotas may not be allocated based purely on firms’ efficiency, rather, preferences
could be given to firms that have closer relationships with quota allocation author-
ities. The most obvious example is state-owned firms. According to anecdotal
evidence, it is widely believed that state-owned firms are the most favoured in the
allocation and thus are least likely to be restrained by the quota system. If it is the
case, state-owned would be the least affected when quotas terminated. Results in
both chapters support this conjecture.
We conclude the main findings and implications, as well as point out future
directions of research in Chapter 5. The Appendices contain extra materials which
are relevant to but are not presented in the main texts.
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Weighing China’s Export Basket:
An Account of the Chinese Export Boom
2.1 Introduction
How much domestic value-added is there in China’s exports to the world? How
technologically sophisticated are these exports? These are the basic questions that
we try to answer in this study. Among all the current issues regarding the impact of
China’s trade on the rest of the world, these are two fundamental questions which
have arisen in policy discussions, academic studies and anecdotal evidence (see,
among others, Amiti and Freund, 2010, 2007; Rodrik, 2006; Schott, 2008). They
are of particular importance in terms of the deep influence that China’s growing
trade has been exerting and could exert on other countries in the near future.
By and large, the above concerns stem from the increasing impacts felt from the
extraordinarily rapid growth of China’s trade value compared to any other country
in the world. From a historical point of view, China’s trade boom has been one of
the major engines and results of its miraculously rapid economic growth since 1978
when the reform and opening-up policy was launched. Its rapid expansion in trade
is particularly prominent in recent years. According to the statistics by the WTO,
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China’s share in the world’s merchandise exports grew dramatically from 3.3% in
1997 to 8.7% in 2007, which makes it now the largest exporter only behind Ger-
many. In the meantime, its share in world trade in manufactures jumped from 4.7%
in 2000 to 12% in 2007, bypassing all other countries and as a result becoming a
real “world factory”. However, a profound question that follows naturally is how
much value-added has been created in this factory. In other words, has this factory
been an innovation studio that adds much value to the final products or is it still
just an assembly workshop that imports materials and exports high-end products
but contributes little to their final value?
Answers to these questions are crucial to the rigorous assessment of China’s
role and impact on the world trade and a number of other related economic issues.
More specifically, having a correct perception of China’s domestic content in its
exports is important in at least two mutually related aspects. First, the composi-
tion of the basket of China’s exports brings about different competitive pressures
to countries of different income levels. If China exports more higher-end products,
developed countries are expected to lose more market share of these products, and
the same effect holds for less developed countries if China’s exports remain highly
labour-intensive.1 Second, the above effect can also translate to the factor market.
As China’s share in the world trade is large, according to Samuelson-Stolper the-
orem, competition from China’s exports could affect the wages of other countries’
labour force with different skill levels. This latter concern has been particularly
strong and prevailing among some researchers and policy makers.2
In this chapter, we use new, detailed and comprehensive linked firm-transac-
1For the latter impact, see, among others, the papers by Lall and Albaladejo (2004) and the
collection of studies in Lederman et al. (2009) for their analysis of China’s substantial export growth
on other developing countries.
2See, for example, Krugman (1995), Freeman (1995), and Sachs and Shatz (1996). However,
there are also authors such as Wood (1995) who hold the opposite view that imports from major de-
veloping countries like China and India do not hurt both skilled and unskilled workers in developed
countries, mainly because these imported products are no longer produced in developed countries.
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tion-level data to look into the export boom by examining China’s domestic con-
tent and technological sophistication. The data we use comprise an annual census
of all large- and medium-sized manufacturing firms in China over the period 2000-
2007, and a monthly transaction-level database of all merchandise passing through
Chinese customs from January 2003 to December 2006. We are then able to link
the two data sets together to get a linked firm-transaction-level data set, which is
the first of its kind among all existing micro-level data sets on Chinese manufac-
turing sector. The rich information enables us to document a series of new facts
about the Chinese export boom. By doing this, our study contributes both to the
growing literature which describes the Chinese export boom, and to the literature
on measuring value-added creation in the global value chain.
More specifically, this chapter focuses on the following two main questions:
1. How has the domestic value-added of Chinese exports changed? Does the
fact that processing and assembly are such an important fraction of exports
mean that the domestic content of exports is particularly small?
2. How has the technology intensity of Chinese exports changed? Have Chinese
exporting firms become more skill and capital intensive, or does the reliance
on processing and assembly mean that Chinese exporters are in fact still quite
labour intensive?
An overview of this study is given as below. First, because we observe imports
and exports by firms, we are able to provide a new measure of the value-added in
Chinese exports by examining the extent to which the export value is from imported
intermediates and from domestic value-added. We show that the foreign content
of Chinese exports is much higher than previously estimated, and therefore the
domestic content lower. On average, the foreign content in Chinese exports was
about 70%, meaning that China’s own value-added only accounted for 30% in its
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huge volume of exports.
Second, our unique data set allows us to examine the characteristics of firms
which contributed to the growth in exports, because we have measures of firms’
technological and human capital inputs. Particularly, we have information on the
skill composition of the workforce, R&D expenditure and the development of new
products. The results show that lower-technology industries tended to export higher
proportions of their products than higher-technology industries, which suggests
that China’s comparative advantages had not actually changed much. Moreover,
it is also revealed that a higher proportion of domestic value-added in exports was
produced by relatively low technology firms than was final value of exports. This
finding is novel and implies that the technological improvement during the export
boom had not changed the overall technology intensity of Chinese export value-
added as much as implied from only looking at the export final value, a result that
contrasts with some popular views.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we de-
scribe the sources and characteristics of the data to be used in this study in more
detail. Section 2.3 proposes a new measurement method of vertical specialisation
that takes into account the speciality of the Chinese exports. We then assess the
technological intensity of Chinese exports evaluated both at the final export value
and domestic value-added in exports, and discuss the implications in Section 2.4.
Section 2.5 summarises and concludes.
2.2 Data
There are two main sources of micro data, firm-level and transaction-level. The
firm-level data comes from the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (CASIF)
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). The transaction-level data
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comes from the database of the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS) which is
compiled and maintained by the General Administration of Customs of China.
2.2.1 Firm data
The CASIF survey data that we use covers the period 2000 to 2007. Two groups
of firms are included in the survey. The first is all state-owned firms, and the
second is firms of other ownership types with annual sales above 5 million Chinese
yuan (CNY), equivalent to around 700 thousand U.S. Dollars (USD) during that
period. On average, more than 200 thousand firms are included each year, and
according to the description of the survey, they account for around 95% of total
Chinese industrial output and 98% of industrial exports, covering nearly 40 two-
digit industries, of which 30 belong to manufacturing industries, and spreading
across all 31 mainland provinces and municipalities.
The NBSC required firms to report details on their production activities, finan-
cial measures and other basic characteristics such as ownership structure, location
and industry. In addition, each firm reports their export value of shipments (if any),
including those exported by the production firms themselves and/or through trad-
ing agents.3 The data cleaning process is described in detail in Appendices A.1 and
A.2.
2.2.2 Trade data
The second data source is the database of the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics
(CCTS) which is compiled and maintained by the General Administration of Cus-
3Firms are given assurances that information from this survey will not be released to the public
or be used against them by other governmental agencies, such as tax authorities (see Cai and Liu
(2009)). For these reasons, firms have less incentive to misreport the information and the data is
less likely to be manipulated by local governments.
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toms of China.4 It records, monthly, all merchandise transactions passing through
Chinese customs from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2006, containing firm iden-
tification (name, address, ownership), product code, value of imports and exports,
quantity of goods, customs regimes, means of transportation, customs code, origin
and destination country. We exclude service trade from the original data as it is not
relevant to our study.5 We also collapse the data to yearly frequency for consistency
with the firm-level data.6
The product codes of traded goods are eight-digit Harmonised Commodity De-
scription and Coding System (HS) codes. The export and import values are re-
ported as free on board (FOB) values in USD. The corresponding quantities are
reported in various units depending on the nature of the goods.7 Each transaction is
also classified under one of 18 customs regimes.8 We collapse these original trade
regimes into four broad categories: ordinary, processing and assembling, process-
ing with imported materials and others. In this chapter, the term “processing” is
equivalent to “inward processing” under which certain goods can be brought into
Chinese customs territory for manufacturing or processing with exportation. The
regime of “outward processing” refers to trade under which goods in free circula-
tion within Chinese Customs territory may be temporarily exported for manufac-
turing, processing abroad, and then re-imported. However, this latter regime only
accounts for 0.004% of China’s total trade value in 2005. Table 2.1 shows that
processing trade alone, including both processing and assembling and processing
with imported materials, accounts for around 40% of all imports and 50% of all
exports. These shares have remained quite stable over the limited period of the
customs data.
4This relatively new data has been recently explored by, among others, Manova and Zhang
(2009, 2012), Fernandes and Tang (2011).
5See Appendix A.3 for more details.
6Both the firm survey and the customs data record information from the 1 January to 31 Decem-
ber of each year.
7For example, kilograms, sets, pairs, metres, square metres.
8See Table A3 in Appendix A.3 for a complete list.
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Table 2.1. Shares of imports and exports by major customs
regime
Imports (%)
Year Ordinary
Processing and
assembling
Processing with
imported materials Others
2003 45.58 9.30 30.05 15.06
2004 44.25 9.42 30.01 16.32
2005 42.41 10.01 31.42 16.17
2006 42.12 9.20 31.33 17.35
Exports (%)
Year Ordinary
Processing and
assembling
Processing with
imported materials Others
2003 41.47 12.39 42.83 3.31
2004 40.98 11.56 43.80 3.66
2005 41.25 11.03 43.74 3.99
2006 42.90 9.76 42.96 4.38
2.2.3 Matched firm-transaction data
Merging the two datasets described above allows us to link firm production with
firm trade. We can then examine, for example, the contribution of imported inter-
mediates to total exports and the skill intensity of exports. The firm- and trade-
data do not use consistent firm identification numbers, so we use firm name as the
matching criteria. Firm name is a reliable match variable because it is ruled that
no firms can have the same name in the same administrative region, and given that
virtually all firms contain their local region name as part of their firm name. About
50% of the exporting firms in the cleaned CASIF data can be matched to the cus-
toms trade records and they account for 60% of exports recorded in the cleaned
CASIF data.9 The remaining 50% of the exporting firms are not matched. The
most likely explanation for this is that these firms export via trading agents and
therefore do not appear in the customs records. The sample of matched firms is
summarised in Table 2.2.
9See Appendix A.4 for details regarding the matching procedures.
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Table 2.2. Summary of the matched CASIF-CCTS sample
Year
Number of
firmsa
Number of
customs-
registered firmsb
Number of
exportersa
Output (bn CNY)a Exports (bn CNY)a Imports (bn)b Exports (bn)b
Nominal Real Nominal Real USD CNY USD CNY
2003 22,787 22,781 16,972 3,839.1 4,026.9 1,188.2 1,260.1 103.4 855.4 123.6 1023.5
2004 34,410 34,397 27,748 5,315.5 5,347.3 1,724.4 1,787.8 145.6 1207.4 174.9 1447.3
2005 37,787 37,766 27,979 6,762.1 6,640.2 2,125.1 2,182.1 173.4 1417.9 235.9 1930.8
2006 42,492 42,470 31,281 8,289.4 8,129.6 2,805.5 2,898.0 203.9 1620.7 293.4 2236.4
Notes.
aInformation originally from the CASIF sample.
bInformation originally from the CCTS sample and converted to the currency unit of yuan when necessary.
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Three points are worth noting. First, there are gaps between the number of
firms and the number of exporters in Table 2.2. For example in 2003, there are
22,787 firms in the CASIF data appearing in the matched sample, but only 16,972
of them are exporters. The reason is that some firms are importers and do not
export anything in some years. These importers account for about one-fourth of all
matched firms.
Second, normally each firm in the matched sample should have a unique firm
code and a unique customs registration code. But Table 2.2 shows the number of
customs-registered firms is slightly less than that of firms identified by firm codes
in the CASIF data, implying that some customs registration codes correspond to
multiple firm codes. This could happen if some firms changed their firm codes in
the CASIF data (for example because of ownership changes or simply typos) but
did not change their registration code in the the customs data. However, such cases
are very rare and are unlikely to have a significant effect on our analysis.
Third, we have two different measures of exports from the two data sets, in
different currency units. After we convert USD into CNY using yearly average
exchange rate, we find that exports from the CASIF data are consistently 10%-
25% higher than exports from the CCTS data. Apart from the inaccuracy of using
yearly average exchange rates instead of actual exchange rates for each transaction,
the most likely explanation for this discrepancy is that some of the matched firms
export products themselves, and at the same time export through trading agents.
While the goods exported through trading agents are counted as part of the pro-
duction firms’ exports in the CASIF data, they are recorded under the name of the
trading agents in the CCTS data.
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2.3 The Domestic Value-added of Exports
In this section, we propose a new method of measuring domestic value-added of
exports by taking into account the speciality of processing trade, and apply it to
our unique micro data in order to reveal how much China’s domestic value-added
is contained in its exports.
2.3.1 Review of related studies
An important part of the growth in world trade in recent decades is the results of
vertical specialisation. Vertical specialisation refers to the phenomenon of frag-
mentation of global production across countries. In the global production network,
each country only engages in certain stages of the whole production process where
it has comparative advantages. With the development of global production, cross-
border transfer of materials and goods with this purpose has been playing an in-
creasingly dominant role in the world trade (Hummels et al., 2001; Yi, 2003; Dean
et al., 2008).
Hummels et al. (2001) (HIY hereafter) first propose a rigorous measure of ver-
tical specialisation, before which there have been many case studies and anecdotes
spread widely in the economic and business study literature but none of them has
a clear and tractable conceptual framework. The measure in HIY is defined as the
value share of imported intermediates in exports and is thus interpreted as the “im-
ported input content of exports”. Specifically, it is constructed by scaling the value
of exports by the proportion of imported intermediates in total output:
VSHIY =
(
M
Y
)
·X , (2.3.1)
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where M is imported intermediates, X is exports, and Y is total output.
By applying this measure to ten OECD countries using input/output tables (I/O
tables), HIY show that 21% of these countries’ exports can be accounted for by
vertical specialisation. Koopman et al. (2010) modifies the standard I/O models
by adjusting for the flow of intermediates across multiple countries, and find that
overall 36% of China’s exports are value-added from foreign countries. Dean et al.
(2007) apply this method to China by making use of the Chinese I/O tables and cus-
toms trade data. They show that about 35% of China’s exports could be attributed
to imported intermediates in 2002, and there had been a 6.5 percentage-point in-
crease between 1997 and 2002.
Nevertheless, a problem with the HIY approach, as seen in Eq. 2.3.1, is that
it assumes that imported inputs are used evenly in production for domestic sales
and in production for exports. If imported inputs are used more intensively in
production for exports, this approach will underestimate the degree of vertical spe-
cialisation. In the example of China, processing exports are prevailing and even
dominant in some industries, and this may result in a more intensive use of im-
ported materials in processing exports than in production for normal exports or
domestic sales. We have already known from Table 2.1 that processing trade plays
a dominant role in Chinese exports. Apart from that, foreign firms and processing
firms have contributed a large fraction of the growth in Chinese exports. This sug-
gests an important role for vertical specialisation: Chinese exporters are possibly
a relatively low value-added segment of an international production chain. The
prevalence of processing trade in China, where firms import materials to produce
final or semi-final products to export to original foreign suppliers, highlights the
importance of considering vertical specialisation in China’s trade.
In view of this problem, Chen et al. (2004) and Koopman et al. (2008) modify
the method of Hummels et al. (2001) by splitting the standard I/O tales into sep-
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arate tables for processing trade and other types of productions (productions for
ordinary trade and domestic sales). Combining these new I/O tables with trade
data, their calculations produce a higher degree of vertical specialisation. For ex-
ample, by Koopman et al.’s (2008) estimation for the year 2002, China’s share of
vertical specialisation is around 50% in general and as high as 80% for some in-
dustries.10 These numbers, as opposed to those in Dean et al. (2007), reflect in turn
the significance of processing exports in China.11
2.3.2 The measuring method
Domestic value-added is the value of exports when the content of vertical speciali-
sation is subtracted. We modify the HIY method of measuring the extent of vertical
specialisation by taking into account the prevalence of processing trade in China.
Because processing firms typically import a large fraction of their final output, ig-
noring this will lead to underestimates of the domestic content of Chinese exports.
Different from the conventional approaches which rely on trade statistics and I/O
tables to calculate the vertical specialisation or domestic content, we will go down
directly to the firm level to see how much a typical firm imports its intermediates
from abroad and how much it exports. To do this, we will base our analysis on
the unique firm-transaction level data set which has never been used before. By
focusing on pure exporting firms which sell all their products abroad, we are able
to obtain the first micro-level evidence of how much foreign content is contained
in Chinese exports.
We note that all the above work on China, i.e. Chen et al. (2004) and Koopman
10Chen et al.’s (2004) study gets a similar result, however it only focuses on the trade between
China and the United States for 1995.
11In a later study, Dean et al. (2008) extend their previous work by comparing the method using
standard I/O tables and that using separate I/O tables as in Koopman et al. (2008). The latter
method is found to generate a systematically larger degree of vertical specialisation than the former,
and more interestingly, the gap between the two estimates is positively correlated with the share of
processing exports in total exports at the sector level.
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et al. (2008), are basically cross-sectional and their time periods do not cover more
recent years after 2002. For China, however, the period under our study, 2000 to
2007, is a time when China was increasingly more integrated to the world trade
and the trade barriers were also significantly reduced in order to be in accordance
with the WTO rules. Over time, it had been easier not only for foreign goods to
be imported into China but also for Chinese products to be sold in other countries.
Therefore a natural result of this change in trade environment is that China could
import more and export more simultaneously over time, which could have affect-
ed the domestic content. Our micro data allows for exploration of this over-time
change.
As a first step, we identify two groups of imported intermediates in the trade
data: imported intermediates for processing trade and imported intermediates for
ordinary trade. Figure 2.1 illustrates the different modes of vertical specialisation
for ordinary exports and processing exports, modified from Hummels (2001, Fig-
ure 1). For ordinary trade (see subfigure (a)), the imported intermediates can be
partly used in production for domestic sales and partly used in production for or-
dinary exports. We identify imported intermediates in all ordinary imports (for ex-
ample imports to be used as capital and consumption goods) by the classification of
the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) and its HS concordance (see Appendix A.6
for the details). However, for the ordinary imported intermediates, because we
cannot tell by the data how much proportion of it is actually used in production
for domestic sales and how much is used in production for exports, we still rely
on the HIY method to impute the proportion of ordinary imported intermediates in
exports.12
For processing trade (see subfigure (b)), firms import materials or parts through
customs, and then export through customs after these materials are processed or
12Since there are no obvious clues on the final directions of ordinary imported materials in gen-
eral, the errors due to our reliance on the HIY method in this part of calculation are idiosyncratic.
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assembled. According to the rule regulating trade in China, all processing imports,
classified either under the regime of processing and assembling or under the regime
of processing with imported materials, should only be used for the purpose of pro-
cessing exports. Therefore all processing imports are used as intermediate inputs
and all of them are finally embedded in processing exports.
Ordinary 
Imports of 
Intermediates
Final Goods
Domestic
Intermediates
Capital
 and 
Labour
Domestic
Sales
Ordinary
Exports
Processing
Imports
Final Goods
Processing
Exports
Domestic
Intermediates
Capital
 and 
Labour
(a) (b)
Fig 2.1. Modes of vertical specialisation for ordinary exports and processing
exports
Based on the above reasoning, a revised formula for the measure of vertical
specialisation is:
VSNEW =M
p+
Mo
Y −X p
·Xo. (2.3.2)
Here the superscripts p and o denote processing trade and ordinary trade respec-
tively. Y −X p is the value of domestic sales plus ordinary exports, and the whole
fraction, Mo/(Y −X p), gives us the proportion of ordinary imports of intermedi-
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ates used in ordinary exports. If Mp and X p were zero, this would be equivalent to
VSHIY.
To see how it has improved the HIYmeasurement, we can look at the difference
between Eq. (2.3.1) and Eq. (2.3.2):
VSHIY−VSNEW =
(
Xo+X p
Y
−1
)
·Mp
+
(
Y −Xo−X p
Y −X p
)
·
(
X p
Y
)
·Mo.
(2.3.3)
For exporting firms who sell their products both in the domestic market and in
the foreign market, the first term is negative as output value always exceeds or is
equal to export value, and the second term is also non-negative by the same reason.
However, if processing trade is dominant in trade and the value of ordinary trade
is close to zero (both Xo and Mo are close to zero), then the whole equation could
well be negative because the second term is now close to zero. This is how the
downward biased estimation of VS (or upward biased estimation of DV ) caused by
the HIY method takes place.
To make further refinements on these results, a possible correction is to restrict
our sample to pure exporting firms which export all their goods abroad. The reason
is straightforward: when these firms have no products sold in the domestic market,
all their imported intermediates are used in production for exports. In this case,
Eq. (2.3.1) and Eq. (2.3.2) collapse to the same equation:
VSHIY =VSNEW =M
o+Mp. (2.3.4)
Once the measure of vertical specialisation VSNEW is obtained, it is easy to
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calculate domestic value-added (domestic content) in exports:
DVNEW = X−VSNEW. (2.3.5)
And the domestic value-added share in exports is:
DVSNEW =
DV
X
= 1−
VSNEW
X
. (2.3.6)
However, it needs to be born in mind that the estimate is a lower bound estimate
of foreign content or upper bound estimate of domestic content of exports because
it is not possible to trace back how much foreign intermediates are contained in
the firm’s domestic inputs.13 Albeit the impossibility to get precise estimate of
domestic content of exports, the micro-level evidence is a valuable supplement
to the highly aggregated sector-level estimates and more importantly, enables us
to explore within-firm variations such as changes over time and origin/destination
variation.
2.3.3 Estimated results
We apply the above methods to the matched CASIF-CCTS sample.14 The industry-
level estimates are presented in Table 2.3, and are also illustrated in Figures 2.2 and
13It would be helpful to illustrate this by an example. Suppose a pure exporting firm has 30
thousand dollars of intermediates imported from abroad and another 20 thousand dollars of inter-
mediates bought from the domestic market, and it combines these materials with capital and labour
inputs to produce 100 thousand dollars of products which are later all sold to other countries. Our
upper bound estimate of domestic content in the firm’s exports is 70% ((1− 30
100
)×100%= 70%).
However, if the domestic intermediates were also produced with some foreign materials and have
half of the value is foreign content (10 thousand dollars), then the precise estimate of domestic
content should now be 60% ((1− 30+10
100
)×100%= 60%).
14Due to the large volatility in imports of raw materials across years, the industries of ferrous-
metals and non-ferrous metals are excluded for the estimation. They account for 4%-6% of the
export value of manufactured goods.
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2.3 for clearer visualisation.
We have three findings here. First, it is found that paper products and electron-
ics have the lowest share of domestic value-added in their exports. The electronics
industry made up a large proportion of Chinese exports but also imported large
amounts of materials from other countries. Therefore overall vertical specialisa-
tion could have been driven up by the electronics exports alone. Second, the HIY
estimates of domestic value-added are generally higher than our estimates, which
confirms that the HIY method tends to underestimate the real degree of vertical
specialisation or overestimate the real share of domestic value-added. Third, in
contrast to Dean et al. (2007) (who study the period 1997–2002), we find that
in almost every industry domestic value-added increases between 2003 and 2006.
However, the increase is small, from 45% to 50% of total export value. Even in
electronics, which is by far the most important exporting industry, there has been
a small increase in domestic value-added. In theory, it is still possible that overall
domestic value-added fell if exports shifted towards industries with low values of
DVSNEW, but Figure 2.3 also shows that the average, weighted by export value, has
also increased slightly over this period.
In Table 2.4, we redo the estimations by restricting the sample to the pure ex-
porters of the matched sample, which are defined as firms with more than 95%
of their output exported. The result is also visualised in Figure 2.4. For many
industries which have large export values, such as electronic/electrical/transport e-
quipments and textiles, the estimated domestic value-added share in exports are
lower than the estimates with the matched sample in Table 2.3. This fact implies
that pure exporters have higher share of their intermediates imported than other
exporting firms.
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Table 2.3. Estimated domestic value-added shares in exports (by industry)
Our method, all firms HIY method, all firms
Code Industry 03/04 04/05 05/06 03/06 03/04 04/05 05/06 03/06
22 Paper products -0.025 0.099 0.211 0.134 0.300 0.447 0.490 0.421
40 Electronic equipments 0.250 0.265 0.295 0.281 0.346 0.436 0.438 0.405
30 Plastics 0.305 0.366 0.447 0.418 0.432 0.491 0.569 0.537
41 Measuring instruments 0.488 0.515 0.521 0.517 0.520 0.556 0.572 0.561
23 Printing 0.457 0.533 0.589 0.522 0.560 0.631 0.650 0.595
28 Chemical fibres 0.592 0.503 0.479 0.535 0.766 0.705 0.692 0.714
19 Leather/fur/feather 0.504 0.539 0.561 0.563 0.585 0.604 0.620 0.630
29 Rubber 0.552 0.593 0.595 0.583 0.786 0.780 0.754 0.767
37 Transport equipments 0.625 0.632 0.646 0.645 0.705 0.698 0.707 0.711
26 Raw chemical materials 0.654 0.638 0.624 0.647 0.751 0.750 0.744 0.759
18 Clothing 0.583 0.637 0.694 0.650 0.635 0.686 0.742 0.699
39 Electrical equipments 0.649 0.681 0.719 0.693 0.705 0.737 0.773 0.747
20 Timber/wood 0.687 0.749 0.716 0.717 0.700 0.779 0.753 0.745
32 Ferrous metals 0.707 0.715 0.720 0.719 0.781 0.785 0.782 0.783
34 Metal products 0.665 0.710 0.757 0.724 0.700 0.752 0.814 0.772
13 Processing of foods 0.693 0.722 0.733 0.728 0.772 0.808 0.824 0.805
36 Special machinery 0.677 0.729 0.760 0.737 0.749 0.791 0.818 0.798
17 Textiles 0.710 0.742 0.758 0.748 0.769 0.798 0.816 0.803
24 Office equipments 0.732 0.742 0.767 0.760 0.756 0.769 0.785 0.781
35 General machinery 0.839 0.798 0.812 0.798 0.811 0.850 0.871 0.854
27 Medicines 0.819 0.801 0.779 0.810 0.901 0.899 0.893 0.904
21 Furniture 0.811 0.846 0.869 0.850 0.836 0.863 0.889 0.870
14 Manufacturing of foods 0.832 0.895 0.878 0.855 0.889 0.921 0.921 0.902
31 Non-metallic minerals 0.856 0.853 0.855 0.863 0.882 0.873 0.868 0.880
15 Beverages 0.898 0.920 0.930 0.927 0.937 0.947 0.964 0.959
Average
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Fig 2.2. Comparison of domestic value-added shares by industry, 2003–2006,
calculated from firm- and transaction-level data. Industries are ordered by DVSNEW.
Each industry’s share of total export value is reported next to that industry’s name.
Average value-added shares are weighted by export value.
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Fig 2.3. Domestic value-added shares by industry by year, 2003–2006. Industries are
ordered by DVSNEW for the whole period. Average value-added shares are weighted
by export value.
Table 2.4. Estimated domestic value-added shares in exports
by the sample of pure exporters (by industry)
Our method/HIY method,
pure exporters
Industry 03/04 04/05 05/06 03/06
Electronic equipments 0.156 0.158 0.140 0.166
Raw chemical materials 0.591 0.606 0.396 0.356
Plastics 0.254 0.338 0.415 0.376
Paper products 0.502 0.579 0.730 0.426
Printing 0.475 0.520 0.566 0.504
Transport equipments 0.479 0.533 0.514 0.505
Measuring instruments 0.512 0.552 0.521 0.566
Rubber 0.529 0.601 0.590 0.584
Leather/fur/feather 0.521 0.506 0.585 0.596
Timber/wood 0.662 0.690 0.632 0.627
Clothing 0.560 0.626 0.682 0.631
Textiles 0.578 0.658 0.691 0.634
Special machinery 0.646 0.694 0.685 0.659
Electrical equipments 0.635 0.654 0.676 0.665
Processing of foods 0.686 0.699 0.719 0.706
Metal products 0.672 0.738 0.778 0.722
Office equipments 0.725 0.716 0.743 0.739
Beverages 0.876 0.843 0.881 0.797
Furniture 0.814 0.835 0.862 0.842
General machinery 0.832 0.864 0.865 0.853
Manufacturing of foods 0.848 0.855 0.819 0.855
Non-metallic minerals 0.882 0.882 0.825 0.859
Medicines 0.961 0.908 0.792 0.910
Chemical fibres 0.638 0.868 0.964 0.965
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Fig 2.4. Domestic value-added shares by industry 2003–2006, comparison of all
matched firms with sample of firms which export at least 95% of their output.
Industries are ordered by DVSNEW for the larger sample of firms. Average
value-added shares are weighted by export value.
2.3.4 Differences across firm types
A great advantage of our firm-level data is that we are able to examine how domes-
tic value-added varies across different types of firm, as well as across industries.
This is shown in Table 2.5. First, note that the vast majority of Chinese exports are
produced in the coastal provinces, and firms in these locations have much lower
domestic value-added. Second, domestic value-added is much lower in foreign-
owned firms.15 This is a clear indication that foreign-owned firms in China are
vertically integrated with their parent companies. They engage in production of
relatively sophisticated products with materials or key parts imported from abroad.
In contrast, non-state domestic firms are much less likely to be vertically integrated
with international companies and thus have fewer chances to import technology-
intensive parts.
Interestingly, the share of domestic value-added in exports for foreign-owned
firms grew proportionately faster than for other types of firm . Given the relatively
15Ownership types are defined using 50% equity share of the relative party as the threshold. For
example, foreign-owned firms are defined as firms with foreign share in equity above 50%.
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short period of time, this growth is worth noting. One explanation is that more for-
eign suppliers of intermediates are moving their factories to or setting local plants
in China (e.g., the establishment of some major Korean LED production plants in
China in 2005), thus the intermediate goods they supply to manufacturing firms in
China are no longer foreign intermediates. It is more so for foreign-owned firms
than for other firms since they have closer relationship with foreign suppliers of in-
termediates. Another possible reason is that domestic Chinese firms have been
more capable of producing intermediates and favoured by these foreign-owned
manufacturers as qualified suppliers. Both forces could be working hand-in-hand,
implying a higher degree of integration of foreign-invested firms with the Chinese
local economy.
Finally, entrants to the export market had higher share of domestic value-added
than existing exporters and those firms which exited the export market, again sug-
gesting that these new exporters are less likely to be vertically integrated into a
global production chain. This is unsurprising given that these new entrant firms
usually lack experience of exporting, are smaller in size, and as a result may face
additional costs in entering overseas markets and finding reliable suppliers.
2.4 Evaluating the Technology Intensity of Exports
We now turn to the technology intensity of exports which is to be evaluated both at
export value and at domestic value-added.
2.4.1 Review of related studies
The issue of the technology intensity of Chinese exports is closely related to the
recent discussion on China’s export sophistication level. Rodrik (2006) and Schott
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Table 2.5. Variation in domestic value-added across
different types of firm
2003–2004 2005–2006
DV share (DVS) overall 0.45 0.50
Coastal provinces 0.44 0.49
Interior provinces 0.72 0.75
Non-state domestic 0.64 0.72
State-owned 0.70 0.76
Foreign-owned 0.35 0.43
Entrants to the export market 0.55
Existing exporters 0.47
Exiters from the export market 0.46
(2008) consider the similarity of China’s export bundle with high-income countries
in order to reveal how sophisticated China’s exports are. Their evidence suggest-
s that the structure of the Chinese export bundle is increasingly similar to that of
high-income countries (Rodrik, 2006; Schott, 2008). However, a fundamental as-
sumption underlying these export structure assessments is that the more similar a
country’s export bundle is to high-income countries, the more sophisticated its ex-
ports are. This approach could be misleading in that it does not take into account
the fact that the production process of even the same exported product that actually
takes place can be very different across countries.
It should also be noted that although Schott (2008), Xu (2007), and Xu and Lu
(2009) have, to some extent, treat product quality as a possible factor for explain-
ing the within-product price variations, they do not focus on the production side
behind the product itself. Even if two countries exported exactly the same products
of the same quality, what had happened with production of these products within
each country could be completely different. Countries exporting the same products
could have very different contributions in value-added to the products exported,
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given the increasingly complicated international divisions in production of com-
modities. In this case, even if quality was perfectly measured, it would still be far
from a full description of the sophistication story.
Take the computer industry as an example. Both China and the U.S. export
laptops, but the U.S. designs and produces many of the key parts such as CPUs it-
self, while China usually imports the most sophisticated components from abroad,
assemble them with relatively low-skill labour, and then export the computers as
a whole. More generally, this is exactly what firms normally do in production for
processing exports. In this case, even if China’s export structure is found to be
over-sophisticated given its income level as in Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2008),
this can well have been overestimated because the actual production activities in-
volved in the production of many sophisticated products in China are in fact not as
intensive in skill or technology as in developed countries. Actually, according to
the calculation by Koopman et al. (2008), China’s own value-added in its exports
is only 50% on average, and is even as low as 20% for seemingly sophisticated
products such as electronic devices.
Since the prevalence of processing trade, or more generally, the presence of
international division of production, can lead to biases with the measurement of
sophistication on the product side, the production process should be taken into ac-
count when it is used to assess a country’s export sophistication. Unfortunately,
almost none of the currently available firm-level data contains matched informa-
tion on imports and exports associated with export production due to consideration
of commercial secrets and/or other reasons. One normally cannot tell how sophisti-
cated a firm’s contribution exactly is throughout its production process of exporting
products. Thus, given current data limitations, it is difficult to explicitly incorpo-
rate the production process of exported goods into rigorous econometric analysis
and thus hard to measure the sophistication of export production process directly.
However, despite the data restrictions, there may still exist some ways by which
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one can look into the sophistication of export production process indirectly. A pos-
sible approach is turn to examine the production technology associated with the
exports.
Amiti and Freund (2010) recently provide the first evidence of China’s ex-
port sophistication on the technology side by measuring its skill content indirectly.
Their work is mainly based on Chinese product-level customs data. They plot the
cumulative export share of Chinese industries which are ranked in ascending order
of industry skill intensity along the horizontal axis. Since the cumulative distribu-
tion curve is shown to have been shifting rightward between 1992 and 2005, this is
interpreted as evidence of increasing sophistication of Chinese exports, as exports
are now concentrated more within industries with high skill intensity. However,
when processing exports are excluded from the sample, hardly any shift is found
in the cumulative distribution curve of industry export share. This difference im-
plies that although the increasing share of exports from skill intensive industries
has been observed, this may well have been due to the increase in processing ex-
ports which rely heavily on imported materials or parts. Furthermore, when they
go on to examine the cumulative distribution curve of imported inputs share sepa-
rately for processing imports and non-processing imports, a much larger increase
in the skill content of imported inputs in found for processing imports than for
non-processing imports. All together, these findings suggest that China’s exports
and imports have both been coming increasingly more from processing trades with
high industry skill intensity, although the skill content change in net exports is still
unclear.
However, this approach is problematic and the result can be misleading if the
distribution of domestic value-added across industries (products) is largely differ-
ent from that of final export value. To see this, suppose China exports only two
goods, Christmas dolls and laptops. The total value of dolls is 15 million USDs
with domestic value-added 10 million USDs, and the total value of laptops is 85
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million USDs with domestic value-added also 10 million USDs, because all the
high-value parts are from the United States. Further, the skill intensity of dolls is
0.2 while that of laptops is 0.6. Now if we calculate the overall skill intensity of the
exports in terms of final value, the results is 0.54 ( 15
15+85×0.2+
85
15+85×0.6= 0.54).
However, the result will be only 0.4 ( 10
10+10×0.2+
10
10+10×0.6= 0.4) if we use do-
mestic value-added instead. This simple example illustrates that final value and
domestic value-added could attach very different weights to a product’s skill inten-
sity and could therefore lead to essentially different conclusions on the overall skill
intensity of the export bundle.
In addition, the measurement of industry technology intensity in Amiti and
Freund (2010) is also far from satisfactory. They measure the skill intensities of
Chinese industries in 1992 and 2005 by using Indonesian data in 1992 due to lack
of Chinese data. This could generate bias if the relative skill intensities of Chinese
industries in 2005 is significantly different from those in Indonesia in 1992. This
gap could be even larger if Chinese industries achieved more rapid technical im-
provements than Indonesia did during the period of over ten years, whether through
indigenous innovations or through foreign technology transfers.
2.4.2 Approach of measuring technology intensity
Measuring the technology intensity of domestic value-added in exports is new to
the current literature and can help uncover the real technology content in Chinese
exports. In addition, we will also compare the results obtained with the two mea-
sures to have a look at the discrepancy between them and thus to see how the
previous method could bias the result.
The measure of skill intensity will also be improved. In this part, we construct
both firm and sector level skill intensity measures directly based on China’s own
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data within the period of export boom, as opposed to resorting to other country’s
data as in Amiti and Freund (2010). The way skill intensity is measured in Amiti
and Freund (2010) is also questionable in that it is simply represented by the ra-
tio of nonproduction workers to total employment. When skill improvement takes
place in other ways than simply an increase in nonproduction workers, or when
there is much (product-related) skill heterogeneity among nonproduction workers
(for example, marketing staff versus lab researchers), this simple measure obvious-
ly cannot capture all the skill variation cross sections and over time. Fortunately,
however, our data allows us to base our measurements on much richer firm skill
information which includes worker education, worker skill qualification, firm in-
vestment on research and development, and firm expenditure on worker training.
This rich skill information makes it possible to provide the first evidence from
the production perspective on how skill intensive Chinese exports are and how it
changed over time in the export boom after 2000.
By exploring the technology intensity of exports, our study is also related to
the the factor content of Chinese exports. In the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV)
model, factor endowment as well as factors embedded in net exports (exports minus
imports) are key elements for predicting the trade pattern of a country. On the
empirical side, however, little is known about the real factor content especially
technology-related factors associated with Chinese exports. Our study uses micro-
level data and is able to provide the first-hand evidence on the intensity of the use
of technology inputs in exporting firms, and therefore can hopefully improve our
understanding of the technology content of Chinese exports.
2.4.3 Industry technology levels and export intensities
Here we use six indices to measure the technology levels for all two-digit indus-
tries. The measures are constructed at the firm level and industry-averages com-
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puted. The definitions of these measures are as follows.
Our three measures of skill intensity are:
• Education intensity. We define the education intensity of an industry as the
proportion of workers with higher-education degrees in 2004. One practical
reason why education intensity is measured this way is that China has a com-
pulsory education law which rules that normally each citizen must receive at
least nine years’ school education (equivalent to junior middle school). As
a result, almost all workers have achieved the legally required compulsory
education and therefore the variation in schooling only exists in education
beyond the junior middle school level. Senior middle school education (in-
cluding some vocational training education) is also very common and have
almost become a prerequisite in any formal job market. However, many
labour-intensive positions still do not necessarily require workers to have
had higher-education degrees. Because of this, there is sufficient variation in
the proportion of workers with higher-education degrees, which makes this
measure effective as an proxy for education intensity.
• Skill intensity. The data set provides information on the number of workers
with technical qualifications at the firm level in 2004. They are usually those
people whose jobs are related to research, product design, maintenance and
repair of sophisticated machines, or other special skills. By dividing the
number of these workers by total employment, we get the measure of skill
intensity which captures the relative endowment of skilled workers.
• Worker-training intensity. We calculate the firm expenditure on worker-
training per worker as a proxy for the on-the-job human capital investment.
Although this is a flow measure, it captures the cross-industry differences
in human capital if industries with high human capital intensity train their
workers more than other industries.
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Our three measures of technology intensity are:
• Computer intensity. This variable is constructed as the number of computers
used per worker. We assume that the value of variable is positively correlat-
ed with the overall skill level of an industry. As much of the sophisticated
innovation activities are carried out on computers, this measure is intended
to capture differences in the use of these equipments at the extensive margin.
However, given the number of computers used, the differences in both the
quantities and qualities of innovation conducted on these machines are not
reflected in this measure.
• R&D intensity. We use this index to capture the intensity of R&D expen-
diture in the final value of output. Specifically, it is the ratio of industrial
R&D expenditure on industrial output. This value of this index means how
much R&D is invested in order to produce one yuan’s worth of output in an
industry. The higher the value, the more R&D intensive the industry is.
• New product intensity. This measure is measured as the ratio of new product
value over total output. In the CASIF data, new product value is defined
as value of output of those products made by new technology, or with new
product designs, structural improvements, new materials, and so on. To some
extent, this reflects how creative firms are in product innovations.
These measures are only available for each firm in certain years.16 Therefore
we assume that skill- and technology-intensity are fixed for each firm over the
sample period and we cannot capture within-firm changes in skill or technology
intensity. Nevertheless, over the relatively short time period, we believe this is a
reasonable approximation.
16Education, skill and computer intensity are asked in 2004 only. Training intensity is asked in
each year from 2004 to 2007. R&D intensity is asked in each year of 2001, 2002, and 2005 to 2007.
New product intensity is asked in 2000 to 2003, 2006 and 2007.
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In Figure 2.5 we plot the three skill intensity measures for two-digit industries.
The two measures of academic and professional qualifications are very highly cor-
related, which suggests it will make little difference whichever measure is used.
The relationship between qualification and training is still positive, but less strong.
Of the five most export-intensive industries, it is clear that electronics and measur-
ing instruments are relatively skill-intensive in terms of qualification, while cloth-
ing, leather goods and office equipment (e.g., stationery) are far less skill-intensive.
In terms of training the ranking is quite different, with measuring instruments be-
ing a relatively high training industry and electronics being a relatively low training
industry.
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Fig 2.5. Three measures of industry skill-intensity. Source: CASIF. The five most
export-intensive industries are labelled: 18=Clothing, 19=Leather and fur, 24=Office
equipment, 40=Electronics, 41=Measuring instruments. The correlation coefficient
between each measure is reported. Industry codes are listed in Table 2.3.
In Figure 2.6 we plot the three technology-intensity measures. Unsurprisingly,
R&D intensity and new product intensity are very closely related, but the use of
computers has a weaker relationship with these other two measures. In particular,
plastics and metal products have very high computer use, but relatively low mea-
sures of new products and R&D. Once again, for all three measures, it is clear that
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of the five most export-intensive industries, electronics and measuring instruments
are technology-intensive, while clothing, leather and office equipment are much
less technology intensive.
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Fig 2.6. Three measures of industry technology-intensity. Source: CASIF. The five
most export-intensive industries are labelled: 18=Clothing, 19=Leather and fur,
24=Office equipment, 40=Electronics, 41=Measuring instruments. The correlation
coefficient between each measure is reported. Industry codes are listed in Table 2.3.
The relationship between export intensity and our six measures of skill- and
technology-intensity is shown in Figure 2.7. A clear negative relationship is ap-
parent for all six measures, although more so for the three skill intensity measures.
Thus, at the industry level, industries which are less skill- and technology-intensive
tend to have higher export intensities. This is consistent with the finding of Ami-
ti and Freund (2010, Figure 4), which shows a concentration of exports in less
skill-intensive industries, reflecting China’s comparative advantages in trade with
the world. It is also notable that industry 41, electronics (which accounts for over
one-third of all exports), tends to be an outlier in that it is relatively skill intensive.
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Fig 2.7. Export intensity and industry skill- and technology-intensity. Source:
CASIF. Industry codes are listed in Table 2.3.
2.4.4 Within-industry technological changes in exports
Since the above analysis reveals substantial differences in technology levels across
industries, we plan to take a look at how firms of different technology levels con-
tributed to exports within their corresponding industries in order to control for these
cross-industry technology differences. Within-industry examination could uncover
useful information regarding technological change with industry-specific charac-
teristics excluded. However, since the data set has information on different technol-
ogy measures only for some specific years, we restrict our sample to the balanced
panel of the CASIF firm data so that every firm in the data has non-missing values
of these technology measures for at least one year.17 We then categorise the firm-
s into two groups: higher-technology group and lower-technology group by their
technology rankings in each corresponding industry averaged over the years where
the technology information is available. We then assign values of these group labels
for each firm to other years where the technology information is missing, assuming
17By doing this we are not allowing entry and exit to affect the tech intensity of an industry.
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that firms did not transit between these groups during the sample period.
By displaying the shares of export value by each technology group and by year,
Figure 2.8 depicts a general picture of the evolution of skill content in exports.
Firms with higher levels of technology saw their share of export value in the bal-
anced panel significantly increased over time, while firms with lower levels of tech-
nology had their share decreased. It is suggestive of an rising technology content
in Chinese exports regardless of how the technology is measured, consistent with
the widely-existed conjectures and basic messages conveyed in some of the current
studies (e.g. Rodrik, 2006; Schott, 2008).
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
Sh
ar
es
 o
f i
nd
ut
ry
 e
xp
or
t v
al
ue
20002001200220032004200520062007
Year
Education
.
2
.
25
.
3
.
35
Sh
ar
es
 o
f i
nd
ut
ry
 e
xp
or
t v
al
ue
20002001200220032004200520062007
Year
Skill
.
12
.
14
.
16
.
18
.
2
.
22
Sh
ar
es
 o
f i
nd
ut
ry
 e
xp
or
t v
al
ue
20002001200220032004200520062007
Year
Worker−training intensity
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
Sh
ar
es
 o
f i
nd
ut
ry
 e
xp
or
t v
al
ue
20002001200220032004200520062007
Year
Computers
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
Sh
ar
es
 o
f i
nd
ut
ry
 e
xp
or
t v
al
ue
20002001200220032004200520062007
Year
R&D intensity
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
Sh
ar
es
 o
f i
nd
ut
ry
 e
xp
or
t v
al
ue
20002001200220032004200520062007
Year
New product intensity
Higher−tech group Lower−tech group
Fig 2.8. Shares of export value by technology group
A more rigorous way to examine this effect requires controlling for more influ-
ential effects. We do this by regressing the firm-level growth rate of export value
over the eight-year horizon on firms’ technology measures and dummies of years,
industries, and ownership types. These dummies are included to capture the differ-
ences in export growth along the dimensions uncovered earlier in this chapter. The
results are reported in Table 2.6. The control group here comprise firms with medi-
um levels of technology. The coefficients of the indicators of higher-technology
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groups are universally positive at high significance levels, while the coefficients of
the indicators of lower-technology groups are significantly negative. This further
confirms the above conclusion that the technology content of exports increased as
firms with higher technology levels appeared to play increasingly larger parts in
exports, offering new evidence to the literature on the technology level of Chinese
exports cited above in terms of firm composition. More generally, the evidence here
emphasises the role of firms in shaping the technology level of exports, and thus
directs the ongoing discussions at the aggregate level down to more fundamental
economic activity, namely firm behaviour.
Table 2.6. Variations of export value growth across different technology groups
(balanced panel)
Education Skill Computer R&D
Worker-
training
New product
intensity
Higher-tech group 0.353 0.294 0.314 0.116 0.361 0.272
(0.056) (0.059) (0.054) (0.079) (0.053) (0.091)
Lower-tech group -0.152 -0.074 -0.099 -0.490 -0.092 -0.283
(0.057) (0.055) (0.062) (0.062) (0.059) (0.056)
Notes. Dummies for years, industries, regions, and ownership types are included in the regressions as well.
2.4.5 Technology intensity of export value
To see whether the skill intensity of Chinese exports has increased between 2000
and 2007,18 we replicate the analysis of Amiti and Freund (2010), but using our
Chinese firm-level measures of skill- and technology intensity. We aggregate the
firm-level measures to the three-digit industry level by each year and order indus-
tries by increasing skill intensity. Figure 2.9 plots the cumulative distribution of
export value in each industry against industry skill- and technology-intensity and
repeats this analysis for 2000 and 2007.
18Note that we are able to analyse skill intensity in 2007 because we use export information from
the CASIF firm-level data, not the transaction level data.
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Fig 2.9. Cumulative share of exports by industry-level skill and technology measures,
2000 and 2007. Skill and technology intensity is measured at the firm-level using the
CASIF data and aggregated to the three-digit industry level. p-values from a
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are also reported.
Figure 2.9 confirms that Chinese exports are still heavily weighted towards in-
dustries with less human capital and technology. In 2000, for example, 60% of
Chinese exports were accounted for by industries in the bottom 30% of the edu-
cation distribution. A similar pattern is observed for the other measures, with a
particularly strong concentration of exports amongst industries with low computer
use.
Figure 2.9 also shows that there has been an increase in the skill- and technology-
intensity of Chinese exports when measured at the industry level aggregated from
firm-level information. For five out of the six measures, the cumulative distribu-
tions shift significantly to the right.19 This result confirms the finding of Amiti
and Freund (2010), but is more reliable than the latter because here it is based on
the measured distribution of skill- and technology-intensity in Chinese firms them-
19To have a statistical ground for the difference in the distributions, p-values from a two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are reported in Figure 2.9.
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selves, rather than relying on the skill-distribution of another country.
Amiti and Freund also show that the increase in skill intensity disappears if
one excludes processing exports. This implies that the increase in skill intensity
was larger in industries with more processing trade. Note, however, that our mea-
sures of skill- and technology-intensity already take into account any effect from
trade processing. For example, suppose that the increase in Chinese exports was
accounted for by processing firms which required only very low levels of skill and
technology, because these firms were simply assembling sophisticated inputs from
abroad. If this was the case, the distribution of exports would have shifted to the
left. Thus, Figure 2.9 provides evidence that despite the importance of processing
trade in Chinese exports, the skill intensity of exports has increased.
2.4.6 Technology intensity of domestic value-added in exports
However, it still remains possible that the shift in the skill distribution of Chi-
nese exports is a result of industries with low value-added (but high skill intensity)
increasing their export share. As we have seen in Section 2.3.3, the electronic-
s industry is the single most important contributor to Chinese exports, has very
low value-added, but also employs a higher than average share of skilled worker-
s. To examine this issue, we use the measures of domestic value-added defined
in Eq. (2.3.6).20 In Figure 2.10 we compare the skill and technology distribution
of Chinese exports in 2006 based on final export value and on domestic value-
added.21 In five of the six measures the distribution of domestic value-added is to
the left of the distribution of export value, indicating that this re-weighting reduces
the measured “sophistication” of Chinese exports.
20Because this relies on the transaction-level data, measures of domestic value added are only
available up to 2006.
21Results for other years are very similar, and are available on request from the authors.
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Fig 2.10. Cumulative shares of gross exports vs. domestic value-added in exports
with respect to technology and skill measures (2006). Gross exports are from the
CASIF data, while domestic value-added are computed as the product of gross
exports and domestic value-added share at the three-digit industry level estimated
from the CCTS data.
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Finally, we wish to examine whether the increase over time in skill- and tech-
nology-intensity is affected by the use of domestic value-added rather than final
export values. Figure 2.11 shows that there has still been an increase in skill and
technology-intensity, but rather less than in Figure 2.9.
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Fig 2.11. Cumulative shares of domestic value-added in exports with respect to
technology and skill measures (2003–2006). Domestic value-added are computed as
the product of gross exports and domestic value-added share at the three-digit
industry level estimated from the CCTS data.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter attempts to provide an assessment of the Chinese export boom from
2000 to 2007, which made China rise from a top five exporter to a top two exporter.
Specifically, our main purpose is to evaluate the domestic contribution and foreign
contribution to China’s manufacturing exports and the technology intensity of the
exports.
Distinct from the existing studies which all use sector-level data, our study re-
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lies on two micro data sets, the firm survey data and the customs trade records, and
also a unique, comprehensive firm-product-level data constructed from them. We
first develop an accounting method to measure the domestic value-added in Chinese
exports, which fits the Chinese case. The method is improved based on Hummels
et al.’s (2001) (HIY) measuring framework of vertical specialisation by taking into
account the difference between processing trade and ordinary trade. The share of
China’s value-added in exports is shown to be only 30%, lower than what would be
obtained by the HIY method. The foreign content increased moderately over time,
which was primarily driven by coastal and foreign firms. We also find that enter-
ing exporting firms were the main source of decreasing domestic content, while
existing exporting firms drove up the foreign content predominantly. Considering
the previous finding that exporters are more likely to be processing firms, the im-
plication here is that engaging in processing trade in China could greatly probably
reduce not only entry costs of exporting but also variable costs of exporting.
Besides, we also examine the technology intensity of Chinese exports. Differ-
ent from previous studies, we use a wider range of technology measures based on
China’s own data to capture the picture more precisely. As expected, we find gen-
eral technological improvement in Chinese exports, although the lower-technology
industries are still found to have tended to export higher proportions of their prod-
ucts than higher-technology industries. More interestingly, the technology inten-
sity of Chinese value-added in exports was lower than that of exports measured
in export value. The export value was distributed more towards higher-technology
industries but the domestic content showed less prominent trend. This finding is
novel and it seems that the “surprisingly” big numbers might be to some extent
misleading and might have covered some important facts: technological improve-
ment during the export boom had not changed the product composition of China’s
own domestic content in exports as much as its final export value implied to many
researchers.
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Quota Restrictions and Price Adjustments of Chinese
Textile Exports to the U.S.
3.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, we looked at the contribution and structure of Chinese exports in
general. This chapter takes a more micro perspective and narrows down the focus
to firms which export textile1 and clothing products. Specifically, we investigate
empirically how these firms respond to changes in a specific type of trade policy
– product quotas. Quotas, as one of the major instruments of protectionist trade
policies, have long been used by many countries to limit the volume of imports for
various purposes. Amongst other things, a major reason for it being favoured to be
a policy tool is that the quantity cap set by a import quota is believed as a convenient
and effective way to protect domestic producers from foreign competition. Such
protectionist policy, however, can lead to additional effects both in the importing
and exporting country.
The reasons behind it are related to a widely accepted notion that quotas work
1For simplicity of expression, the broad term “textile(s)” is frequently used in this chapter to
represent both “textiles” and “clothing” hereafter.
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differently from tariffs as there is no simple “tariff-equivalence” for quotas. One
reason is to do with the market structure: imperfect competition allows firms to
exercise their market power by charging higher prices and selling fewer products
than under tariffs (Bhagwati, 1965; Feenstra, 2003). A second reason is that the
imposition of quotas induces quality upgrading by exporters. As first rigourously
analysed by Falvey (1979), a quota is equivalent to a specific price increase, that
is, the same price increase for each physical unit of goods, therefore as a result
the quota will cause the relative price of expensive goods to decrease and shift
the demand toward these high-price goods. Since the share of high-price goods
increases, the average price goes up. In this sense, this effect of quota is very
similar to the quality upgrading due to the per unit transport cost which was first
observed by Alchian and Allen (1964) and empirically supported by Hummels and
Skiba (2004). Given that our purpose is not comparing quotas with tariffs – instead,
we simply focus on the effect of quotas –, the quality upgrading hypothesis is more
relevant to our study.
Some empirical studies have lent direct support to the quality upgrading hy-
pothesis for the effects of quotas. Feenstra (1988) studied the effect of U.S. quo-
tas against Japanese automobiles and found evidence of quality upgrading of car
models via two channels: improvement in characteristics for each model and an in-
crease in the share of high-cost models. The descriptive analysis of Moore (2002,
Ch. 4) documented rising unit value of the U.S. imports of Chinese textiles and ap-
parel after China became a signatory to theMultifibre Arrangement (MFA) in 1983.
More recently, Harrigan and Barrows (2009) tested the hypothesis by looking at the
effect of the removal of the U.S. textile quotas on imports of Chinese textiles and
apparel according to the quota phase-out requirement of the MFA. Their study finds
clear evidence of quality downgrading due to the quota removal and thus confirms
the hypothesis.
Without much doubt, it has been clear that a quota does lead to quality upgrad-
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ing via changes in the shares of products of different costs/prices. However, our
current knowledge of the quota effect is only limited to the demand side and noth-
ing is known about the supply side. Specifically, while we already have convincing
evidence on how quotas affect product quality at the product-level in the export
market, we still lack information on how firms actually respond to quotas. When
a firm faces changes in the restrictiveness of quotas, it could respond by enter-
ing/exiting the export market or by changing their mix and relative shares of export
products. Investigation into firm response is not just out of theoretical curiosity; it
also has implications for policy designers. Recognition of the possibility that quo-
tas lead to reallocation of resources both among and within firms in the exporting
country could refine our understanding of the economic effects of quotas, as a trade
policy, in terms of impacts on industry dynamics and firm behaviour.
In this regard, our study is also closely related to the recently emerging theories
on multi-product firms. Motivated by the growing evidence that international trade
is dominated by multi-product firms and that a significant part of the margins of
trade growth is driven by changes in product mix within firms, the multi-product
firm models extend the single-product firm models by building the product-mix
decisions of firms into the heterogeneous firm model of Melitz (2003). Theoretical
work in this direction includes, but not limited to, Arkolakis and Muendler (2010),
Bernard et al. (2011), Eckel and Neary (2010), and Nocke and Yeaple (2008). A
key feature of this line of theories is the product-level heterogeneity aside from the
firm-level heterogeneity. In the setup of these models, firms differ from each other
in their productivity and also are able to produce or export products of different
qualities. Consequently, firms not only select to export but also select to export
some specific products. When there are changes in trade costs, firms have two
extensive margins of adjustments: between-firm extensive margin and within-firm
extensive margin. The former refers to firms’ entering/exiting the export market,
the sole extensive margin in the Melitz (2003) model, while the latter represents
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firms’ adding/dropping product lines, a new margin of adjustment.
Models such as this could explain why and how firms respond to the changing
market environment by making entry/exit decisions and/or by optimising product
structures. But it has been a challenge to empirically test or evaluate these theories
because, in reality, trade policies mostly come as part of complex policy packages
and thus cannot be linked to specific firms or products. For example, in the study of
product switching patterns of Indian firms, Goldberg et al. (2010) use the tariff rate
of a firm’s main industry as the trade policy measure, but this could be problematic
for studying multi-product firms as it may be that a firm’s products are not always
protected by the industry tariff uniformly; a firm could in fact produce products
across different industries, and even for the products in the same industry, they
could be subject to different tariff schemes. As an improvement, Bernard et al.
(2011) use four-digit SIC tariffs of Canada on U.S. imports as a proxy for the
degree of trade liberalisation when studying the behaviour of U.S. firms, but the
four-digit tariffs are still too aggregated to identify how differently products are
restrained by tariffs within a single firm.
Firmly connected to the two literatures, this chapter provides empirical evi-
dence on how quotas affect exporting firms. Specifically, we examine how firms
make adjustments to their export behaviour when there are changes in import quo-
tas in a foreign market. We choose the case of Chinese textile exports to the U.S.
for this study. This is an ideal case for studying firm behaviour involving changes
in quota policies for several reasons. First, our data is originally from the trade
transactions recorded by Chinese customs and, after aggregation, provides a unique
and comprehensive firm-product-level data set which greatly facilitates analysis of
both firms and products. Second, the time period of the data covers the event of the
global removal of textile quotas, which is widely known as the MFA/ATC quota
elimination. This event is large-scale, discrete in timing, and exogenous to firms
and consumers. Third, the information on the levels of U.S. textile quotas can be
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mapped to Chinese textile products, thus making it possible to distinguish prod-
ucts of different quota restrictiveness within firms. Finally, the above features of
the data perfectly allow for research designs of treatment-control comparisons with
different controls, enabling us to reveal causal effects of quotas at different levels.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. On the one hand,
by exploring firm behaviour, our study opens up a new angle of looking at the
economic effects of quotas, and adds to the micro-level and supply-side evidence
on the effect of quotas. Importantly, our results complement those of Harrigan
and Barrows (2009), which are all about the effects on products in the importing
market, from the other side of the mirror.
In addition, our study enriches the broad literature of firms’ response to trade
policies. We produce clear evidence on how changes in quota restriction induce
firms to adjust their export prices, and how the effect of quota liberalisation varies
across different types of firms and products. Since within-firm adjustment in the
multi-product firm models is a new element to the heterogeneous firm models, the
new predictions regarding within-firm adjustments need to be evaluated with data.
However, in the existing theoretical models, trade policies are mostly oversimpli-
fied as policies leading to changes in trade costs. For this reason, contexts of con-
crete policy environments are required such that related issues could be addressed
and discussed in a clear way. However, as already mentioned, trade policies in the
existing empirical work concerning multi-product firms are too aggregated to be
related to individual firms and products. By contrast, quotas in this study can be
linked to individual products at a very disaggregated level. Apart from this, other
nice features of the MFA/ATC quota elimination provide a unique and clear-cut
policy shock for studying firm responses.
In a recent paper by Khandelwal et al. (2011), they also explore the MFA quota
elimination, using the same data as ours, and find evidence for firm exit and prod-
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uct price drop. By comparing firms of different ownership types, they attribute
the price drop to the exit of state-owned firms and entry of non-state firms which
charged lower prices. This finding is consistent with their theory of inefficient allo-
cation of quota licenses, which, based on the anecdotal evidence that state-owned
firms were more likely to get licenses, predicts that the removal of MFA quotas
would force inefficient state-owned firms to leave and more productive firs to enter
the export market. A main difference between our study and theirs is that we ex-
plore the sources of the drop price and the heterogeneity of the quota elimination
effect both across firms and across products.
A brief overview of our findings is given as below. First, using an entirely
independent source of data, we provide consistent results to Harrigan and Barrows
(2009) – the MFA quota removal reduced average export prices by about 30%.
Second, a further analysis reveals that the most important contribution to this price
fall is caused by the entry of “low price” firms, which implies that quotas impose
higher trade barriers on market entry than on exporting new products. Third, it is
also shown that less than one-third of the price reduction is due to firms lowering
prices on products which they sold before and after the quota removal, indicating
a degree of price drop even within product categories. Finally, we find evidence
about how the quota removal effect varies across firms of different ownership types,
and this sheds light on the inefficiency of the quota allocation system in China.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 gives the institution-
al background of the MFA/ATC quota system. Section 3.3 describes the data used
in this study. In Section 3.4, we propose our research design and explain the em-
pirical methodology involved. Empirical results are presented in Section 3.5 and
we check their robustness in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes with remarks on
future research directions.
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3.2 Institutional Background
For trade in textile and clothing products, the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) had
been the dominant international agreement that protected markets in developed
countries from developing countries via quota limitations on imports between pairs
of importing and exporting countries since 1970s. Central to the MFA were a series
of bilateral agreements between large developed-country importers, such as the
U.S. and E.U. countries, and developing-country exporters, such as Bangladesh,
China, and India.
In 1995, the MFA was succeeded by a new agreement, the Agreement on Tex-
tiles and Clothing (ATC), as an achievement of the Uruguay Round talks. Under
the ATC framework, countries reached bilateral agreements on the details of how
quotas were imposed and how they would be removed gradually. By the rules of
the ATC, textile and clothing products were integrated into GATT/WTO rules in
four phases (1995, 1998, 2002, and 2005), and each phase involved quota phase-
outs on more products and an acceleration of growth rates in quotas. Particularly,
in the final phase the quotas were to be totally eliminated on 1 January, 2005.
The U.S. is the second largest overseas market for Chinese textile exports, after
Japan.2 As China was not a member of WTO before 2001, it was initially not eli-
gible for the ATC quota phaseouts. However, after China entered into the WTO in
the end of 2001, it immediately enjoyed the first three stages of quota integration in
the U.S. market in 2002 (Harrigan and Barrows, 2009). The U.S. quotas on import-
s of Chinese textiles were removed on 1 January 2005. But according to China’s
WTO accord, special safeguard mechanisms against Chinese textile exports would
remain in effect until December 31, 2008 in case these products disrupted the desti-
nation market. This implies quotas could still be reimposed temporarily after 2005
2If we see Hong Kong as an overseas market for Chinese exports, then Hong Kong ranks second
among all destination. But we do not consider reexports of Chinese textiles from Hong Kong to
other countries, which will unnecessarily complicate our analysis.
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if Chinese textile exports were believed to have harmed the market of the import-
ing country (Yeung and Mok, 2004; Harrigan and Barrows, 2009). Indeed, as the
imports of Chinese textiles did grow extraordinarily fast, some temporary quantity
caps on imports were set by the U.S. against the large influx of some Chinese tex-
tile products after the middle of 2005. According to a new memorandum reached
by both countries in November 2005, some new quotas would remain in force for
a three-year period from 2006 to 2008.
While there were dramatic changes in the U.S. quotas on imports of textile
products from China, it is worthwhile to note that the U.S. Most-Favoured-Nations
(MFN) tariffs for these products which also naturally applied to China after its
WTO entry remained fairly stable. Particularly, from 2004 to 2005, all U.S. MFN
tariffs on textiles remained unchanged, thus making the lift of MFA/ATC quotas by
far the only major policy shock during this short period.3
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data source
Our sample consists of products covered by the MFA/ATC which were exported
by Chinese firms to the U.S. market from 2000 to 2006. The data is from the
transaction-level database of the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS) which
records monthly the firm identifications, free-on-board values, physical quantities,
destination/source countries, and other information on all goods passing through
Chinese customs. All goods are labeled by eight-digit Chinese HS codes. Since
virtually all the MFA/ATC products fall in the Harmonised System (HS) chapters
3The information on U.S. tariffs can be found in the Tariff Database on the website of the United
States International Trade Commission (USITC) at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/.
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of textile and clothing products, i.e., chapters 50 to 63,4 we first drop all products
outside these chapters. Further, since MFA/ATC products account for more than
90% of the export value of these textile products, we exclude the small propor-
tion of products which are not covered by the MFA/ATC.5 The raw data contains a
number of trading agents (intermediary firms) which mediate trade for other firms
without directly engaging in production themselves. Inclusion of these firms could
cause problems as their behaviour is probably very different from that of produc-
tion firms which are the objects of this study. Therefore we exclude these trading
firms which are identified by certain keywords in their names.6 The data is further
collapsed to the firm-product level for each year to facilitate our analyses. Thus, an
observation in the data is identified by a firm code (i), a six-digit product code ( j),
and the year (t).
3.3.2 Identification of MFA/ATC products
MFA/ATC products account for more than 92% of Chinese textile products export-
ed to the U.S. (HS chapters 50 to 63) and are identified according to the Appendix
of the ATC.7 HS codes are common across countries for the first six digits and each
4We notice that the HS codes were upgraded in 2002 to a new version, but for six-digit-level
textile and clothing products, the codes remained almost the same. Besides, for the key parts of
this study, we only compare products which existed both in 2004 and 2005, which excludes product
categories that were given codes new to the previous HS. Thus, the switch of HS codes are very
unlikely to affect our analyses.
5In the related studies on imports of Chinese textiles in the U.S., Harrigan and Barrows (2009)
and Brambilla et al. (2010) also restricted their samples to MFA/ATC products.
6Manova and Zhang (2009, 2012) identified such firms for the period of 2000 to 2005, but they
did not mention what these keywords were. Ahn et al. (2011) used the Chinese characters meaning
“importer”, “exporter”, and “trading” to identify the “intermediary firms”. By contrast, we use
our own, but more comprehensive list of keywords which are exclusively used by various kinds
of trading agents in China. See Wang and Yu (2010) for a complete list of the keywords and the
comparisons of our identification results with those by Manova and Zhang (2009, 2012) and Ahn
et al. (2011).
7See Table B1 of Appendix A for the proportion of the MFA/ATC products in Chinese textile
products exported to the U.S. in 2004. The full text of the ATC, including its Appendix, is available
at the WTO webpage at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/16-tex_
e.htm.
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country can add more digits according to its own needs. The Appendix of the ATC
details the products at the six-digit HS level, enabling us to identify these products
precisely in our customs data.
3.3.3 Identification of quota products
The U.S. implemented quotas on Chinese textile products through the U.S. Office
of Textile and Apparel (OTEXA), which listed by year detailed quota information.
In practice, these quotas were implemented through three-digit OTEXA quota cat-
egories and each category contains multiple ten-digit HS codes, the most detailed
HS level.8
One difficulty that prevents us from precisely identifying quota products at the
most detailed eight-digit Chinese HS level in our data is the fact that the Chinese
and the U.S. HS systems are consistent only up to the first six digits. This means
although the U.S. quotas can be linked to the ten-digit U.S. HS codes, they cannot
be linked to the Chinese HS codes at levels more detailed than 6 digits. For this
reason, we collapse our data on product from the eight-digit level to the six-digit
level so that we are able to map data on U.S. quotas to our customs data (at the
six-digit level).
3.3.4 Calculation of fill rates
The fill rate (or utilisation rate) is a widely used measure which indicates how
restrictive a quota is during a given time period (normally a year). It is defined as
the ratio of the actual quantity imported to the quantity set by the quota. It ranges
from 0 to 1, with a bigger number representing a higher proportion of a quota
8We obtained the concordance between OTEXA quota categories and ten-digit HS codes from
OTEXA.
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actually used. A higher fill rate indicates a higher degree of restriction a quota
imposes on a product. An effective quota is a quota which is sufficiently restrictive
to impose real restraint on trade in a product. If the fill rate falls below a certain
level, the quota is then seen as being not restraint on trade. Therefore, the quota fill
rate is a crucial measure to differentiate effective (binding) quotas from ineffective
(unbinding) quotas.
The calculation of fill rates for this study, however, has been largely complicat-
ed by both the fact that we can only restrict our main analyses at the six-digit level
and the fact that the U.S. administered textile quotas through three-digit OTEXA
categories. In principle, the calculation of the fill rate for each six-digit product j
at year t in the U.S. market should be as straightforward as
FILLRATE jt ≡
QUANTITY jt
QUOTA jt
, (3.3.1)
where QUANTITY is the actual quantity exported and QUOTA is the quantity
limit imposed. Obviously, to get FILLRATE jt , one must know QUANTITY jt and
QUOTA jt . But the reality is that we have no direct data on both QUANTITY jt and
QUOTA jt .
However, using an external data on the U.S. import quantity of each ten-digit
product from China by year,9 we are able to get QUANTITY jt simply by aggrega-
tion over all subsidiary ten-digit products k under j, i.e.,
QUANTITY jt = ∑
k∈ j
QUANTITYkt . (3.3.2)
9We obtained this information from the underlying data of Schott (2008), which is downloadable
at Peter Shott’s personal webpage at http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_
international.htm
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Now the difficulty is in how to get QUOTA jt . Quotas are quantity limits, and
therefore as above, QUOTA jt can be seen as an aggregation from ten-digit prod-
ucts:
QUOTA jt = ∑
k∈ j
QUOTAkt . (3.3.3)
Unfortunately, since U.S. textile quotas were mostly implemented at the much
more aggregated three-digit OTEXA category level, we do not have exact informa-
tion on the quota level for each ten-digit product, QUOTAkt , which is essential for
the calculation. However, if fill rates for all ten-digit products within each quota
category are assumed to be the same as the category-level fill rate, FILLRATEkt
will be known from OTEXA and can be attributed to all HS products within corre-
sponding U.S. quota categories.10 The quota level QUOTAkt can now be computed
as
QUOTAkt =
QUANTITYkt
FILLRATEkt
. (3.3.4)
Inserting Eq. (3.3.2), (3.3.3), and (3.3.4) into Eq. (3.3.1), we eventually obtain
the six-digit-level fill rate which is aimed for:
FILLRATE jt =
∑k∈ jQUANTITYkt
∑k∈ jQUOTAkt
=
∑k∈ jQUANTITYkt
∑k∈ j(QUANTITYkt/FILLRATEkt)
,
(3.3.5)
Finally, following Brambilla et al. (2010), Harrigan and Barrows (2009), and Khan-
delwal et al. (2011), a quota is defined to be binding if and only if FILLRATE jt ≥
10In fact this is exactly how Brambilla et al. (2010) attached quota information to HS products.
89
CHAPTER 3: QUOTA RESTRICTIONS AND PRICE ADJUSTMENTS
0.9, but we will check the sensitivity of our results to a range of other cutoffs for
binding fill rates later on .11
3.4 Research Design
The purpose of this empirical work is to reveal the effect of the MFA/ATC quota
removal on the exporting behaviour of firms, in particular in terms of the export
price and entry into and exit from the export market. From the point of a research
design, we already have the event of policy change clearly defined on the time line
– the MFA/ATC quota removal on 1 January 2005, and our data covers periods
both before and after that event. But to complete this task of identifying the causal
effect, we still need clearly defined treatment and control groups which exist in
both the pre-event and post-event periods. Treatment-control comparisons in such
a fashion naturally call for a “difference-in-differences” (DD) design. However,
the construction of treatment-control groups depends on the specific content of
research target.
As the first step, we start with a product-level comparison, abstracting away
the role of firms. The data are collapsed down to the product level, so each product
price is actually the quantity-weighted average price across all firms. This is to be in
line with Harrigan and Barrows (2009) and allows us to see how the quota removal
affects products in general. The crucial data underlying our DD comparisons are
11In some cases there existed two layers of quotas for some Chinese textile products. The first
layer was simply category-specific quotas which were implemented through three-digit OTEXA
quota categories. All products within a category were subject to a common quantity limit. The
second layer was category-group quotas which were imposed on multiple OTEXA quota categories
within the category group. Some products were subject to quotas of both layers (See Brambilla et al.
(2010) for more details). For example, in 2001, products in OTEXA category 218 were subject to
a category-specific limit of 12,565,591 square metres, 91.0% of which was filled by the end of
the year; but at the same time, they were also constrained by a category-group (GROUP-I which
consisted of categories 210, 218, 219, etc.) limit of 1,506,349,283 square metres, 85.1% of which
was filled by the end of the year. In such cases, we take the maximum of the two fill rates (91.0%
in the above example) as the actual fill rate of these products in that year.
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the data of the years 2004 and 2005. The treatment group here is those products
bound by quotas in 2004 but no longer subject to quotas after 2004, while the
control group is those products unbound by quotas (including those without quotas)
in 2004 and no longer subject to quotas after 2004. A product’s status of belonging
to either the treatment group or the control group is fixed over time, that is, it
does not switch its status over time. By this setup, we exclude products which
were reimposed quotas after 2005, and thus simply focus on the effect of the quota
removal. Apart from this, if a product lacks data in 2004 and 2005, it will not be
classified as being in either of the groups. For this reason, the products which do
not exist in our data in either of these two years are excluded from our analytical
sample.12 The DD regression takes the form of:
Y jt = α + ∑
t∈T
δtYRt +ρTREAT j+ ∑
t∈T
λt(YRt×TREAT j)+FE+ ε jt , (3.4.1)
where subscripts j and t index product and year, T represents the whole set of years,
i.e., T= {2000,2001,2002,2003,2005}, Y jt is the outcome variable, which could
be value, quantity, or unit value,13 YRt is the year-fixed effect, TREAT j indicates
whether a product is in the treatment group or the control group as follows:
TREAT j =


1, bound by quota in 2004 and no quota in 2005;
0, unbound by quota in 2004 and no quota in 2005.
The term FE represents some sorts of fixed effects to be included where necessary.
The constant term α captures the average of Y jt for the control group in 2004. The
12These products account for about 0.5% of the value of all export products.
13Unit value is the calculated as total value divided by total quantity.
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error term ε jt is assumed to be of i.i.d. distribution. In the spirit of DD design, δt
captures the change in Y jt over time for all products, and ρ picks up the differ-
ence between the treatment and the control group in the base year, that is, 2004.
Further, the coefficient λt gives a second difference: it estimates the differences in
the outcome variable between the treatment and the control groups after removing
cross-year differences controlled by δt . The year 2004 is chosen to be the omitted
year as this is the year right before the MFA/ATC quota elimination. Importantly,
of λt of various years, λ2005 is the key one as it is the DD coefficient that captures
how the quota removal in 2005 affected previously quota-bound products and pre-
viously quota-unbound products differently. Particularly, if λ2005 turns out to be
negative and significant in the price regression, it then indicates that the removal
of quotas lowered product prices, or reversely, the imposition quota of would raise
product prices.
The data also allow us to explore variations in the outcome variables at more
disaggregated firm-product levels, that is, we can replace Y jt with Yi jt , where i
indexes firms. Further, since it is possible that some time-invariant characteristics
could to some extent drive our results, we again add FE, which represents various
forms of fixed effects, to control for these unobserved but potentially influential
time-invariant factors. Specially, FE can be firm fixed effects, product fixed effects,
or firm fixed effects plus product fixed effects in some circumstances. The addition
of these fixed effects restricts the above-mentioned treatment-control comparisons
to be within-firms, within-products, or within firm-product combinations. Note that
a DD setup is a version of fixed effects estimation itself, which is seen in our time
and treatment dummies. But since the flexibility of the content of FE allows refined
exploration of treatment-control comparisons at different levels, the differences in
these results should give meaningful implications on the sources of variations in the
outcome variables. Thus, the complete specification for the log unit value comes
as the following:
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lnYi jt = α + ∑
t∈T
t ̸=2004
δtYRt +ρTREAT j+ ∑
t∈T
t ̸=2004
λt(YRt×TREAT j)
+ωMSHAREi jt +FE+ εi jt .
(3.4.2)
While the above DD regression is designed for evaluating treatment effects, it is
not able to further distinguish the effects between groups of observations. Specif-
ically, the DD regression is expected to give the average quota effect of the sam-
ple, but it is not able to offer any answers to how that effect differs between, for
example, new exporters and existing exporters. As will be clearer later on, further
splitting the sample into different groups of observations of different characteristics
enables us to inspect the heterogeneity in the quota effect, especially that regarding
how the quota effect worked on different types of firms differently.
To overcome this problem, we extend the DD regression simply by one addi-
tional dimension, which is often termed as “difference-in-differences-in-differences”
(DDD) design14 in analogy with DD design. In practice, DDD estimates could be
obtained from differences between multiple DD regressions. Suppose these DD
regressions take the same form as above:
lnYdi jt = α
d + ∑
t∈T
t ̸=2004
δ dt YRt +ρ
dTREAT j+ ∑
t∈T
t ̸=2004
λ dt (YRt×TREAT j)
+ωdMSHAREi jt +FE+ εi jt ,
(3.4.3)
where the only difference with Eq. (3.4.2) is the superscript d which is an indicator
of the regression based on a subsample of the previous DD regression sample.
At some point in the analyses that follow, we divide products into differentiated
14This method is sometimes also called “triple differences” design.
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products and homogeneous products by their price variabilities for the purpose of
relating variations in price drop to quality differentiation. In that case,
d =


dif, differentiated products;
hom, homogeneous products.
In the case where we try to identify the differences in the treatment effect for firms
of different ownership types and sizes, the specifications of the subsamples are
d =


state, state-owned firms;
foreign, foreign firms;
dom, other domestic firms.
and
d =


large, large exporters;
small, small exporters.
Finally, we also intend to look at the differences between entrants and incumbents
in the export market, in which case
d =


new, new exporters;
cont, continuing exporters.
The DDD estimates of interest for the above two cases are λ dif2005−λ
hom
2005, λ
state
2005−
λ dom2005, and λ
foreign
2005 −λ
dom
2005, λ
large
2005 −λ
small
2005 , λ
new
2005−λ
cont
2005.
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3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Descriptive results
To have a sense of the scope of the changes in the quota coverage, Table 3.1 shows
the numbers of products (six-digit HS level) covered by quotas and products bound
by quotas for each year. The changes in these numbers over time are highly consis-
tent with the timeline of quota removal and reimposition. Before 2004, the num-
bers of products not subject to U.S. quotas increased only very slightly from 33
to 46.15 In 2004 quotas on about 90 (134− 46 = 88) more products were re-
moved, but the number of products not subject to quotas increased abruptly by
420 (554−134 = 420) in 2005 when all the MFA quotas were scheduled to be e-
liminated completely. However, because of the U.S. special safeguard mechanism,
quotas were reimposed on some products in the middle and end of 2005, and a new
U.S.-China memorandum was reached which specified which and how new quo-
tas were to be imposed from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2008. This explains
the reason why in the table the number of quota products was still positive in and
after 2005 when it should have been zero if the U.S. had not taken any safeguard
measures. The number of quota-bound products exhibited similar trends, but an
exception is that new quotas in force in 2006 were not binding. In other words,
none of the 179 products subject to U.S. quotas in 2006 had a fill rate above 0.9.
Note that the figures given above of how many products were bound and un-
bound by quotas each year are not exact indications of the treatment and the control
group. As explained in Section 3.4, the definitions of the two comparison groups
require data on two crucial years: 2004 and 2005. If a product does not exist in our
15In fact, there could be some products which exited quota coverage before 2004 if a product is
defined at more detailed HS levels than 6 digits. But in such case, we would not be able to link these
products with quota information from the U.S. source. As a result, if a six-digit HS product exited
quota coverage in a year, it should be interpreted as a case that all products in this HS category
exited quota coverage entirely.
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Table 3.1. Numbers of the MFA/ATC products
exported from China to the U.S.
Subject to U.S.
quotas or not
Bound by U.S.
quotas or not
Year No Yes No Yes Total
2000 33 471 236 268 504
2001 35 480 380 135 515
2002 40 501 471 70 541
2003 46 529 460 115 575
2004 134 446 443 137 580
2005 554 107 565 96 661
2006 477 179 656 0 656
Notes. Products are six-digit HS products. Quota products are those tex-
tile and clothing products subject to U.S. quotas. Quota-bound products
are those textile and clothing products subject to U.S. quotas with fill rates
larger than 90%. Fill rate of a product is the ratio of actual quantity import-
ed by the end of calendar year to quota level of that year. An exception is
the year 2005, in which quotas were reimposed on some products after the
middle of the year and the fill rates are calculated based on periods shorter
than 7 months in stead of a whole calendar year.
data in 2004 or 2005, it is excluded from our analytical sample. For this reason,
the numbers of products in the treatment and control groups should be smaller than
those of the quota-bound and the quota-unbound products, respectively. Indeed,
such discrepancy is seen if one compares Table 3.1 with Table 3.2 which gives a
brief summary of the two comparison groups.
The export values from the two comparison groups in Table 3.2 are more in-
tuitively displayed in Figure 3.1 which makes a comparison of the export value
growth rates between these two groups of products. The difference between these
two groups graphically captures the effect of the quota removal in 2005 on export
value growth. Indeed, it shows that the difference in growth from 2004 to 2005
is prominent. Underlying data suggest that after quotas were removed, the previ-
ously quota-bound products experienced 155% growth ((1735/681−1)×100%=
155%) in exports, while those not bound by quotas in 2004 only grew by 61%
((4540/2830−1)×100%= 60%). This big contrast reflects the significant effect
of the MFA quota elimination and is also generally consistent with what Harrigan
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Table 3.2. Summary of the treatment and control groups in the
analytical sample
Number of products
Value of products
(million USD)
Year Treatment Control Total Treatment Control Total
2000 75 295 370 400 813 1,213
2001 82 300 382 472 873 1,345
2002 87 322 409 424 1,169 1,593
2003 93 344 437 557 2,003 2,560
2004 98 374 472 681 2,830 3,510
2005 98 374 472 1,735 4,540 6,275
2006 96 366 462 2,382 5,531 7,912
Average 90 339 429 950 2,537 3,487
Notes. Products are six-digit HS products. Treatment group: products bound by quotas in 2004 and
not subject to quotas in 2005. Control group: products unbound by quotas in 2004 and not subject
to quotas in 2005.
and Barrows (2009) found for the U.S. imports of Chinese apparel and textiles in
the same period.16
The fact that export quantities increased far faster in the group of products
which had binding quotas removed is entirely unsurprising. More pertinently, in
Figure 3.2, we plot by year the unit values for the treatment and control group-
s separately. To make the unit values comparable across products with different
physical measurement units (e.g., kilograms and square metres), all unit values are
demeaned within each group of products with the same physical measurement u-
16By the estimates of Harrigan and Barrows (2009), the value of imports of Chinese apparel and
textiles grew by 45%. There are several possible reasons for the discrepancy between their estimate
and ours. First, Harrigan and Barrows’s (2009) sample includes all MFA/ATC products imported
from China, while ours excludes trading firms, keeping only pure production firms. Production
firms may have incentive to increase their exports more by themselves than by trading agents after
the MFA/ATC quotas expired in order to save costs on intermediary fees paid to trading firms.
Second, their definition of goods is at the ten-digit HS level, more detailed than ours. Export
value of quota-bound six-digit products in 2004 may be lower than that of quota-bound ten-digit
products because our measure of fill rates of six-digit products may have been driven down by quota-
unbound ten-digit products within each six-digit category. This leads to fewer products classified
as quota-bound products in 2004 than by ten-digit definition. Third, their estimates of growth are
weighted averages of quota groups, where the weights are the groups’ shares of exports averaged
over 2004 to 2005. As the share of quota-unbound products were much higher in 2004 than in 2005,
their measure probably gives more weights to the export growth of quota-unbound products than if
simply calculates the aggregate value growth.
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Fig 3.1. Export value of products
nit. On top of others, a compelling message from the figure is that with a common
declining trend, the unit value plummet in 2005 was much steeper for the treatment
group than for the control group: the average decrease of demeaned price is more
than 3 USDs for the treatment products, while it is only more than 1 USD for the
control products. This finding serves as strong evidence of price decline caused by
the quota removal. Overall, the graphical illustration here implies a sizable nega-
tive effect of the quota removal on product price, and also justifies the use of formal
estimation strategies involving treatment-control comparisons.
3.5.2 Product-level analysis
The baseline estimates come from the product-level regressions of Eq. (3.4.1). The
results are reported in Table 3.3, with the outcome variable being log value (lnV jt),
log quantity (lnQ jt), or log unit value (lnP jt). First, let us look at the plain OLS
specification (“No FE”) without including any fixed effects. The parameter δ2005
shows that the total export value of an average textile product nearly doubled (94%)
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Fig 3.2. Unit value of products
in 2005 after the quotas were eliminated. But λ2005 further reveals that among these
products, the growth rate was 60% higher for those products subject to binding
quotas prior to the quota elimination, compared to those not. Similar results are
found for quantity, but the magnitudes are larger. On average, the products experi-
enced 106% growth in 2005 relative to 2004 in terms of quantity exported. Again,
the growth is extremely uneven between the quota-bound and the quota-unbound
products. As is captured by λ2005, the quantity growth rate was 88% higher for a
quota-bound product than for a quota-unbound product. This number is impres-
sive and is consistent with the previous statistics and the finding in Harrigan and
Barrows (2009).
Then, we move on to the other two specifications which impose fixed effects
into the regression: measurement unit fixed effects and product fixed effects. One
reason for the measurement unit fixed effects to be introduced is, as mentioned
before, to avoid the difficulty in comparing prices among products measured by
different physical units (e,g., kilograms versus square metres). The other reason
is to correct the potential bias caused by pooling products measured by different
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Table 3.3. Full result of the product-level estimates of the price effect of quota. Dependent variable: lnP jt .
Export value: lnV jt Export quantity: lnQ jt Export unit value: lnP jt
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
δ2000 −0.417
∗∗∗ −0.545∗∗∗ −1.023∗∗∗ −0.517∗∗∗ −0.622∗∗∗ −1.081∗∗∗ 0.099∗ 0.076 0.060
(0.146) (0.142) (0.144) (0.158) (0.155) (0.157) (0.053) (0.051) (0.049)
δ2001 −0.536
∗∗∗ −0.647∗∗∗ −1.105∗∗∗ −0.594∗∗∗ −0.722∗∗∗ −1.203∗∗∗ 0.080 0.096∗ 0.109∗∗
(0.146) (0.140) (0.133) (0.166) (0.160) (0.152) (0.054) (0.054) (0.050)
δ2002 −0.093 −0.179 −0.550
∗∗∗ −0.060 −0.118 −0.517∗∗∗ −0.032 −0.060 −0.031
(0.114) (0.109) (0.102) (0.125) (0.122) (0.112) (0.048) (0.047) (0.045)
δ2003 0.139 0.094 −0.105 0.157 0.114 −0.108 −0.018 −0.019 0.002
(0.101) (0.098) (0.089) (0.112) (0.108) (0.096) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039)
δ2005 0.944
∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 1.075∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.086) (0.093) (0.091) (0.093) (0.099) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035)
δ2006 1.395
∗∗∗ 1.389∗∗∗ 1.328∗∗∗ 1.388∗∗∗ 1.388∗∗∗ 1.323∗∗∗ 0.007 0.000 0.005
(0.096) (0.096) (0.103) (0.106) (0.107) (0.114) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
ρ 0.483 0.054 0.061 −0.400 0.422∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.278) (0.325) (0.305) (0.116) (0.115)
λ2000 0.580
∗ 0.319 0.292 0.581∗ 0.381 0.365 −0.001 −0.061 −0.075
(0.339) (0.303) (0.299) (0.331) (0.308) (0.293) (0.093) (0.089) (0.082)
λ2001 0.727
∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗ 0.615∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.036 −0.086
(0.278) (0.243) (0.228) (0.287) (0.262) (0.242) (0.093) (0.090) (0.087)
λ2002 0.079 0.010 0.138 0.023 −0.062 0.099 0.056 0.072 0.037
(0.218) (0.199) (0.201) (0.227) (0.212) (0.210) (0.070) (0.066) (0.068)
λ2003 −0.203 −0.202 −0.158 −0.095 −0.081 −0.037 −0.108 −0.122 −0.121
(0.220) (0.206) (0.200) (0.216) (0.208) (0.191) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076)
λ2005 0.592
∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.196) (0.213) (0.211) (0.212) (0.230) (0.062) (0.063) (0.068)
λ2006 0.570
∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.201) (0.217) (0.221) (0.219) (0.238) (0.069) (0.069) (0.075)
R2 0.078 0.254 0.807 0.071 0.193 0.802 0.018 0.225 0.863
Notes. Products are six-digit HS products. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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physical units together. For example, suppose there are two different measurement
units: grams and kilograms. Obviously the price of a product measured in grams
will tend to be much less than one measured in kilograms. If, after quota removal,
exports of products measured in grams increased by more than exports of products
measured in kilograms, we would get an average price fall. This should be dealt
with by measurement unit fixed effects. The inclusion of product fixed effects
would do more than that: it modifies the above plain OLS estimates to be based
on the time variation in the price specific to a given product. On the one hand,
the inclusion of measurement unit fixed effects turns out to only reduce the size
of estimates slightly. On the other hand, since the sample is a balanced panel of
products between 2004 and 2005 (as seen in Table 3.2), the plain OLS and product
fixed effects model produce identical estimates on λ2005. Hence for convenience,
here we just reply on the plain OLS results for interpretation.
The obviously lower magnitudes of growth for export values than for quantities
imply decreasing product unit values following quota elimination. And indeed, the
sign of λ2005 for the regressions of unit values are reversed. Unit values for textile
products deceased 11% on average in 2005. As expected, the effect of binding
quotas is sizable but in the opposite direction to what has been found for value
and quantity. To be more precise, a binding quota lowered unit values as much as
29%.17
3.5.3 Firm-product-level analysis
Our data allows us to explore price variations at the firm-product level, and we now
move on to implement various forms of the fixed effect component as outlined in
Eq. (3.4.2). The fixed effect component could be specified at different levels. Par-
17It is only marginally lower than Harrigan and Barrows’s (2009) finding for the price decrease,
which is 32%.
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ticularly, we are interested in how these specifications generate different results for
the price variations. If the results from these specifications are significantly differ-
ent from each other, the differences should suggest how the quota effect on price
is driven by various factors embodied in these fixed effect components. Table 3.4
reports all the results together.
In the upper panel where there is no control for firm’s market share of products,
the first column “No FE” (the specification without any fixed effects) gives an esti-
mate of the average effect of the quota removal on price. The figure is about -35%,
slightly larger than found in Table 3.3. Because the variation of price is now at a
more disaggregated firm-product level, we can see each firm-product combination
as a “variety”. Thus, the price drop of “varieties” here is also contributed by firms
lowering price for each product, apart from a price drop at the product level. Fur-
ther, the bigger magnitude found here suggests that “varieties” have sharper price
decrease than found for (six-digit) products.
The role of firm-level heterogeneity in driving the price variation is also reflect-
ed in the difference between the specifications of No FE and Firm FE. After adding
firm fixed effects, two thirds of the quota effect vanishes and the R2 grows dramat-
ically. By contrast, however, adding product fixed effects (Product FE) reduces the
effect by less than one third and increases the R2 by a much smaller magnitude.
Together, these numbers suggest that firm-level adjustments alone explain the ma-
jority of the price reduction. More specifically, two thirds of the price drop is due to
the increased share of new firms which generally produce lower-price products,18
while one third is due to within-firm price fall. In the rest of the columns, the fixed
effects are specified at increasingly disaggregated levels. As expected, as the fixed
effects become more restrictive, the quota effect shrinks while R2 grows gradually.
18Suppose if the sample was a balanced panel of firms, the result of the fixed effects model would
be identical to the result of the OLS model without any fixed effects. However, since this is not the
case, the difference in these results, as shown in Table 3.4, comes from changes in firm composition
or net entry of firms in the export market.
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The difference between the column of “Product FE” and the column of “Prod-
uct FE + Firm FE” is interesting. The product fixed effects should rule out time-
invariant factors that cause price differences among products, and the addition of
firm fixed effects further makes the estimation a within-product and within-firm
comparisons. Importantly, note that if the sample was a balanced panel of firms,
that is, if each firm was observed for each of the sample years, we would expect
to get identical results from these two specifications in a DD setup. However, if
the sample was an unbalanced panel of firms, we would then expect a discrepancy
between the results due to changes in the composition of firms over time. As a fact,
it is seen that the inclusion of firm fixed effects further reduces λ2005 by a slightly
more than half of the size. This delivers to us a message that for a given product,
on average more than half of the price drop after the quota elimination was actually
due to firm turnover in the export market. In other words, firm entry and exit (or
net entry as the net effect) were important sources of the price effect of the quota
removal even after taking into account the differences in prices across products.
The above findings provide evidence on the relative roles of firm entry and
within-firm adjustments hidden behind the negative effect of quota removal on
product price. Multi-product firm theories have made predictions on the micro-
level adjustments of exporting following changes in trade costs. On top of generat-
ing other implications, the above empirical results shed light on these predictions.
Insofar as quotas have similar effects to per unit transport cost, a novel implication
of the model of Bernard et al. (2011) is that apart from entry of less productive
firms, the quota removal would also induce continuing exporters to start exporting
low-quality products. Nevertheless, since there is no explicit relationship between
firm productivity and product quality in Bernard et al.’s (2011) model, it is unclear
whether and how firm entry actually affects average product prices. However, if
less productive firms generally export lower-quality products in the real world, we
shall expect more firms to appear in the export market, export products of lower
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Table 3.4. Estimates of the price effect of quota from DD
specifications with different levels of fixed effects. Dependent
variable: lnPi jt .
Without control for market share
No FE Firm FE Product FE
Product FE +
Firm FE
λ2005 −0.348
∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
R2 0.146 0.644 0.494 0.774
With control for market share
No FE Firm FE Product FE
Product FE +
Firm FE
λ2005 −0.346
∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
ω 0.394∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.031) (0.035) (0.028)
R2 0.147 0.645 0.495 0.774
Notes. Products are six-digit HS products. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% levels respectively. Coefficients on other explanatory variables are suppressed here to
save space, but the full result is reported in Tables B2 and B3 of Appendix B.
prices than continuing exporters, and thus draw down the average prices of export
products. This is exactly what we have found in Table 3.4.
In the lower panel of the table, firm’s share in exports of each product from
China, MSHARE, is included to control for changes in markups in price variations
as in Manova and Zhang (2012). The argument behind it is that the quota removal
could induce firms to lower product prices not only via quality downgrading effec-
t but also because of more intensive competition from both incumbents and new
exporters. The coefficient of MSHARE, ω , should be able to capture such compe-
tition effect if the changes in a firm’s market power is well picked up by its market
share. The result shows that ω is positive and highly significant across regressions
of all specifications on fixed effects, indicating that, other things being equal, big-
ger market power allows firms to charge higher prices. But the net effect of the
quota removal remains almost the same as in the upper panel.
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3.5.4 Competition effect or quality change?
Although at least part of the price drop should be attributed to the removal of quo-
tas, the nature of the decrease in price is still somewhat mysterious. Our control
variable of the firm’s share in the exports of a product has been introduced to cap-
ture the effect of changing markups on product prices. If a firm enjoys a bigger
market share in the U.S. market compared to other Chinese firms, it is expected to
be able to charge higher prices on a given product, other things equal. However, a
problem with this control is that when there are changes in market conditions, these
firms are not necessarily less vulnerable to more intensive competitions. Even if
they are less likely to reduce their prices, we do not know to what extent this ar-
gument is true because the MFA/ATC quota removal applies to other developing
countries which export to the U.S. as well. For this reason, simply including mar-
ket share relative to other Chinese firms is probably not an ideal proxy to isolate
the competition effect in the price fall, and therefore we are sure quite sure about
the relative contributions of the competition effect and quality downgrading in the
average price fall.
With such caveat borne in mind, here we take an indirect approach to see
whether the significant price drop found above is more likely due to increased ex-
port competition or due to quality downgrading. This approach comes from our
conjecture that in an extreme case where products are perfectly homogenous (these
products are of the same quality in a physical sense),19, and then any price drop
should be due to a competition effect rather than changes in the physical charac-
teristics of the good, in other words, changes in quality. At the other end of the
spectrum where all products are differentiated in quality – product varieties are
vertically different and involve different technology and cost, then we would ex-
pect quality changes to be more likely to happen because firms can switch between
19Some raw materials in the HS chapter of textiles can be considered as proximate to homoge-
neous products, e.g., HS 500100 “Silk-worm Cocoons Suitable for Reeling”.
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product varieties of different qualities. In other words, differentiated products have
bigger scopes for altering product qualities than homogeneous goods. In the real
world, if we can differentiate differentiated products from homogenous products
or measure product quality heterogeneity by whatever means, then the above rea-
soning leads to a relevant and testable hypothesis for our interpretation of the price
drop:
If price falls are due only to the effects of increased competition, then homoge-
neous products will have the same price falls as differentiated products; if there is
also a genuine quality effect, differentiated products will have larger price falls.
Without having any direct or external measures of product quality at a reason-
ably disaggregated level, we rely on the standard deviation of a product’s price in
2004 to identify differentiated products and homogeneous goods. More specifical-
ly, if a product’s standard deviation of log price is above the median of all products
in 2004, it is seen as a differentiated product; otherwise it is seen as a homoge-
neous product.20 Such division of products enables us to implement an extra level
of comparison on top of the baseline treatment-control comparison.
It would be helpful to first take a glance at the characteristics of these multiple-
level comparison samples before going down to the formal estimation. As seen in
Table 3.5, our definition of differentiated versus homogeneous products splits up
the products into two groups of virtually equal number of products.21 The price
variation among the differentiated products is about 50% larger than that among
homogenous products, whether within the treatment group or within the control
group. Interestingly, products are more likely to be homogeneous products in the
treatment group than in the control group, which may be due to the fact that the
20We also tried 25% and 75% percentiles of the standard deviation of price as thresholds to define
homogeneous and differentiated products, and the result is more pronounced.
21Because we include the product of median price variation into the category of differentiated
products, the group of differentiated products contains exactly one more product than the group of
homogeneous products.
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Table 3.5. Description of homogeneous and differentiated
products in treatment and control groups in 2004
Homogeneous
products
Differentiated
products Total
Treatment N = 53 N = 35 N = 88
s.d.(p) = 0.767 s.d.(p) = 1.207 s.d.(p) = 0.954
Control N = 153 N = 172 N = 325
s.d.(p) = 1.129 s.d.(p) = 1.601 s.d.(p) = 1.524
Total N = 206 N = 207 N = 413
s.d.(p) = 1.005 s.d.=(p) = 1.581 s.d.(p) = 1.453
Notes. Products are six-digit HS products. “N” represents number of products, and “s.d.(p)”
represents the standard deviation of log price. Differentiated products: products of which
the standard deviation of log price is above the median level of all products in 2004. Homo-
geneous products: products of which the standard deviation of price variation is below the
median level of all products in 2004. Treatment group: products bound by quotas in 2004
and not subject to quotas in 2005. Control group: products unbound by quotas in 2004 and
not subject to quotas in 2005.
U.S. had bigger demand for relatively homogeneous goods from China and hence
quotas on these goods were more likely to be filled.22
We then apply the DDD estimation setup of Eq. (3.4.3) to these two subsamples
of products at the firm-product level. The results for the estimation with and with-
out controlling for differences in measurement units across products are presented
in Table 3.6. Apart from showing the ordinary regression result, it also presents the
result with measurement unit fixed effects being included to make quantities and
unit values comparable across products measured by different physical units. As
before, the sign of the key coefficient λ2005 is always negative and significant for
both of the heterogeneous products and the homogeneous products, which mean-
s price drop as a result of the quota removal was a common phenomenon across
products of different levels of quality differentiation.
But more interestingly, the coefficients say that the competition effect reduced
22Also we observe that the numbers of products in both of the treatment group and the control
groups here are smaller than in Table 3.2. This is because some products were exported only by a
single firm in 2004, and thus the price variations across firms for these products are not available.
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Table 3.6. DDD estimates of the price effect of quota for
product differentiation. Dependent variable: lnPi jt .
Differentiated products
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ dif2005 −0.356
∗∗∗ −0.311∗∗∗ −0.304∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.038)
R2 0.018 0.157 0.470
Homogenous products
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ hom2005 −0.166
∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.030) (0.024)
R2 0.035 0.293 0.574
Difference:
dif. vs. hom. products
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ dif2005−λ
hom
2005 −0.190
∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗ −0.206∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.059) (0.048)
Notes. Products are six-digit HS products. Differentiated products: products of
which the standard deviation of log price is above the median level of all products
in 2004. Homogeneous products: products of which the standard deviation of log
price is below the median level of all products in 2004. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Coefficients on other explanatory variables
are suppressed here to save space.
prices by 16%, and the combined competition and quality effect reduced prices by
31%. So the quality effect is about equal to the competition effect. Of course,
it is also possible that since homogeneous products are not really homogeneous,
thus some of the price fall in that group can also be due to a quality effect. If this
is the case, the quality effect estimated in this way is a lower bound: the actual
quality effect was possibly stronger than the competition effect. In sum, this result
lends support to our hypothetical statement above, suggesting that quality down-
grading seems to have played an important role in the price drop. The removal of
quotas lowered product prices significantly, but perhaps it was more because firm-
s changed their product-mix to focus more on high-quality varieties than because
they reduced prices on existing price labels in face of fiercer competition.
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3.5.5 Heterogeneous effects across firms
(a) How were MFA/ATC quotas allocated in China?
Under the MFA quantity restrictions, quotas were extremely important and scarce
economic resources in China. For a long time, all quotas were strictly controlled by
the state and were allocated to production firms through pure bureaucratic forces.
MFA quotas were first distributed from the bureau at the national level to its provin-
cial and municipal branches, who then decided how the quotas were to be allocated
among firms. Not surprisingly, the dominance of bureaucratic coordination lead
to an entire lack of transparency in the quota allocation, which, as it turned out,
inevitably caused active rent-seeking activities and inefficient allocation of quotas
(Moore, 2002, Ch. 5).
In recognition of such obvious drawbacks with the quota management system, a
series of reform measures were taken step by step by the government to rationalise
the quota allocation and introduce market mechanism into it. First, the allocation of
quotas through administrative departments became more based on firms’ past per-
formances. Firms which previously obtained higher quotas and utilised higher pro-
portion of them were more likely to get a large size of quotas. Second, an auction
system was introduced and gradually extended to some of the product categories.
The auction system was comprised of two parts: “open bidding” and “bidding by
agreement”. Roughly speaking, under the first scheme, quotas were auctioned pub-
licly and firms which bid the highest price would be allocated the quota at the price
they bid, while under the second scheme, the price was determined by the auction
committee and was normally lower than under the open bidding system to benefit
more firms.
The shift of the quota allocation system from administrative coordination to-
ward market coordination was far from being complete. Although the government
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was reluctant to release accurate data on the proportions of administrative allo-
cations and auction allocations, by all accounts, auctions never played a major
role in the allocations. For example, an estimate showed that the quotas allocated
through the bidding system accounted for only 30% of all U.S. quotas by 2000
(Moore, 2002, Ch. 5). Meanwhile, for the administrative allocations, despite the
fact these arrangements were claimed to be made mainly according to firms’ past
export record, political favourism was in fact toward large state-owned firms in the
coastal regions (Yang, 1999), while foreign firms had to go through special ad-
ministrative procedures to obtain quotas and often met unexpected difficulties in
getting them (Moore, 2002, Ch. 5).
(b) Firm ownership type
Since state-owned firms had intimate political connections with the government
and had enjoyed larger quotas in the past, the bias in allocating quotas among firms
also existed in the auction system of “bidding by agreement”. This type of bidding
accounted for 70% of all auctioned quotas and these quotas were actually largely
reserved for state-controlled firms (Moore, 2002, Ch. 5). Supportive evidence on
the inefficiency in the allocation of quotas is also found in more rigorous studies.
For example, in a study of Chinese textile and apparel exports which uses the same
data as ours, Khandelwal et al. (2011) studied firm entry and exit in the export
market when the MFA/ATC quotas were removed, and found entrants had lower
prices than the incumbents and caused state-owned firms to exit. This finding is
consistent with the above argument that the MFA/ATC quotas were particularly
favoured toward state-owned firms away from economically efficient allocations.
The conjecture that state-owned firms were probably less restricted by quotas
is supported by the figures in Table 3.7, where we compare state-owned firms with
other domestic firms in the first two specifications without any fixed effects and
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with measurement unit fixed effects. The quota effect seems to be 13 to 15 percent-
age points smaller for state-owned firms than for other domestic firms. However, if
we compare within each product, the difference does not exist any more. But this
is still consistent with the above explanation as differences in these results suggest
that products exported by these two types of firms were different. State-owned
firms may have particularly focused on certain products which were probably less
restrained by quotas especially for these firms of state ownerships.
We also distinguish foreign-owned firms (wholly owned by foreign investors)
from others. According to the estimates in the table, it is found that the quota ef-
fect is nearly 20 percentage points larger than non-state domestic firms. At first
glance, it seems a bit strange as foreign firms are usually thought to export high-
er quality products and have much closer and constant relationships with foreign
markets (especially their mother countries), for example through within-firm trade
with parental companies in a foreign country. By the nature of such trade modes,
foreign firms are less likely to lower their product prices. And as a result, their quo-
ta effect should have been smaller instead of larger than non-state domestic firms.
But consider how the mechanism of quality downgrading could in fact come about
here. It is possible that these firms had been producing a larger variety of verti-
cally differentiated products and therefore were able to change the composition of
their export products by shifting weights towards low-price products after the ex-
piration of the MFA/ATC quotas. If such quality downgrading outweighs the price
reduction effect, the negative differential effect found here is not surprising.
(c) Firm size
Analogously, the heterogeneity of the price effect of quotas may also exist among
firms of different sizes. An important reason to look at the firm size lies in the po-
tential role of the firm productivity behind firm adjustments. What is already known
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Table 3.7. DDD estimates of the price effect of quota for
firm ownership type. Dependent variable: lnPi jt .
State-owned firms
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ state2005 −0.204
∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.051) (0.037)
R2 0.030 0.212 0.589
Foreign firms
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ
foreign
2005 −0.546
∗∗∗ −0.565∗∗∗ −0.386∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.064) (0.051)
R2 0.023 0.115 0.472
Other domestic firms
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ dom2005 −0.349
∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.041) (0.032)
R2 0.029 0.140 0.493
Difference: state-owned vs. other domestic
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ state2005−λ
dom
2005 0.145
∗∗ 0.134∗∗ −0.018
(0.072) (0.067) (0.052)
Difference: foreign vs. other domestic
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ
foreign
2005 −λ
dom
2005 −0.197
∗∗ −0.192∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.077) (0.061)
Notes. Products are six-digit HS products. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels respectively. Coefficients on other explanatory variables are suppressed
here to save space.
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Table 3.8. DDD estimates of the price effect of quota for
firm size. Dependent variable: lnPi jt .
Large exporters
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ
large
2005 −0.280
∗∗∗ −0.315∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.028) (0.021)
R2 0.023 0.170 0.536
Small exporters
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ small2005 −0.573
∗∗∗ −0.524∗∗∗ −0.428∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.116) (0.100)
R2 0.014 0.147 0.433
Difference: large vs. small exporters
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ
large
2005 −λ
small
2005 0.293
∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.100) (0.081)
Notes. Products are six-digit HS products. Large firms: firms with export sales
above median averaged over years . Small firms: firms with export sales below
median averaged over years. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Coefficients on other explanatory variables are suppressed here
to save space.
from theories is that more productive firms are more likely to enter the export mar-
ket. But what remains unclear is how productivity affects firms’ price adjustment
behaviour in response to changes in quotas. Unfortunately, our data contains no
information for measuring firm productivity directly. However, we can take firm
size as a reasonable proxy for firm productivity since most empirical studies have
documented an unambiguously positive correlation between these two variables.
Here, we split the sample of firms into large firms and small firms according to
their export sales relative to the sample median. To see how large firms behave
differently from small firms, like before, we adopt the DDD approach by taking
the difference between two DD regressions. The results are reported in Table 3.8.
Small firms are shown to be more responsive than large firms. Roughly, the
small firms reduced their product prices twice as much as the large firms did in per-
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centages. And this result holds for all specifications. Particularly, the small firms
lowered product prices 21 percentage points more than the large firms even when
we compare price reductions within each six-digit product. That is to say, taking
away the time-invariant differences across products, small firms still seem to be sig-
nificantly more flexible in adjusting product prices. To put it more precisely, once
the quotas were gone, it seems relatively easier for small firms to take advantage
of the new export opportunities by switching to export low-price products. If small
firms are less productive firms compared to large firms, it implies that low-price
products produced by less productive firms may have been crowded out because
of quotas. And as a result, quota removal would lead to more obvious price drop
among firms of low productivity.
(d) New exporters vs. continuing exporters
While the baseline analysis has established the evidence of the price-reducing ef-
fect of quota removal, we do not know yet whether such price effect is homoge-
neous for new exporting firms and incumbents in the export market. As the firm-
level extensive margin of exporting, the firm entry induced by the quota removal
influences the average price of products if the changes in quotas have different ef-
fects on these new exporters from those on existing exporters. Empirically, the
overall price drop observed could be because new exporters in general export prod-
ucts of lower qualities than existing exporters, or because the quota removal has
stronger negative effect on new exporters. The evidence above has already con-
firmed the first channel, and we will now take a look at the second channel to see
how the new firms and continuing firms in the export market respond to the quota
removal differently by adjusting product prices.
The estimation strategy is based on Eq. (3.4.3), with the two subsamples being
new exporters and continuing exporters defined by each year. Note that here new
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exporters and continuing exporters are defined by the information of the begin-
ning year (2000) and the ending year (2006) of our sample. Thus, new exporters
are those who started exporting after 2000 and continued to export in 2006, while
continuing exporters exported in both 2000 and 2006. For each regression, λ2005
captures the effect of the quota removal on prices for each of the subsamples. The
difference between the two λ2005, i.e., λ
new
2005−λ
cont
2005, from the two separate regres-
sions reflects the differential effect of the quota removal on the entering exports as
opposed to the continuing firms. If the difference is negative and significant, it then
indicates a larger price effect of the quota removal on the entering exporters than
on the continuing exporters.
Indeed, it seems to be the case in the first two columns of Table 3.9. The first
column does not specify any fixed effect components and therefore simply reveals
the average effect across all firms and products. In the second column, the inclu-
sion of the fixed effects of measurement unit restricts comparisons to be within
groups of products of the same physical measurement units. The results from both
specifications are more or less the same: the elimination of quotas induced the en-
tering exporters to lower product prices about 13 to 14 percentage points more than
the continuing exporters did. Therefore, the conjecture that the price effect of the
quota removal is more pronounced for new exporters is supported. However, the
inclusion of more disaggregated fixed effects, product-level fixed effects, makes
the difference insignificant. Our explanation is that different from established ex-
porters, new exporters deliberately selected to export products that had especially
large price reductions in 2005 to meet the increasing demand for these products.
The negative coefficient in the first two specifications could contain such selection
bias, and by the same reason, the inclusion of product-specific factors can mitigate
such endogeneity in estimation. The differences in these results suggest the above
argument is likely to be the case.
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Table 3.9. DDD estimates of the price effect of quota for
firm entry. Dependent variable: lnPi jt .
New exporters
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ new2005 −0.304
∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.038) (0.030)
R2 0.017 0.141 0.492
Continuing exporters
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ cont2005 −0.174
∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.056) (0.040)
R2 0.039 0.185 0.602
Difference: new vs. continuing exporters
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ new2005−λ
cont
2005 −0.130
∗ −0.141∗∗ −0.039
(0.075) (0.070) (0.054)
Notes. Products are six-digit HS products. New exporters: firms which started
exporting after 2000 and also exported in 2006. Continuing exporters: firms which
exported in both 2000 and 2006. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% levels respectively. Coefficients on other explanatory variables are suppressed
here to save space.
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3.6 Robustness and Further Discussions
3.6.1 Selection across countries
The basic identification strategy of this study is to compare quota-bound products
(treatment group) with quota-unbound products (control group) in order to assess
the causal effect of binding quotas. As we restrict our sample to Chinese exports
solely to the U.S. market, a problem that potentially could have caused bias to
our result is export destination selection by firms due to cross-country differences
in changes of quota coverage and restrictiveness. For example, if quota-unbound
products in the U.S. experienced larger quota reductions than in the E.U., the slower
growth of quota-unbound products (if any) relative to quota-bound products after
quota abolishment could be at least partly due to more exports being diverted to the
E.U.. And in this case, the effect of the quota removal on export value would have
been overestimated.
Although unfortunately it is impossible to get detailed quota fill rates for each
country, the lower panel of Table 3.10 suggests that the above conjecture is not
likely to be the case. For products never bound by U.S. quotas, the U.S. share in
China’s exports to the world turned out to increase from 10.5% to 15.5% in 2005
after the expiration of the MFA/ATC. Meanwhile, all other major destinations did
not see any significant increases in their shares. The observation that the exports
of quota-unbound products grew relatively more rapid to the U.S. than to other
economies demonstrates the fact that there was no obvious evidence of exports of
these products being diverted away from the U.S. market. Instead, the phenomenon
observed here illustrates some degree of export diversion in the other way round:
more exports were shipped to the U.S. instead of other destinations. If such bias
could be corrected, it would further strengthen the treatment effect we have found
instead of weaken it.
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Table 3.10. Distribution of Chinese textile and clothing exports in
different economies
Products bound by U.S. quotas
Year U.S. E.U. Hong Kong Japan Others Total
2000 7.8% 10.0% 24.4% 32.2% 25.6% 100.0%
2001 5.8% 7.8% 16.7% 45.6% 24.1% 100.0%
2002 3.9% 5.0% 23.7% 35.9% 31.4% 100.0%
2003 2.5% 8.0% 22.6% 21.9% 45.0% 100.0%
2004 2.7% 6.4% 21.0% 32.9% 36.9% 100.0%
2005 15.1% 13.4% 10.9% 22.1% 38.6% 100.0%
Products never bound by U.S. quotas
Year U.S. E.U. Hong Kong Japan Others Total
2000 9.3% 6.1% 31.0% 26.3% 27.2% 100.0%
2001 9.0% 6.4% 28.3% 28.8% 27.5% 100.0%
2002 8.4% 7.2% 28.7% 24.9% 30.9% 100.0%
2003 9.6% 7.6% 26.7% 22.0% 34.0% 100.0%
2004 10.5% 8.4% 23.1% 20.6% 37.4% 100.0%
2005 15.5% 11.5% 18.3% 17.1% 37.6% 100.0%
2006 16.3% 12.3% 16.6% 14.3% 40.5% 100.0%
Notes. Quota products are those textile and clothing products subject to U.S. quotas. Quota-
bound products are those textile and clothing products subject to U.S. quotas with fill rates larger
than 90%. Fill rate of a product is the ratio of actual quantity imported by the end of calendar
year to quota level of that year. An exception is the year 2005, in which quotas were reimposed
on some products after the middle of the year and the fill rates are calculated based on periods
shorter than 7 months in stead of a whole calendar year.
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3.6.2 Restrictiveness of quotas on firms
An underlying assumption of our estimation exploring the firm-product-level vari-
ations is that binding quotas at the product level are binding for all firms which
export these products. While it might be arguable that the 90% fill rate is some-
what subjective when used as the criterion to tell binding quotas from unbinding
quotas,23 it could be even more problematic if we consider the fact that some firms
may not really be constrained by quotas even if these quotas are fully filled. Espe-
cially, if firms are not equally able to obtain quota permissions from quota author-
ities, the fill rate of a product could matter differently for different firms. For the
reasons already discussed, some firms could simply have easier access to quotas
irrespective of their production and export efficiency, while some could not even
if they qualify to do so by any efficiency criterion (for example, productivity and
export capacity).
The most prominent factor for such heterogeneous restrictiveness of quotas on
firms is perhaps firm ownership type. As mentioned before, for textile exports,
all anecdotal accounts point to the fact that state-owned firms were particularly
favoured when quotas were allocated among firms by administrative decisions. In
an extreme case, some state-owned firms could use their political ties with the au-
thorities to eventually get the quota amount as much as they want, and thus the
quota is not restrictive for them at all even if the quota is binding at the product
level for whatever fill rate threshold we use. By contrast, some foreign and private
domestic firms could find it much harder to get quota amounts, thus severely con-
strained by the quota even if the quota is far from being fully filled at the national
23In practice, the E.U. regards quotas more than 95% filled as binding, while the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC) adopted 90% as the divided line (United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission, 2002). Besides, according to the study of Evans and Harrigan (2005),
90% fill rate is the threshold to define a binding quota, which was later adopted by both Harrigan
and Barrows (2009) and Brambilla et al. (2010). But as Harrigan and Barrows (2009, footnote 15)
admitted, because of complex technical issues with the quota management system, a quota is rarely
fully filled. In this sense, we can not exclude the possibility that an 85% fill rate for a particular
product could somehow be equally binding to a 90% fill rate for another product.
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level.
If the above reasoning is indeed the case, then the above product-level quota
fill rates will not be relevant for distinguishing the restrictiveness of these quotas
on individual firms. Instead, what would matter more for firms is whether they can
get quota permissions to export products. This means we should turn to define the
restrictiveness of exporting a product for a firm according to the product’s quota
status rather than its fill rate. To see if this makes a difference, we first need to have
an idea of the distribution of quota fill rates in 2004, which is depicted in Figure 3.3,
where the horizontal axes represent the quota fill rates of products while the vertical
axes measure their shares in terms of number of products and/or export value. This
figure shows that the majority (nearly 80% in terms of number of products and 95%
in terms of value of products) of the products are quota products. Further, virtually
all these quota products have fill rates above 70%. In other words, 70% fill rate
can roughly be used as a threshold to tell quota products from non-quota products.
However, quota products are not equally important: products with fill rates higher
than 88% account for three quarters of value and half of the number of products,
which means that exports are skewed towards products relatively constrained by
quotas at the aggregate level.
Because of the above reasons, we need to check to which extent our base-
line results depend on the choice of threshold fill rate to define a treatment group.
Specifically, We experiment with three groups of treatment groups here, which are
products with fill rates in 2004 falling in the ranges of 70%-80%, 80%-90%, and
90%-100% respectively, while the control group is comprised of products which
were not subject to quotas (or equivalently, with fill rates below 70%) either in
2004 or in 2005.
Table 3.11 displays the results of the robustness check by estimating the DD
coefficient at the product level. We find that when quotas for the treatment group
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Fig 3.3. Distribution of U.S. quota fill rates at the product level in 2004
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become increasingly restrictive at the aggregated product level, the price effect of
quota become increasingly pronounced across all specifications of the fixed effects.
This result is not surprising as it demonstrates that the fill rate is a reasonable index
for the restrictiveness of quotas for products. But is it so for quotas on individual
firms? The answer is: not always. We could see this by doing the similar robustness
check as above to estimate the DD coefficient at the firm-product level. The results
are reported in Table 3.12. It is seen that when the fill rates for the treatment
group increase from the range of 70%-80% to 80%-90%, the price fall does not
always get bigger. Especially, when we control for time-invariant firm-specific
effects, the size of the price effect reduces dramatically. However, if we compare
the results of the fill rates of 70%-80% to those of 90%-100%, the difference in the
”Product FE” column implies that for a given product, quotas more fully filled are
indeed more restrictive on firms. This relationship still holds even if we make the
comparison within firms and products. Thus, the overall message here is that more
fully-filled quotas at the product level only tend to be more restrictive on firms
when the difference in fill rates are big. Particularly, it provides further evidence
to justify our choice of 90% fill rate as the criterion to define a binding quota,
although a caveat is also seen that restrictive quotas are not necessarily restrictive
for all individual firms.
A more careful investigation requires that we should detect firm-level factors
which may affect how a firm is constrained by quotas in general. Although it is
not easy to do so, there are some specific types of firm characteristics which are
suspected to have correlations with firms’ capability of getting quotas at desired
levels. Ownership type, firm size, and firm’s exporting history, among others, are
probably most likely to be correlated with unobservable or hard-to-observe factors
that affect the firm-level restrictiveness from quotas. In this regard, Section 3.5.5
has already provided supporting evidence for these concerns. On the one hand,
all the results seem to be unanimously consistent with our conjecture that firms of
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Table 3.11. Product-level estimates of the price
effect of quota using alternative treatment groups
defined by different fill rate ranges. Dependent
variable: lnP jt .
Treatment 1: 70%<=fill rates< 80%
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ2005 0.037 −0.075 −0.119
(0.119) (0.117) (0.122)
R2 0.020 0.133 0.832
Treatment 2: 80%<=fill rates< 90%
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ2005 −0.020 −0.208
∗∗ −0.175∗∗
(0.088) (0.086) (0.081)
R2 0.018 0.227 0.864
Treatment 3: 90%<=fill rates<= 100%
No FE Meas. unit FE Product FE
λ2005 −0.241
∗∗ −0.392∗∗∗ −0.396∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.092) (0.090)
R2 0.021 0.146 0.847
Notes. We experiment with three groups of treatment groups here, which
are products with fill rates in 2004 falling in the ranges of 70%-80%, 80%-
90%, and 90%-100% respectively, while the control group is comprised of
products which were not subject to any quotas either in 2004 or in 2005.
Products are six-digit HS products. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% levels respectively. Coefficients on other explanatory variables
are suppressed here to save space, but the complete results are available
from the authors upon request.
different characteristics are affected differently by textile quotas. To be concrete,
state-owned firms, large firms, continuing exporters, all prove to be less affected
by the dramatic changes in quotas in general. On the other hand, if such potential
bias in omitted variables could be corrected, the heterogeneity in the quota effect
on firms of different characteristics found in Section 3.5.5 would be even bigger.
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Table 3.12. Firm-product-level estimates of the price effect of
quota using alternative treatment groups defined by different
fill rate ranges. Dependent variable: lnPi jt .
Treatment 1: 70%<=fill rates< 80%
No FE Firm FE Product FE
Product FE +
Firm FE
λ2005 −0.099 −0.149
∗∗∗ −0.100∗ −0.118∗∗
(0.070) (0.057) (0.054) (0.047)
R2 0.092 0.676 0.472 0.795
Treatment 2: 80%<=fill rates< 90%
No FE Firm FE Product FE
Product FE +
Firm FE
λ2005 0.007 0.005 −0.117
∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗
(0.034) (0.026) (0.027) (0.021)
R2 0.162 0.664 0.487 0.779
Treatment 3: 90%<=fill rates<= 100%
No FE Firm FE Product FE
Product FE +
Firm FE
λ2005 −0.303
∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022)
R2 0.099 0.670 0.466 0.795
Notes. We experiment with three groups of treatment groups here, which are products
with fill rates in 2004 falling in the ranges of 70%-80%, 80%-90%, and 90%-100% re-
spectively, while the control group is comprised of products which were not subject to
quotas (or equivalently, with fill rates below 70%) either in 2004 or in 2005. Products are
six-digit HS products. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respec-
tively. Coefficients on other explanatory variables are suppressed here to save space, but
the complete results are available from the authors upon request.
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3.7 Conclusions
This study provides an empirical assessment of the effect of quota restrictions on
firms, throwing new light on both the classical literature on quotas and the recently
emerging theories on multi-product firms. To that end, we use a unique and com-
prehensive firm-product-level data set of Chinese textile and clothing firms to look
into details how they actually responded to the elimination of the MFA/ATC quotas
on 1 January, 2005 in the U.S. market.
Three features of our data make the identification of the quota effects possi-
ble and convincing. First, the event of the MFA/ATC quota removal was large-
scale and clear-cut in terms of timing and product coverage. Second, a linkage
is built by us between the U.S. import quotas and Chinese textile and clothing
products at a considerably disaggregated level. Third, collapsed from the original
firm-transaction-level customs records, our firm-product-level data offers valuable
export product information within exporting firms with sufficient variations over
time and cross products of broad categories.
By employing a “Difference-in-Differences” estimation strategy, we find an av-
erage price drop of about 30% due to the removal of the MFA/ATC quotas. For this
overall drop in price, more than half was found to be caused by the firm turnover
or the changes in the firm composition in the export market, indicating that quotas
probably affect more on firm entry than on product composition within existing
firms in the export market. Admittedly, the price drop could be a mixed con-
sequence of several jointly working forces. Especially, the quota removal could
probably lead to increased competition in exporting from larger exports of some
existing exporters and the entry of new exporters. But our analysis shows that
the quality downgrading is more likely to have played a dominant role than the
competition effect in the fall of prices because differentiated products exhibited
significantly larger price reduction compared to homogeneous products.
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We also find huge heterogeneity in the quota effect across firms. State-owned
and large firms were also shown to be more immune to the shock of the expiration
of the quotas. Continuing exporters were also less affected by the removal of the
quotas than new exporters. The main reason is perhaps that it had been easier for
these firms to obtain quotas from quota-distribution authorities in China, and thus
had been less constrained by the quotas during the time when the MFA/ATC was
still in force.
To a large extent, how trade policies work on heterogeneous firms still remain-
s an under-explored area. Given the increasingly easier access to disaggregated
micro-level data, investigations into issues in this wide area are expected to produce
richer results which could push forward our current understanding of the effects of
trade policies on firm behaviour. One future direction in our agenda is to take a
careful look into the “black box” of multi-product firms to see how they actually
adjust their product mix in terms of adding and dropping products as well as chang-
ing the relative shares of exiting products in response to changes in quotas. Another
interesting topic is made feasible by the fact that the monthly information in our
raw data allows us to investigate how speedily the firms reacted to the sudden and
massive change in quotas, and how such change impacted the market structure and
the distribution of firms across geographical space. These future research topics
touch some under-explored areas and will definitely enrich our current understand-
ings of the relationship between firms and trade policies.
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Quota Restrictions and Intra-firm Reallocations:
The Effect of the MFA Termination
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we estimated the price effect of theMFA quota removal on firms. This
chapter takes a further look into the firm response to the quota elimination by study-
ing the patterns of intra-firm adjustments. The focus is thus placed more on the
multi-product firm (MPF) behaviour compared to the last chapter. There are sever-
al reasons why MPFs have received considerable attentions from trade economists
recently. First of all, compelling evidence has shown that MPFs are the main par-
ticipants in the cross-border trade activities and they dominate international trade
in many aspects (e.g. Bernard et al., 2011, 2010c). Second, the heterogenous firm
model of Melitz (2003) highlights the resource reallocation across firms induced
by changes in trade conditions. However, its assumption that each firm produces
only a single product contradicts the prevalence of MPFs in reality. MPFs, by their
nature, produce and also export multiple products to other countries, which makes
them distinct from single-product firms. The recent MPF models incorporate this
feature into the Melitz model and thus push the theory further by deliberately look-
ing into how resources are reallocated within firms which produce more than one
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product, as well as the reallocation across firms. Finally, the increasing availability
of firm-product-level micro data makes empirical studies in this area feasible, not
only providing evidence to the newly developed theories but also documenting new
stylised facts that inspire theoretical explorations.
The importance of MPFs in exports is also reflected in Chinese customs data.
Table 4.1 shows that during the period 2002-2006, about 60% of the exporting
firms of textiles exported more than one product (defined by HS8 categories), and
this proportion was rising slightly each year. Even more impressive is the high
share of these firms in export value – nearly 90% of export value of these goods
were contributed by multi-product exporters, also with an increasing share over the
years. These figures are quite comparable with those found for developed countries,
such as the U.S. (see Bernard et al., 2010c), and those for developing countries,
such as India (see Goldberg et al., 2010).1 The dominant role of multi-product
exporters in the exports of textiles strongly backs up the notion that one cannot
properly understand firm export bahaviour without considering MPFs.
This chapter provides the first empirical evidence on how multi-product export-
ing firms respond to changes in textile quotas by reallocating resources across prod-
ucts within firms.2 We use comprehensive and detailed records of the transactions
of Chinese firms with other countries via customs. On the one hand, this data set
covers the period 2000–2006, during which the long-existing Multifibre Arrange-
ment (MFA) quotas on textiles and clothing were eventually removed globally on
1st January 2005. On the other hand, when these MFA quotas were still valid,
they only applied to certain types of products as well as to certain countries. Thus,
1According to Bernard et al. (2010c), multi-product firms accounted for 39% and 87% in num-
ber of firms and value of output respectively in the U.S., while they are 47% and 80% in India
by the calculation of Goldberg et al. (2010). Note that their focuses are on firm production rather
than exports, and products are defined by 5-digit SIC categories or similar-level classification, more
aggregated than HS8 categories that we use in this study.
2For simplicity of expression, in this chapter the broad term “textile(s)” represents both textile
and clothing products without explicit indication.
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Table 4.1. Distribution of single-product and multi-product exporters in
Chinese exports to the U.S.
Share of number of firms Share of export value
Year
Single-
product
exporters
Multi-
product
exporters Total
Single-
product
exporters
Multi-
product
exporters Total
2002 42.93% 57.07% 100% 12.37% 87.63% 100%
2003 42.46% 57.54% 100% 10.51% 89.49% 100%
2004 41.71% 58.29% 100% 10.23% 89.77% 100%
2005 39.22% 60.78% 100% 10.15% 89.85% 100%
2006 38.74% 61.26% 100% 10.69% 89.31% 100%
Notes. This table presents by year the shares of single- and multi-product exporters in all Chinese exporting
firms, calculated from the database of the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics. Products here are defined by
HS8 codes.
the removal of MFA quotas provides a unique and ideal setting for examining how
multi-product firms make adjustments in response to quota restrictions since we
have variations of policy over time, across products, and across destinations.
The prevalence of MPFs found above is also seen in the textile industry in Ta-
ble 4.2, where we look at the sample of Chinese textile exporters in the U.S. market
who export only textiles to the U.S.. The figures are quite similar to Table 4.1, but
a more interesting finding is for the year 2005, the year when all MFA quotas ter-
minated. The proportion of MPFs increased dramatically by 15 percentage points,
and the share jumped up by 5 percentage points, implying that MPFs became even
more dominant without export quantity restraints.
Several interesting results stand out in this study. First, we find that the removal
of MFA quotas induced firms to expand their export product scopes (numbers of
products exported) by one third on average. This is the result of firms sudden-
ly adding new product categories into their export product bundles. Second, the
evidence shows that firms tend to reduce their concentration on the best-sales prod-
uct in exports following the quota elimination. The size of the reduction is about
10%, and is mainly caused by the emergence of new export products. Third, a
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Table 4.2. Distribution of single-product and multi-product exporters in the
sample of pure Chinese textile exporters exporting to the U.S.
Share of number of firms Share of export value
Year
Single-
product
exporters
Multi-
product
exporters Total
Single-
product
exporters
Multi-
product
exporters Total
2002 52.34% 47.66% 100.00% 16.71% 83.29% 100.00%
2003 49.92% 50.08% 100.00% 12.32% 87.68% 100.00%
2004 54.05% 45.95% 100.00% 14.75% 85.25% 100.00%
2005 40.21% 59.79% 100.00% 9.24% 90.76% 100.00%
2006 41.94% 58.06% 100.00% 11.14% 88.86% 100.00%
Notes. This table presents by year the shares of single- and multi-product exporters in the sample of Chinese textile
exporters in the U.S. market who exported only textiles to the U.S., calculated from the database of the Chinese
Customs Trade Statistics. Pure textile exporters are defined as exporters who only exported textiles to the U.S., and
products here are defined by HS8 codes.
further look across firms of different ownership types produces a robust finding,
that is, state-owned firms were largely irresponsive to the massive changes in quo-
tas, while foreign-owned responded most strongly in terms of adjustments in both
produce scope and concentration. We attribute this phenomenon to the quota allo-
cation inefficiency that is believed to have existed in China during the MFA period,
which refers to the fact that state-owned firms were given preferences in getting
quota allowances through administrative allocations regardless of their efficiency.
Finally, the above findings are reconfirmed by comparing exports to two destination
countries – the U.S., a major MFA country, and Japan, a major non-MFA country
–, and more importantly, firms’ focus on markets is found to have shifted toward-
s the U.S. and away from Japan. These findings reveal the patterns of intra-firm
resource reallocations triggered by abrupt changes in quota restrictions, and shed
light on some newly emerging theories.
Our study first contributes to the recent literature on multi-product firms. A
key insight of this literature, notably the models of Baldwin and Gu (2009), Eckel
and Neary (2010), Bernard et al. (2011), and Mayer et al. (2011), highlights firms’
decision on product mix following changes in market conditions: firms tend to
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concentrate more on their “core products”, which reflect the firms’ cost advantages
in production, when the market size increases or the trade cost decreases, or, more
generally, when the competition becomes tougher. Thus, changes in economic
conditions not only lead to the entry and exit of firms but also trigger resource
reallocations within firms.
These theoretical predictions have received support from empirical evidence
which depicts the patterns how external economic conditions affect resource re-
allocations within firms. For example, Bernard et al. (2011) study the effect of
the introduction of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1988 on
U.S. firms. Their result shows that U.S. firms experiencing higher Canadian tariff
reductions exhibited a rise in the concentration of production in their largest prod-
ucts, relative to firms experiencing lower Canadian tariff reductions. Using Mexi-
can manufacturing firms data, Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) examine product-level
dynamics within firms in the context of Mexican trade liberalisation under NAF-
TA. They find evidence that the introduction of NAFTA triggered intense product
churning (simultaneous adding and dropping of products) within firms. Goldberg
et al. (2010) investigate how Indian firms adjusted their product mix by adding
and/or dropping products in production during a period of major market reforms.
Without finding any evidence of tariff cuts impacting MPFs’ product mix, they at-
tribute this result to the fact that the high industrial regulation in India had made
firms reluctant to withdraw established product lines once their large entry costs
were sunk. For Canadian firms, Baldwin and Gu (2009) find reduction in product
diversification caused by tariff cuts, although it is more so for non-exporting plants
than for exporting plants.
While the above empirical evidence is broadly consistent with theoretical pre-
dictions, the changes in economic conditions in these studies are either a mixture
of some forms of trade cost reduction and other factors, or only specific at the in-
dustry level. Thus, it is hard to link these external changes to products within firms.
131
CHAPTER 4: QUOTA RESTRICTIONS AND INTRA-FIRM REALLOCATIONS
Since MPF theories specify trade costs at the product level, an ideal empirical con-
text would involve policy variations across products. In this chapter, we explore
a special policy shock – the elimination of MFA quotas. Compared to the above
cases of trade liberalisation, the MFA quota removal have nicer features of being
specific to products, having clear schedule which fits perfectly with the time peri-
ods of our data, and being exogenous to firms. Apart from these, the coverage of
MFA quotas also varies greatly across countries, as some countries imposed MFA
quotas against some Chinese imports while others did not. This additional level of
variation is in line with the theories, since in the theoretical models multi-product
firms should also be able to export to multiple destinations (such as in the models
of Bernard et al. (2011) and Mayer et al. (2011)). Overall, the event of the MFA
removal encompasses essential elements of a clear-cut policy experiment with rich
variations within firms, thus enabling one to study the behaviour of multi-product
firms more thoroughly and precisely.
Our study is also closely related to the previous studies on the quota effect.
The theory that quotas lead to the product quality upgrading dates back to Alchian
and Allen (1964) and Falvey (1979), who emphasised the shift in demand towards
higher-quality goods when the quota rent amounts to imposing the same extra price
for each physical unit of goods. This argument has found its support in the empiri-
cal studies of Feenstra (1988) and less directly Hummels and Skiba (2004). Using
product-level U.S. import data, recent studies by Harrigan and Barrows (2009) and
Brambilla et al. (2010) found the elimination of MFA quotas in 2005 caused sig-
nificant quality drop of the U.S. imports of textile and clothing products from other
countries, especially China. However, despite the evidence that quotas do lead to
quality upgrading via changes in the shares of products of different costs/prices, the
above evidence is only limited to the demand side and nothing is known about the
supply side. Using the firm-product-level Chinese customs data, Khandelwal et al.
(2011) look into the extensive margins of the export price drop of Chinese textile
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and clothing exports to the U.S., and found that the price drop after the MFA quota
phaseout is predominantly due to the firm-level churning – the entry of firms with
relatively low prices at the expense of incumbent state-owned enterprises. While
this study has documented convincing evidence on how firm entry and exit explain
the observed price drop, we still lack information on how existing exporting firms
actually make intra-firm adjustments in response to changes in quotas. In Chap-
ter 3, we examine the issue of how firms changed their export product prices as a
result of quota removal, but we have not explicitly investigated intra-firm adjust-
ments either.
In this chapter, we fill this blank by looking into how quotas affect firms’ deci-
sion on product scope and concentration. Our customs data enable us, for the first
time, to produce micro-level evidence of how firms actually adjust the structure of
their export product bundle in face of a massive and sudden removal of all quantity
restrictions. Because of this, our findings supplement the results of Khandelwal
et al. (2011) as we open the “black box” of firms and place our focus on intra-firm
reallocations instead of firm entry and exit. We also try to answer the question of
how the changes in the product mix have influences on the concentration of export
products. In this way, our study not only sheds light on the theories of MPF be-
haviour, but also extends the current knowledge about the effect of quota policy to
the internal side of firms.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2 we introduce the
institutional background of this study. In Section 4.3 we review the most relevant
theories and propose testable relationship;s. Section 4.4 describes the data and em-
pirical methodology, and Section 4.5 contains and analyses the results. Section 4.6
concludes the main findings and point out future directions. Additional tables not
presented in the main text are contained in Appendix B.
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4.2 Institutional Background
4.2.1 The termination of MFA quotas
The general background of the MFA has already been introduced in Section 3.2
of Chapter 3. However, relevant to the study of this chapter, it is worth noting
that only the U.S., E.U., Turkey, and Canada had quotas against Chinese textile
imports after during the MFA quota phaseout era.3 Interestingly, despite being the
top destination market of Chinese textile exports, Japan did not impose any quantity
restrictions on Chinese goods even before 2005, mainly because of its declining do-
mestic industry and heavy reliance on imports from neighbouring countries (about
70% textile imports were from China in 2004).
4.2.2 The reality of quota allocations in China
As explained in detail in Section 3.5.5 of Chapter 3, for quota allocation in Chi-
na, preference was in fact given to large state-owned firms in the coastal regions
for the administratively allocated part of quotas (Yang, 1999), while in contrast
foreign firms had to go through special administrative procedures to obtain quo-
tas and often met unexpected difficulties in getting them (Moore, 2002, Ch. 5). If
such statements are true, quotas were then not allocated efficiently as some less
efficient state-owned firms could in any case get quota licences regardless of their
performances while some more efficient foreign and private firms could not get the
desired amount of quotas simply because they have weaker political connections
with the authorities.
The inefficient or distorted quota allocation is in contrast with the existing
multi-product firm theories where the market- and product-specific trade costs are
3An exception is Norway which is not part of the E.U., but it dismantled all quotas in 2000.
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the same for all firms and the market entry conditions are solely determined by
trade costs and firm productive efficiency. In other words, in the theoretical world
quotas are allocated perfectly efficiently, whilst for China in reality it is probably
far from being the case. This contradiction implies that firms’ responses to the quo-
ta removal should be heterogeneous across different ownership types. Embedding
the assumption efficient quota allocation into a multi-product firm model, Khan-
delwal et al. (2011) derived implications for how firms would respond to removal
of quotas, that is less productive firms enter into the export market while price
drop is explained by incumbent exporters. With Chinese customs data, however,
what they found empirically is the opposite: the average price fall is mainly driven
by low-price (high-productivity) entrants at the expense of the exit of incumbent
state-owned enterprises. Their finding thus lends support to the above suspicion
that MFA quotas were allocated inefficiently in China. In the following analysis
with a new angle of looking into the adjustments within firms, we also test the
conjecture of quota allocation inefficiency by investigating how firms of different
ownership types respond differently to the quota removal.
4.3 Theoretical Benchmark
The quota allocation system in China implies there are some firm-level barriers to
obtaining quota licences. Firms first need to meet some criteria in order to be able
to get quota licences, whether through administrative allocation or open auctions.
Apart from that, because quota licences are issued separately for individual product
categories and the quantity permission can vary greatly across products, barriers
also exist at the product level. Given the circumstance, it is therefore reasonable to
believe that the MFA quota system creates some kind of firm-product specific trade
cost to firms in China. There are two ways of thinking about the economic role of
such a trade cost. First, as mentioned, a firm needs to overcome some barriers to
135
CHAPTER 4: QUOTA RESTRICTIONS AND INTRA-FIRM REALLOCATIONS
qualify for applying for quotas or participating in auctions. Some costs must be
sunk regardless of the result of quota application or auction. In this sense, a quota
has a fixed cost component. Second, theoretical analyses have demonstrated that
a quantity restriction in effect works in a similar way to a per (physical) unit cost
in that it gives rise to a specific increase in per unit cost (see, for example, Falvey,
1979; Feenstra, 2003; Demidova et al., 2009). Thus, a quota also brings about a
variable trade cost proportional to the units exported.
Despite the mixed nature of the quota in terms of trade cost interpretation, the
model of Bernard et al. (2011) (BRS hereafter) provides a theoretical benchmark
for understanding how the removal of quotas would induce resource reallocations.
In the BRS model, each exporting firm can ship multiple products to multiple for-
eign countries. For a given destination market, besides market entry cost (set-up
cost), a firm will also have to pay a fixed cost for supplying each product in that
market, plus the variable trade cost of exporting goods which takes the “iceberg”
form. Importantly, for a reduction in trade cost in a given market, whether it is the
fixed or variable trade cost associated with each product, the model generates qual-
itatively the same predictions concerning the direction of resource reallocations
across and within firms. Since these results hold for both reductions in fixed and
variable trade cost, the BRS model offers unambiguous predictions on the intra-
firm effect of the MFA quota elimination which removes quota-imposed trade costs
specific to firm, product, and market.
First, because the elimination of quotas greatly removes barriers of exporting
previously quota-restraint products, firms do not need quota licences any more to
export these products. Thus those products which were previously only supplied to
the domestic market or other non-MFA countries can now be profitably exported
to that market which has quotas lifted. This not only is a straightforward result
of quota elimination, but also corresponds to the implication regarding product
extensive margin in the BRS model.
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Another related model is Eckel and Neary (2010) (EN hereafter), which, with
an assumption of oligopolistic market structure, allows strategic interplay between
multi-product firms producing similar goods. This is a feature that distinguishes
this model from the BRS model. Globalisation takes place through two channels
here: (a) the market-size effect, by which firms face larger markets, and (b) the
competition effect, by which existing firms are exposed to more competition from
new firms. They find that the market-size effect does not affect firms’ product
scope, while the competition effect induces firms to drop product lines of rela-
tively high marginal production costs and produce a higher proportion of products
of “core competence”. By this mechanism, the net effect of globalisation is that
firms become “leaner and meaner” in the sense that their product range contracts
with a sharper focus on their “core competence”. Nevertheless, the implications
of this model are only about the production side of firms. If these predictions can
also be extended to the export side of firms, then this model would predict, on the
contrary to the BRS model, a decline in product scope as a result of the MFA quo-
ta elimination, since the removal of quotas induce more firms to enter the export
market while the market size is fixed. However, given the reality that there are a
large number of medium- and small-sized textile firms in China producing similar
goods, the market structure of this industry is unlikely to be oligopolistic. Despite
these different predictions derived different model settings, we can examine the re-
lationship between the MFA quota removal and the firm’s export product scope as
Relationship 1.
Relationship 1 Intra-firm product scope: existing exporters export more products
to a former MFA country relative to the MFA period and relative to non-MFA coun-
tries.
Second, if the BRS prediction holds, which implies an expanded product scope
as a result of the fact that quota removal induces the firm to diversify their product
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mix by adding more products into their export product bundle, there could be a re-
duction in firms’ focus on products that previously enjoyed highest revenue shares
because some resources are reallocated towards these new export products.
However, a different implication might be drawn from the model of Mayer et al.
(2011) (MMO hereafter), where firms increase the skewness of product sales due to
tougher competition. In their framework, the toughness of competition is modelled
as positively related to market size (number of consumers) and bilateral trade cost
(ice-berg type trade cost). Larger market size and higher trade cost induce firms
to skew their exports toward their core products. Although the removal of MFA
quotas fits quite closely into the case of trade liberalisation (reductions in fixed
and/or variable trade cost) in the BRS model, it is not clear in the MMO framework
how the lifting of quotas would change market toughness, because (a) there is no
obvious reason to believe the end of the MFA would change the market size in a
given destination, and (b) quotas do not exactly resemble ice-berg type trade cost.
However, if the removal of quotas does not change the market size while it does
significantly reduce the bilateral trade cost, then the market becomes “less tough”
in the MMO model. If this is the case, then by the MMO model we should also
expect a reduction in product skewness following the elimination of quotas. Again,
as seen above, this prediction goes against that of the EN model: if the latter can
be extended to firms’ exports, we should expect an increase in firms’ concentration
on “core products” due to the competition from the entry of new exports. Since it
is not clear from the theories which prediction is more likely to hold in reality, we
summarise a testable statement as Relationship 2.
Relationship 2 Intra-firm product concentration: the distribution of export sales
revenue is more even (less skewed) among products within existing exporters, with
a decreasing concentration on certain products.
Third, in respect of the reality of the quota allocation system in China (see,
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for example, Moore, 2002, Ch. 5; Yang, 1999; Khandelwal et al., 2011), state-
owned firms could obtain quota licenses more easily than other firms, regardless
of their actual export performance, due to the political preference given by quota
allocation authorities. They were initially less constrained by quotas and therefore
the removal of quotas should have less impact on these firms. Khandelwal et al.
(2011) tested the implication of the inefficiency in quota allocation by looking at
the firm entry and exit in the export market. They found that after the MFA state-
owned firms were crowded out in the export market by the entry of other firms,
thus lending support to the quota allocation inefficiency conjecture. However, this
conjecture has not yet been tested from, the perspective of intra-firm reallocations.
This leads to Relationship 3.
Relationship 3 Firm ownership type and responsiveness: state-owned firms are on
average less responsive to the MFA quota removal in terms of intra-firm adjust-
ments in product scope and product concentration.
4.4 Data and Methodology
4.4.1 Data source
We use the same micro database as used in Chapter 3 – the Chinese Customs Trade
Statistics (CCTS). However, we only use the data from 2002 to 2006 here to avoid
any inconsistency in product codes due to the upgrade of the commodity coding
system - Harmonised System (HS) - in 2002.4 Besides, this selection of years
also prevents unnecessary complication because 2002 is exactly the beginning year
4Note that in Chapter 3 we use this data from 2000 to 2006, because the six-digit-level HS
codes for textiles were virtually unaffected by the upgrade of the coding system. But at the eight-
digit level, the level of aggregation we use in this study in order to link Chinese source of quota
categories with trade data, more codes were likely to have been affected. Keeping only data after
2002 rules our this complication.
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of the last phase of MFA quota relaxation and hence the composition of quota
products should remain basically unchanged from 2002 through 2004, making the
year 2004 the only breakpoint in data and thus facilitating a clear-cut comparison
of what happens before and after the expiration of MFA quotas. As before, imports,
service trade, and trade intermediaries are excluded from our data so that it only
contains commodities exported by production firms to other countries, and the data
is also collapsed to the year level to facilitate our analysis. Each observations in
the data is thus identified by the combination of firm code, eight-digit product code,
destination, and year.
To identify eight-digit-level quota products, we resort to the booklet of Quota-
Restrained Textiles and HS Catalogue (Revised Version) (China Chamber of Com-
merce for Import and Export of Textiles, 2002), which publishes the full list of
the HS10 codes of Chinese textile and clothing products subject to MFA quotas
set by different importing countries, i.e. the U.S., the E.U., Canada, and Turkey.
These quotas were effective from 2002 through 2004. We further aggregate this
list to the HS8 level so that it can be precisely linked to the HS8 codes in the above
micro-level data.5
4.4.2 Analytical samples
For the purpose of studying firms’ exporting behaviour, what is missing in the
customs data are domestic firms who do not export or who only export through
trade intermediaries. In other words, the firms we observe in the customs data
is a self-selected sample of firms who engage in exporting directly. Admittedly,
this sample is not appropriate for studying the determinants of firm entry into the
export market. But this is not quite an issue here since to empirically investigate the
5We do this by assuming that an HS8 category is a quota-restrained category as long as it con-
tains one or more HS10 codes listed in the booklet of China Chamber of Commerce for Import and
Export of Textiles (2002).
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Table 4.3. Number of firms exporting
to the U.S.
Year Others
Exporting
in 2004
and 2005 Total
2002 10,205 15,862 26,067
2003 10,720 21,984 32,704
2004 8,355 33,105 41,460
2005 22,015 33,105 55,120
2006 35,854 27,896 63,750
Notes. This table lists by year the number of firms which
ever exported in both 2004 and 2005, and the numbers of
other firms as well as all firms.
theoretical predictions regarding intra-firm adjustments, which is the main target of
this chapter, one only needs to look at continuing exporters in the export market.
Besides, for studying the role of the ownership type, if the differences do exist
across firms of different ownership types, the differences should also be observed
for the sample of existing exporters.
Existing exporters, or continuing exporters, are those firms which exported be-
fore to a given market. By construction, this sub-sample of firms does not include
any entering or exiting exporters, thus the estimated economic effects are purely
intra-firm effects for existing exporters, perfectly corresponding to those relation-
ships we proposed concerning the bahaviour of these firms.
Practically, to drop as few firms as possible, instead of keeping firms which
exported each year during the sample period, all firms are included as long as they
exported in both 2004 and 2005. It turns out that, as seen in Table 4.3, there are
33,105 such firms. Besides, it is seen again that in 2005 a large number of new firms
started exporting, and the number of net entry is 13,750 (22,105−8,355= 13,750)
out of a total of 41,460 firms in 2004. As expected, this net entry is much more
marked than any other year.
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4.4.3 Construction of comparison groups
For the purpose of constructing appropriate comparison groups at the firm level for
the econometric estimation that follows, firms are grouped according to the types
of products they export. One reasonable way to do so is classify firms according to
whether or not they only export textile products. Since there also exist a number of
firms which export both textiles and other products (e.g., leather shoes), we group
firms into three types:
• pure textile firms, i.e., firms who exported nothing other than textile products
(treatment group, “P1”);
• pure non-textile firms, i.e., firms who exported nothing other than non-textile
products (control group, “C1”);
• mixed-industry firms, i.e., firms who ever exported both textile and non-
textile products (treatment group, “M1”).
The classification is, by definition, exhaustive and mutually exclusive, and thus any
firm should fall into one of the three types.6
Since the main trade barriers of interest here are imposed by U.S. quotas, a
more convincing comparison would distinguish between firms exporting only quota
products and firms exporting other textile products. Restricting the sample only to
pure textile firms defined above, we therefore further define three sub-categories of
firms:
• pure quota firms, i.e., firms who exported nothing other than U.S.-quota
products (treatment group, “P2”);
6For the analysis of firms exporting to the U.S. market, the above classification is based on
products a firm exports to the U.S., whilst for the analysis of firms exporting both to the U.S. and
Japanese markets, the classification is based on products a firm exports to both markets.
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• pure non-quota firms, i.e., firms who exported nothing other than non-U.S.-
quota products (control group, “C2”);
• mixed-product firms, i.e., firms who ever exported both U.S.-quota and non-
U.S.-quota products (treatment group, “M2”).
By definition, any pure textile firm is classified as belonging to one of these three
categories.
Table 4.4 describes by year the number of these firms exporting to the U.S.
market. Unsurprisingly, we find a huge influx of new textile exporters into the U.S.
in 2005 in the left block of the table. Despite a general trend of increase in the
number of firms across all firm types in that year, this increase is extraordinary –
about one and half times for pure textile firms, much bigger in proportion than for
other firm types. This is because the termination of MFA quotas greatly reduces
the U.S. market entry cost and induces many previously domestic Chinese firms to
start exporting to the U.S. The right block of the table gives a description of our first
analytical sample, Analytical Sample I, of firms which ever exported to the U.S.
both in 2004 and 2005, which is exactly the existing exporters sample described in
Table 4.3. By construction, this sample is balanced in 2004 and 2005 for each of
the firm categories.
Firms in the sub-categories of pure textile exporters are described in the left
block of Table 4.5. Since pure quota firms are much more constrained by U.S. quo-
tas than pure non-quota firms, a difference in firm entry between these categories
should give us a sense of the degree to which quota had imposed trade barriers
on firms. Comparing the figures of 2005 relative to 2004, indeed an astonishingly
steep growth – about four-time growth – is found for pure quota exporters, making
their number well overtake all others overnight. The result again illustrates a siz-
able, positive effect of the quota removal on firm entry. The sample summarised in
the right block is our second analytical sample, Analytical Sample II. It excludes
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Table 4.4. Number of textile vs. non-textile exporters exporting to the U.S.
All exporters
Analytical sample I:
Exporters exporting in 2004 and 2005
Year Mixed Textile Non-textile Total
(M1)
Mixed
(P1)
Textile
(C1)
Non-textile Total
2002 3,776 1,391 20,900 26,067 3,007 535 12,320 15,862
2003 5,114 1,835 25,755 32,704 4,239 883 16,862 21,984
2004 6,761 2,446 32,253 41,460 6,141 1,776 25,188 33,105
2005 9,349 6,001 39,770 55,120 6,141 1,776 25,188 33,105
2006 9,730 6,624 47,396 63,750 5,315 1,348 21,233 27,896
Notes. “Mixed” refers to firms who ever exported both textile and non-textile products, “Textile” refers to firms who exported nothing
other than textile products, and “Non-textile” refers to firms who exported nothing other than non-textile products. Textile products
are those products included in the HS chapters 50-63.
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all pure textile exporters which did not export executively in 2004 and 2005. The
number of firms reduces dramatically compared to Analytical Sample I, but this
sample allows for more extreme treatment-control comparisons.7
4.4.4 Estimation strategy
We use regression tools to reveal the effect of the MFA quota removal on firms.
The methodology is quite straightforward. We have a clear time point when all
the quotas were removed, which provides us a before-after variation. We also have
firms which were severely bound by quotas and those which were not, and this
provides us a cross-sectional variation. Thus the estimation can be carried out by
making comparisons in a “difference-in-differences” (DD) manner by exploring
the variations both over time and across groups of firms.
The DD regression function takes the following form:
Yit = α +T
′
tδ t +D
′
iρ i+(TDit)
′λ it + εit , (4.4.1)
where i and t index firm and year, respectively, and t ∈ {2002,2003,2005,2006};
Yit is the outcome variable; α is the constant term; Tt contains year dummies with
the omitted year being 2004; Di contains dummies indicating different groups of
firms constrained differently byMFA quotas; TDit contains all possible interactions
between the elements of Tt and Di; εit is the error term assumed to be uncorrelated
7An even more extreme comparison is between pure quota firms who only export binding-quota
textiles and pure quota firms who only export non-binding-quota textiles. However, after further
splitting the sample of pure quota firms into these two groups, we find, averaged over years, only
more than 20 firms fall into the group of pure binding-quota textile firms, which makes the sub-
sample highly unrepresentative and the comparison result unprecise. Besides, as we discuss later
on, product-level quota restrictiveness does not matter that much down at the firm-level, mainly
because different firms are restrained differently by the same product quota, no matter how big its
fill rate turns out to be. For these two reasons, we do not consider this comparison here.
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Table 4.5. Number of quota vs. non-quota textile exporters
All pure textile exporters
Analytical sample II:
Pure textile exporters exporting
in 2004 and 2005
Year Mixed Quota Non-quota Total
(M2)
Mixed
(P2)
Textile
(C2)
Non-quota Total
2002 573 415 403 1,391 335 86 114 535
2003 811 498 526 1,835 524 151 208 883
2004 1,093 656 697 2,446 950 410 416 1,776
2005 1,970 3,071 960 6,001 950 410 416 1,776
2006 2,003 3,425 1,196 6,624 780 282 286 1,348
Notes. “Mixed” refers to firms who ever exported and only exported both quota-textile and non-quota-textile products, “Quota”
refers to firms who exported nothing other than quota-textile products, and “Non-textile” refers to firms who exported nothing
other than non-quota-textile products. Textile products are those products included in the HS chapters 50-63. Quotas refer to
U.S. MFA quotas on China.
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with the covariates and have a zero mean; all other parameters are coefficients to be
estimated. In what follows, group indicators inDi are consistent with the classifica-
tions in Section 4.4.3, and one of the groups will be seen as the comparison group
while others are treatment groups. Thus, in comparison 1 using Analytical Sam-
ple I, Di = {P1,M1} with C1 as the base (control) group. In comparison 2 using
Analytical Sample II, Di = {P2,M2} with C2 as the control group. In the spir-
it of difference-in-differences approach, δ t captures the general trend of changes
over time, while ρ i reflects the differences across different groups of firms. The
key coefficients of interest are λ it , which are the estimates of how the differences
between firm groups are different over time; particularly, λ i,2005 reflects how the
difference changed in 2005 relative to 2004, which is then attributed to the MFA
quota removal.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Product scope
Regarding the quota effect on product scope, we estimate Eq. 4.4.1 with the num-
ber of products as the dependent variable. The control groupC1 is pure non-textile
firms, against which both pure textile firms P1 and mixed-industry firms M1 are
to be compared. In practice, this comparison is done by running a difference-in-
differences regression with a full set of interaction terms between year and treat-
ment dummies, as outlined in Eq. (4.4.1). The omitted year is 2004, the last year of
the MFA. The result is plotted in Figure 4.1, with the full regression output shown
in Table B4 of Appendix B. In this figure, each dot represents the estimate of the
number of export products for each group of firms in each year, and the bars in-
dicate 95% confidence intervals, all recovered from the DD regression coefficients
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and covariances.8 Note that, for simplicity in exposition, we do not include mixed-
industry firms in the figure; however, the result for this type of firms can be found
in Table B4.
The figure reveals a lot of information. For firms of all ownership types, the
number of products exported is very similar between pure textile firms and pure
non-textile firms within the periods before 2005, constantly between 3 to 4 products
on average. However, the divergence happened in 2005: an unprecedentedly big
gap was created one-off by a large jump in the number of products exported by pure
textile firms which does not occur in the control group. On average, pure textile
firms increased their number of export products by 2 (from 2.90 to 4.96), while
the increase with pure non-textile firms was only 0.3 (from 3.06 to 3.34), resulting
directly in the stark difference in the product scope after 2005. It is also seen in
Table B4 that an even bigger discrepancy emerged between mixed-industry firms
and pure non-textile firms, which is probably because the mixed-industry firms
exported a wider range of goods to start with, although, as will be seen later, its
proportion increase was smaller. The timing of the divergence exactly coincides the
termination of MFA quotas, and the clear-cut DD results give us much confidence
that the expansion in export product scope was indeed caused by the removal of
quotas, thus lending support to Relationship 1.
The remaining three panels of Figure 4.1 show the effect of quota removal on
the number of products exported to the U.S. separately by firm ownership type.
Induced by the quota removal, among pure textile firms, foreign-owned firms ex-
panded their product scope by far the most in the U.S. market, nearly 3 products
(from 2.85 to 5.58), and private firms increased their number of products a bit less,
nearly 2 products (from 2.92 to 4.81), while by contrast we do not have such statis-
tically significant evidence of expansion in product scope for state-owned firms. In
comparison, the increase the number of exported products by firms in the control
8In these regressions, the dependent variables are all unlogged number of products.
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group is small for all firm types, as we would expect.
These differences found here are completely consistent with the institutional
background of quota allocations in China, and hence Relationship 3 regarding the
relative responsiveness of state-owned firms. Given that state-owned firms could be
issued quota licences regardless of their export performance while other firms, es-
pecially foreign firms, would find it more difficult to get as much quota allowances,
the complete removal of quotas would trigger a process of resource reallocation
toward better-performing firms, and the process would then be determined more
by their economic efficiency than by their connections with the government. In
terms of product scope, a natural result of such reallocation would be that better-
performing firms started exporting products which they had not been able to due to
extra constraints caused by their disadvantageous ownership types. When the dis-
tortion was corrected, ownership did not matter as much as before, and previously
discriminated firms would respond more strongly.
Changes in the number of products are straightforward for interpretation, but
proportional changes may better reflect the responsiveness of firms. Thus, alter-
native to showing changes in raw numbers, we also repeat the DD regressions for
logged number of exported products. The results are presented in Table B5, where
it is seen that the above conclusions hold qualitatively with a proportional change
interpretation, with a take-away message that the quota removal increases the num-
ber of products exported by about one-third.
An even more convincing comparison is between firms exporting only quota
textiles and those only exporting non-quota textile products, albeit at the price of a
much smaller sample. By intuition, the former group of firms are those constrained
the most by MFA quotas, while the latter are constrained the least. We thus narrow
down the sample to only pure textile firms, who are then further classified into
three subgroups: pure quota firms (firms only exporting quota textiles), pure non-
149
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
4
:
Q
U
O
T
A
R
E
S
T
R
IC
T
IO
N
S
A
N
D
I
N
T
R
A
-
F
IR
M
R
E
A
L
L
O
C
A
T
IO
N
S
3.57 3.45
2.90
4.96
5.23
3.13 3.16 3.06
3.34
3.64
MFA
Quota
Removal
2
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
5
.
0
0
6
.
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
U
.
S
.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
End of year
All firms
Note: plotted using regression coefficients.
Sample: firms who exported to the U.S. consecutively in 2004 and 2005.
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Fig 4.1. Regression result (Table B4) by firm ownership type: average
number of products exported by firms to the U.S., textile vs. non-textile
firms, 2002-2006
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quota firms (firms only exporting non-quota textiles), and firms who ever exported
both quota and non-quota textiles. The regression takes the same form as before,
only that comparison groups are changed: the key comparison is now between
pure quota firms and pure non-quota firms. According to the results displayed
in Figure 4.2 (and correspondingly, Table B6 of Appendix B), not only the story
revealed is qualitatively the same as before, but also the estimated size of the quota
effect on product scope is quantitatively more or less unchanged for all firms in
general and for each ownership type individually. Again, the conclusions here are
robust in interpretation if we turn to proportional changes estimates in Table B7,
where the estimated effect on product scope is still one-third as in Table B5.
4.5.2 Product concentration
Nowwe turn to look at what the data reveals with regard to Relationship 2. To mea-
sure product concentration, we could use second-order measures such as Herfind-
ahl index, or entropy measures such as Theil index, as in the empirical parts of
the BRS and MMO papers. But a problem with these measures is that they do not
work sensibly for a single observation; they usually require at least two data points
to have a distribution to produce a reasonable measure.9 Thus, to adopt these mea-
sures single-product firms would have to be dropped, which could bias our result
as single-product firms make up a non-trivial proportion of our firm sample (refer
to Table 4.1). In order to include all firms regardless of the number of products
they export, we measure product concentration here by simply looking at the value
share of the top product in a firm’s total export sales. For example, if a firm ex-
ports 10 products, and the shares of these products in the firm’s total export sales
range from 0.05 to 0.5, then we take the value 0.5 as the index for the firm’s export
product concentration. A bigger value of this measure means a higher degree of
9This is why MMO exclude the sample of single-product firms to calculate their measures of
product concentration.
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Fig 4.2. Regression result (Table B6) by firm ownership type: average
number of products exported by firms to the U.S., quota vs. non-quota
firms, 2002-2006
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concentration of exports on a firm’s best-sales product.
Figure 4.3 (refer to columns 1-4 of Table B8 for the details) confirms the con-
jecture given by Relationship 2. With the specification still being Eq. (4.4.1), the
dependent variable is now the share of the top product in a firm’s total export sales.
As shown in Figure 4.3, the average value of this share is about 0.85 for non-textile
firms in 2004, and only slightly lower for textile firms. In 2005, however, tex-
tile firms had significantly larger (about 8 percentage points) decrease in this share
compared to non-textile firms, implying that the removal of quotas induced firms
to concentrate less on their core product.
To address the question of how the above finding is driven by single-product
exporters, we repeat the regression exercise on the subsample of multi-product
firms which exported multiple products in each year. We find the quota removal
effect on product concentration is 5 percentage points, which suggests that nearly
40% ((8− 5)/8× 100% = 37.5%) of the product concentration drop is attributed
to the adjustments of single-product exporters. This means ignoring single-product
firms could cause a non-trivial bias to our result.10
Further splitting the sample into different ownership types, very similar over-
time changes are found for private and foreign firms, compared to all firms; re-
markably in Figure 4.3, there is a common sharp dip for textile firms in the product
concentration measure in 2005, of size of 10 percentage points, while the decrease
for non-textile firms is negligible. By contrast again, we do not find any significant
effect for state-owned firms. Taken together, the evidence here means the average
decline in product concentration was driven by the response of private and foreign
firms whilst state-owned firms remained irresponsive to the removal of quotas. The
implication is that state-owned firms were not efficient enough to soak up the new
export opportunities brought about by the expiration of MFA quotas while firms of
10This regression result is unreported but available from the author upon request.
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Fig 4.3. Regression result (columns 1-4, Table B8) by firm ownership type:
share of top products exported by firms to the U.S., textile vs. non-textile
firms, 2002-2006
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other ownership types actively captured the opportunities by evening out their sales
proportions of export products. This finding is supportive of the patterns described
in Relationship 3.
A question which naturally arises is how this fall in product concentration came
about. Note that it did not occur because of the entry of new exporters (which
largely drove the results in Chapter 3), because the sample is restricted to firms
which exported to the U.S. in both 2004 and 2005. However, it could still be driven
by firms adding or dropping products or by firms changing the share of existing
products. If a firm adds or drops products into the export market, the concentration
of products is likely to go down or go up respectively, if the sales of other products
remain stable. One way to wipe out these confounding influences is to simply focus
on products which firms exported consecutively in 2004 and in 2005. We call these
firm-specific “continued products” for convenience. As seen in Figure 4.4 (and
columns 5-8 of Table B8 for the detailed regression output), when the sample is
restricted to the continued products exported by existing exporters, all the effects
found above become insignificantly different from zero. This suggests that the
decline of concentration is mainly due to the diversification of product mix caused
by firms exporting new products.
Together, the evidence from Figures 4.3 and 4.4 reveals an important mechanis-
m of firms in responding to the quota removal: private and foreign firms respond
actively to the quota removal by exporting new products and thus lowering their
focus on the previous core product, while, by contrast, state-owned firms remain
irresponsive to the change in economic conditions due to their lack of ability to
make swift adjustments in face of more intensive market competition. As before, a
plausible explanation is that these state-owned firms had initially been least bound
by the quota system since they were most likely to get as much quota as they wanted
despite the low efficiency of many of them, and as a result they were least affected
by the liberalisation of quotas and were also least able to cope with new export
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Fig 4.4. Regression result (columns 5-8, Table B8) by firm ownership type:
share of top continued products exported by firms to the U.S., textile vs.
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situations.
In resemblance to Figures 4.3 and 4.4, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 (corresponding to
columns 1-4 and 5-8 of Table B9, respectively) present the results for the sample
containing only pure textile firms, and compare quota-textile firms against non-
quota-textile firms. The above conclusions remain robust: the key message of
Figure 4.5 is that the quota removal brought down product concentration by 9 per-
centage points on average, while, by contrast, the reduction is insignificantly dif-
ferent from zero in Figure 4.6 where the sample is restricted to continued products
only. The difference between Figures 4.3 and 4.4 suggests, again, that the reduc-
tion in product concentration was caused mainly by the exporting of new products
within existing exporters. As before, the above patterns are observed for all firm
ownership types except state-owned firms.
4.5.3 Alternative comparisons: U.S. versus Japan as destina-
tions
As the U.S. is a major MFA quota country for China while Japan is a major non-
quota country, another way to pin down the above effects is to treat the U.S. as
the treatment group while Japan as the control group. Here we simply restrict the
sample to pure textile firms which ever exported and exported only textiles to the
U.S. or Japan. In other words, we are comparing the exporting behaviour of firms
which exported only textile products to the U.S. with firms which exported only
textile products to Japan.
Since many of these firms can export to both countries at the same time, they
can actually be the same firm in the comparison. This means that we can perform
a within-firm comparison which provides an even tighter comparison group, since
it eliminates possible unobserved firm-specific differences between the treatment
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Fig 4.5. Regression result (columns 1-4, Table B9) by firm ownership type:
share of top products exported by firms to the U.S., quota vs. non-quota
firms, 2002-2006
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Fig 4.6. Regression result (columns 5-8, Table B9) by firm ownership type:
share of top continued products exported by firms to the U.S., quota vs.
non-quota firms, 2002-2006
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and control groups. We therefore introduce firm fixed effects into Eq. (4.4.1), where
each observation is now identified by a firm code (i), a destination country code (c),
and a year indicator (t). Thus, the regression model now takes the form of:
Yict = α +T
′
tδ t +D
′
cρc+(TDct)
′λ ct +ϕi+ εict , (4.5.1)
where ϕi is the firm fixed effect, and Dc is reduced to a dummy for the U.S. – it
takes on the value of one if the destination is the U.S. and zero if it is Japan. The
key coefficient of interest is λc,2005, which captures the differential effect of the
quota removal on the U.S. compared to on Japan.
First of all, Figure 4.7 (see also columns 1-4 of Table B10) presents the differen-
ce-in-differences regression results for the number of products firms export to each
of the destination markets. It is shown that from 2004 to 2005, there is a general
trend of rise in the number of export products among pure textile firms, but this is
more so for the U.S. than for Japan. For the Japanese market, the average number
of products increased by 0.2 (from 5.37 to 5.60) but is insignificantly different
from zero, while in the U.S. the number of products increases by 2.2 (from 3.95 to
6.16). Splitting the sample by ownership type, we find such expansion in product
range in the U.S. market is the strongest for foreign firms, where the product scope
expanded from 3.74 to 7.09, almost doubled. In other words, half of the product
categories an average firm exported to the U.S. in 2005 were newly added into this
export market. The expansion is a bit less remarkable for private domestic firms,
though still as much as by 2 products (from 4.07 to 5.96). Not surprisingly, the
change is insignificant at all for state-owned firms. This finding accords with the
patterns we observed before about product scope within the U.S. market. Foreign
and private firms actively reacted to the removal of quotas by adding more products
into their export bundle while state-owned firms turned out to be very irresponsive.
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Fig 4.7. Regression result (columns 1-4, Table B10) by firm ownership type:
average number of products pure textile firms exported to the U.S. and
Japan, 2002-2006
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Besides, intra-firm variations across countries also allow us to evaluate how
restrictive product quotas were in the U.S. market relative to other non-quota coun-
tries. Our hypothesis is that if the MFA quotas were indeed restrictive (imposing
additional costs) for firms, then after the quota expiration in 2005, firms should
have incentive to add more products to the U.S. than to Japan. To test this rela-
tionship, for product scope we now only count the number of those products in
the two markets – products which firms exported at least to Japan in 2004.11 For
these products in 2004, they were not constrained by any quotas in Japan but were
mostly subject to MFA quotas in the U.S.. However, in the first half of 2005, all
quotas were lifted in the U.S. and firms exporting to the U.S. were freed from the
obligation to obtain quota licences. We thus would expect firms to start exporting
some of these products which they had exported only to Japan in 2004. In other
words, for each firm the increase in the number of these products should be larger
in the U.S. than in the Japanese market.
Indeed, this is exactly what we find in Figure 4.8 (column 5-8 of Table B10),
and all results turn out be more pronounced. Overall, in 2005, firms exported 0.5
more product categories (from 1.54 to 2.03) to the U.S., but meanwhile contract-
ed the scope of products exported to Japan by 2 (from 5.34 to 3.29). The gap
found here (0.5+ 2 = 2.5) is 0.5 larger than found in Figure 4.7, where the gap
is 2.2− 0.2 = 2.0. To have a sense of the relative size of the difference between
the two gaps, we turn to the results from regressions of logged number of prod-
ucts in Table B11. The estimates show that the estimated effect on the product
scope is 21 percentage points bigger (0.521−0.315= 0.206) in the second sample
of products than in the first sample, a strong indication of an important intra-firm
activity: firms shifted resources from Japan to the U.S. when quotas were lifted.
As straightforward as it may be, this can be seen as the evidence of the existence
11To put it another way, we only count the number of products for each firm and for each market
if they were exported by the firm to Japan in 2004; it does not matter whether they were exported
to the U.S. or not in 2004.
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of product-specific barriers in the U.S. market. The differences across ownership
types are more or less the same as before: caused by the ultimate liberalisation of
quotas, foreign firms added most products while there is no significant evidence of
state-owned firms expanding their product scopes.
Parallel to the cross-firm comparisons in the U.S., cross-country comparisons
provide another way of investigating the effect of the quota removal on product con-
centration in a difference-in-difference fashion. Not surprisingly, a similar story is
found for product concentration in Figure 4.9 (full results are contained in columns
1-4 of Table B12). On the whole, the removal of quotas in the U.S. induced firms to
focus a bit less on their core product, resulting in a 3 percentage-point reduction in
the share of top product. However, the reductions are not statistically significant if
we look at each ownership type individually. Interestingly, as Figure 4.10 (equiva-
lently, columns 5-8 of Table B12) indicates, even the overall statistical significance
of the above pattern of decreased concentration vanishes if one only looks at the
sample of products firms exported consecutively in 2004 and 2005 to both coun-
tries. This is what we expect since it would imply that the reduction in product
concentration is mainly driven by the fact that firms started exporting new products
and hence the sales share of their previous core product dropped.
4.6 Conclusions
How multi-product firms respond to trade policies is an area on the frontier of
recent trade studies. In this chapter, we contribute to this line of research by study-
ing the effect of the elimination of MFA quotas on resource reallocation within
multi-product firms. Specifically, we investigate how Chinese exporting firms al-
tered their export product scope and concentration before and after the MFA quota
removal in the U.S. market, as well as across countries with and without quotas
against Chinese textiles.
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Fig 4.8. Regression result (columns 5-8, Table B10) by firm ownership type:
average number of products (exported to Japan in 2004) pure textile firms
exported to the U.S. and Japan, 2002-2006
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Fig 4.9. Regression result (columns 1-4, Table B12) by firm ownership type:
share of top products exported by pure textile firms to the U.S. and Japan,
2002-2006
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Fig 4.10. Regression result (columns 5-8, Table B12) by firm ownership
type: share of top products (exported to Japan in 2004) exported by pure
textile firms to the U.S. and Japan, 2002-2006
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CHAPTER 4: QUOTA RESTRICTIONS AND INTRA-FIRM REALLOCATIONS
For export product scope, our results show that, on average, firms would in-
crease their number of products exported by one third due to the quota removal.
This is because quota removal creates new export opportunities for firms who now
find it profitable to export new product categories they once needed licences to do
so. For product concentration, we find the reduction in the share of top product
is nearly 10%, but it is not significantly different from zero if we only look at
products firms export consecutively before and after the quota elimination. This
implies that the abrupt lifting of quotas caused firms to reduce their focus on pre-
viously top-sales product to create room for newly added export products.
Interestingly, these findings are highly heterogeneous across firm ownership
types. While the above conclusions hold for private and foreign-owned firms, they
are not obvious for state-owned firms. We believe this difference could be ex-
plained by the inefficiency in the allocation of quotas when the MFA was still valid.
The reason is that when other firms needed to pay a considerable amount of costs
to get quota licences, state-owned firms could get quota allowances easily because
their political connections with the quota allocation authorities, so the removal of
quotas did not mean as much to state-owned firms. Apart from the above, we al-
so find evidence of intra-firm shift of market focus away from Japan to the U.S.
after the MFA terminated, which highlights the existence of product-level barriers
created by the U.S. MFA quotas.
This chapter sheds light on some recently emerging theories regarding MPF
behaviour in that our study gives clear-cut results on intra-firm adjustments in re-
sponse to changes in clearly identified trade policies. But the analysis of the MFA
and firm behaviour could also be extended to some other interesting topics. One
of them is to look into how firms try to get around quotas by transshipping goods
via third countries or by direct investment in other countries that are eligible for
quota-free exports, which is currently being under study by us.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
This thesis has studied the relationships between trade liberalisation and firm ba-
haviour, with a special focus on Chinese textile and other manufacturing firms
during the period 2000-2007, a time when China integrated with the world econo-
my more than ever since it started to transit from a centrally planed economy to a
market economy in 1978. However, the issues addressed here are not only specific
to China; instead, given the general background of China’s entry into the WTO,
the setting of China vis-a`-vis the world trade offers rich opportunities for study-
ing more generally how firms engage in trade in an environment of declining trade
barriers.
Chapter 2 attempts to explain the nature and sources of China’s recent rapid ex-
port growth. We improve the method proposed by Hummels et al. (2001) by taking
into account the fact that processing trade is prevalent in China. For that purpose,
we link a firm-level data set to a transaction-level data set to match firms’ produc-
tion information with their trade records. We find that on average China’s own
value-added only accounted for 30% in its exports. While coastal firms and foreign
firms were the major sources of the increase in foreign content share, non-state do-
mestic firms were the main contributor to the decrease in domestic content share
over time. Entering firms had lower domestic content than others, while existing
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firms had much higher foreign content than others. This implies that engaging in
processing trade could probably greatly reduce not only entry costs of exporting
but also variable costs of exporting. Then we use different measures of technology
intensity to examine the technology content of Chinese exports evaluated both at
the final value and domestic value-added. The results demonstrate that the skill
intensity has increased over time, but the overall level is lower when the exports
are evaluated by domestic value-added rather than by final value. This finding is
novel and implies that the prevailing perception of “over-sophistication” of Chinese
exports should be discounted.
Chapter 3 looks specifically at firms which export textile products. It studies
the response of Chinese textile firms to the end of the the Multifibre Arrangement
(MFA) in 2005. The MFA had long been a protectionist agreement which allowed
developed countries to impose import quotas to protect their domestic producers
from the competition from developing countries’ textile and clothing products. The
elimination of MFA quotas provides an unusual opportunity to examine the effects
of a trade policy shock on firm behaviour. It was massive in scale, discrete in
timing and exogenous to firms and consumers in the textile industry. Since theMFA
did not affect all textile products, we use a “difference-in-difference” approach to
estimate the causal effects of the MFA termination. Using transaction-level data
from the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics over the period 2000-2006, we find
that the MFA removal reduced average export prices by about 30%, which is very
consistent with other findings in the literature. A distinguishing feature of our study
is that our data allows us to examine the sources of the price reductions. It shows
that more than half of the price drop was due to firm entry and that the MFA had a
smaller effect on the pricing behaviour of state-owned firms. The latter finding has
an interpretation regarding the efficiency of the quota allocation system in China.
It accords with the notion that, other things equal, state-owned firms had been able
to obtain quota licences more easily and hence quotas were not as restrictive for
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them as for other firms.
Chapter 4 looks further into resource reallocations within firms. It presents the
first clear-cut evidence on how multi-product firms adjusted their product structure
in response to MFA quota elimination. We find that the removal of MFA quotas
induced firms to radically expand their export product scope (number of export
products) by as much as one third, and meanwhile caused firms to reduce the sales
share of the core product by nearly 10 percentage points as a result of a more diver-
sified product mix. While these effects are obvious for private and foreign-owned
firms, they are completely insignificant for state-owned firms, probably because the
latter were not as constrained by quotas due to their closer political connections to
the quota allocation authorities. This further supports the interpretation of the quota
allocation inefficiency in Chapter 3. Finally, the above findings are reconfirmed by
comparing exports to two destination countries – the U.S., a major MFA country,
and Japan, a major non-MFA country. More importantly, firms’ focus on markets is
found to have shifted towards the U.S. and away from the Japanese market within
exporting firms, thus highlighting the trade barriers created by U.S. quotas. The
results shed light on some recent theories regarding the intra-firm adjustments in
response to changes in trade policies.
Studies in this thesis work can be extended to studying some other interesting
topics. For instance, most trade studies looking at the effects of trade costs use
official trade statistics. However, some large volumes of trade actually take place
through illicit activities such as smuggling and illegal transshipment. A fundamen-
tal reason behind such cross-border economic activities is to do with trade costs
created by formal and informal trade barriers. The incentive of trade cost evasion
is particularly strong in illicit activities. Thus, this largely ignored “dark side” of
international trade offers a unique and fantastic opportunity for studying into the
relationship between trade cost and economic activities, a task that has proven to be
difficult because of too many confounding mechanisms/factors if one simply looks
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at official trade records. Related studies include Fisman et al. (2008) and Fisman
and Wei (2004, 2009).
As an extension of the studies on MFA quotas in this thesis, a joint research
project has been initiated by the author and some colleagues. During the Multifi-
bre Agreement (MFA), strict import quotas were imposed on Chinese textiles and
apparel. As a result, some Chinese exporters illegally transshipped their products
destined to the U.S. and the E.U. via third countries to avoid the quotas. We s-
tudy the case of transhipment via African countries, and show that Chinese apparel
exports to African countries predicted U.S. imports from the same countries but
only for apparel products with binding quotas in the U.S. and for countries with
preferential access to the U.S. market. We also provide some preliminary evidence
of transshipment to the E.U. via Bulgaria and Romania by comparing different
sources of trade statistics before and after these countries joined the E.U.. In ad-
dition, we try to find factors that could help explain variations in the prevalence of
transshipment across countries, including, for example, regional trade agreements,
geographical proximity, and density of ethnic Chinese population.
Another possible research direction in our agenda is to study the role of in-
termediation in trade. Quite recently, there has been a new literature in this area
(see, for example, Antra`s, 2011; Akerman, 2010; Ahn et al., 2011; Bernard et al.,
2010a,b). Among many other mechanisms, intermediaries match sellers with buy-
ers, help break into more markets, provide trade credits, and build up extensive
business networks. In this area, not only theoretical models are just emerging, but
also empirical studies are quite limited, partly due to data availability. As far as
we are concerned, there are only some stylised facts on how intermediaries facili-
tate trade and how the intermediated trade is related to firm productivity. Little is
known about how intermediaries actually play their role in terms of reducing trade
costs or overcome trade barriers. To identify the underlying mechanisms empir-
ically, exogenous and massive changes in trade costs are needed so that one can
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establish a convincing causal link between trade cost and intermediation.
A plausible case is again the MFA quota removal. MFA quotas created enor-
mous barriers and restrictions for Chinese textile and clothing exports. However,
since some countries/areas neighbouring to China could export to the U.S./E.U.
quota free, one of many intermediaries’ businesses was to help Chinese firms to
transship textiles to developed countries via these neighbouring countries. We have
already found evidence that during the MFA period, Hong Kong was one of the
most important “entrepoˆts” for transshipment of Chinese textiles. The abolishment
of MFA quotas in 2005 provides a quasi-experiment setting for studying the role
of intermediaries in transshipment, since the incentive for using intermediaries as
middlemen to transship does not exist any more when any firm can export without
quota licenses. Interestingly, our evidence shows that the termination of U.S. MFA
quotas in 2005 caused the share of indirect exports of textiles from China to Hong
Kong by nearly 40 percentage points, which is a strong indication that intermedi-
aries had played an important role when quotas were in force. As a next step, we try
to find what kinds of firms chose to export via intermediaries instead of exporting
directly, and hope to establish evidence that could be compared against predictions
in recent theories.
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Data Preparation
A.1 Firm-level Data: The CASIF
Table A1 describes the number of firms in the CASIF data. A growth pattern is clearly
documented. Since we are only interested in the manufacturing sector, some data cleaning
is needed. The industries in the CASIF are coded by a unique coding system known as the
National Standards of China (GB/T). Each firm in the CASIF reports their main industry by
a four-digit GB/T code. The coding rule was changed after 2003 when a new version of G-
B/T was introduced. Because this change makes the industry codes inconsistent over time,
we construct our own concordance table to create a consistent set of three-digit industry
codes throughout the sample period.1
Table A1. Number of firms
in the CASIF
Year Number of firms
2000 162,885
2001 169,031
2002 181,557
2003 196,222
2004 279,092
2005 271,835
2006 301,961
2007 336,768
1It is not possible to create a consistent set of four-digit codes. The constructed concordance
table is available from us upon request.
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We exclude several industries from the sample, based on two-digit industry codes:
mining (codes: 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11), energy (codes: 44, 45, 46) tobacco (code: 16),
handicrafts (code: 42) and recycling (code: 43). We exclude tobacco because the pro-
duction and sales of tobacco in China is still highly regulated by the government and was
not open to foreign investment even after China’s entry into the WTO. We exclude hand-
icrafts because products from this industry are potentially extremely heterogeneous, as it
includes, for example, production of artworks. Recycling firms are excluded because most
of the four-digit industries classified under recycling before 2003 were integrated into other
two-digit manufacturing industries in the new industry coding system after 2003.
To further obtain a clean sample which is suitable for analysis, we delete from the data
those observations for which any of the following conditions is satisfied:
• Observations which report their location information in wrong formats.
• Observations which have missing or non-positive values on any of the variables
related to output, sales, capital and intermediate inputs.
• Observations whose number of employees is missing or less than eight.
• Observations which have missing or negative values on any of the variables related
to ownership structure and export value of shipments.
• Observations whose value of product sales is less than export value of shipments.
All key variables are deflated to make them comparable over time.
A.2 Deflators
Output and export values are both deflated by an ex-factory price index at the two-digit
industry level when necessary. Because the deflator for intermediate inputs is not directly
available for each two-digit industry, we impute it by combining information from two
sources: the year-specific purchasing price index of materials, fuels and power and China
Input-Output Table 2002. Since the purchase price index of materials, fuels and power
is available for eight broadly defined categories,2 we then use information from China
2They are ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals, chemical materials, wood and paper pulp, con-
struction materials, agriculture products and textile materials.
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Input-Output Table 2002 to construct a matrix that defines the input weights of these eight
intermediate input categories for each two-digit industry.3 With these weights, we then
get the weighted-average of price index (deflator) of intermediate inputs for each two-digit
industry.
All the deflators mentioned above can be found in China Statistical Yearbooks of vari-
ous years. The 122-sector China Input-Output Table 2002 is from the NBSC. We treat the
price in the initial year (2000) as the numeraire for all price indices.4
A.3 Transaction-level Data: The CCTS
Table A2 describes the number of firms in the CCTS data. It shows that the number of
firms engaging in trade grew hugely from 2000 to 2006. Since the focus of our study is on
manufacturing exports, an ideal, clean trade data should only contain all exports of manu-
factures and their corresponding imports. However, the reality is that many manufacturing
firms not only use imports of manufactures but also imports of primary (agricultural) goods
to produce manufactures (for example, many firms in China import soy beans from abroad
to produce cooking oils), we therefore only exclude service trade from the raw CCTS data,
leaving all agricultural and manufactured goods in the trade data. Service trade corresponds
to the two-digit HS codes of 98 and 99.
Table A3 summarises the different customs regimes which apply to the trade data.
Relevant to our study are ordinary and processing trade regimes.
Table A3. Definitions of the Chinese customs regimes
Regime code Regime name Definition
10 Ordinary trade Unilateral imports or exports through customs.
11 International aid Aid or donations given gratis between governments or by international
organisations.
12 Donation by overseas Chi-
nese
Donations given by overseas Chinese or compatriots in Hong Kong,
Macau or Taiwan.
3There are three input-output tables available for the sample period from 2000 to 2007, which
are input-output tables for 2000, 2002 and 2005. However, the input-output table for 2002 is the
most disaggregated (122 sectors versus 40 sectors for 2000 and 17 sectors for 2005), and therefore
enables us to aggregate the those sectors to two-digit GB/T industries more precisely in order to be
in line with the CASIF industries.
4All these deflators are available from us upon request.
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Table A3. (Continued)
Regime code Regime name Definition
13 Compensation trade Imports of equipment supplied by foreign firms or by using foreign ex-
port credit under a contractual arrangement for the supplier to recover
the cost with the subsequent exportation of products in installment.
14 Processing and assembling The type of inward processing in which foreign suppliers provide raw
materials, parts or components under a contractual arrangement for the
subsequent re-exportation of the processed products. Under this type of
transaction, the imported inputs and the finished outputs remain property
of the foreign supplier.
15 Processing with imported
materials
The type of inward processing other than processing and assembling in
which raw materials or components are imported for the manufacture of
the export-oriented products, including those imported into Export Pro-
cessing Zone and the subsequent re-exportation of the processed prod-
ucts from the Zone.
16 Goods on consignment Goods traded by arrangement in which a seller sends goods to a buyer
or reseller who pays the seller only as and when the goods are sold. The
seller remains the owner (title holder) of the goods until they are paid for
in full and, after a certain period, takes back the unsold goods.
19 Border trade Petty trade carried out in the border towns of China, between the de-
partments or enterprises designated by the governments of provinces or
autonomous regions and the border towns on the other side, as well as
to the mutual market trade between the border inhabitants of the two
neighbouring countries.
20 Equipment imported for
processing trade
Imports of equipment for processing trade activities under the custom-
s regimes of processing and assembling and processing with imported
Materials.
22 Contracting projects Exports of equipment or materials to be used for China-invested turnkey
projects or constructing projects.
23 Goods on lease Imports or exports under the financial lease arrangement with the dura-
tion of the lease for one year or more.
25 Equipment/materials invest-
ment by a foreign-invested
enterprise
Imports of equipment, parts or other materials by a foreign-invested en-
terprise as part of it is total initial investment.
27 Outward processing Exports of raw materials, parts or components under a contractual ar-
rangement for processing or assembling abroad and the re-imports of the
processed products.
30 Barter trade Exported goods directly exchanged with the equivalent in imported
goods without any currency medium.
31 Duty-free commodity Duty-free import commodities sold in the specific shops to the specif-
ic individuals on payment of foreign currency according to the specific
customs regulations.
33 Warehousing trade Goods imported into or exported from the customs bonded warehouses
located outside a Bonded Area.
34 Entrepot trade by bonded
area
Goods imported into a Bonded Area for storage and the re-exports of the
goods from the Area.
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Table A3. (Continued)
Regime code Regime name Definition
39 Others Others
Notes. Definitions are from the General Administration of Customs of China.
A.4 Matching the CASIF to the CCTS
Merging the two data sets described above allows one to link records of firm production
activities with firm customs trade. This requires matching the observations in the two data
sets.
Each firm in the CASIF and the CCTS has a unique registration code. However, differ-
ent coding systems are used in each data set – the firm codes in the CASIF are designated
by the local administrative authorities and are of nine digits, while those in the CCTS are
given by the customs and are of ten digits. This fact invalidates the firm code as an effective
variable to link the two data sets.
Our principal solution is to use firm name, which is unique to the firm,5 as a means of
identifying the common firms in both data sets, and then construct a concordance of their
firm codes in these two data sets. However, since there exit cases where a firm changed
its names or reported it differently over time, we record all the names once used by a firm
and expand the set of firm names as match variables. Apart from firm name, there are
also other common variables which could help identify the same firm in the two data sets.
Concretely, we combine telephone number and name of contact person as the secondary
match variable to build the linkage between the two data sets. After the construction of
the firm-code concordance, we check the credibility of the matched linkage by looking at
firms’ location information from the two data sources. A successful matched firm should
have the same location information in the two sources. The detailed matching procedures
with basic descriptive statistics are elabourated as follows.
5The registration of firm in local administrative authorities does not allow any repetition of firm
name in the same local administrative region. This means there exists the possibility that firms
in different administrative regions can share the same name. However, after checking the data
carefully, we find virtually all firms have the local region name (e.g., “Beijing City”) as part of
their firm name. This fact reduces the possibility of mismatching due to firm name repetition to a
minimum level.
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Table A2. Number of firms
in the CCTS
Year Number of firms
2000 82,064
2001 89,660
2002 104,245
2003 124,299
2004 153,779
2005 177,494
2006 208,425
Name:
ABCDEF2
Name:
ABCDEF1
Name:
ABCDEF2
Name:
ABCDEF3
Matched
Unmatched
Unmatched
CASIF firm
ID: 123456789
CCTS firm
ID: 9876543210
Fig A1. Matching Approach I
A.4.1 Matching Approach I: strictly by firm name
In this matching, a firm is matched if and only if it has identical name in the CASIF and
in the CCTS for a given year. A feature of this approach is that, for each year, a firm cor-
responds to only one observation (hence one name) in the CASIF while it can correspond
to multiple observations (hence multiple names) in the CASIF. Although a firm can appear
multiple times in the CCTS in a year, this matching approach can still link a firm in the
CASIF to the CCTS as long as it has the same name for at least once in the CCTS in that
given year. However, if none of the names of a firm in the CCTS can be matched with an
identical name in the CASIF, it is not identified. Some times, when firms registered in the
customs or reported its name in the customs differently to its name in the CASIF, or the
customs staff slightly mistyped its name into computer, this could make the firm unmatched
by this approach. This matching approach is illustrated in Figure A1.
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Table A4. Number of firms matched:
simply by firm name
Province
inconsistency
Postcode
inconsistency
Year 0 1 0 1 Total
2000 18,451 134 15,125 3,460 18,585
2001 21,503 80 17,445 4,138 21,583
2002 24,929 7 20,530 4,406 24,936
2003 28,888 10 24,360 4,538 28,898
2004 44,365 19 35,099 9,285 44,384
2005 44,869 10 34,457 10,422 44,879
2006 53,734 14 47,051 6,697 53,748
Notes. Here 1 indicates inconsistency and 0 otherwise.
Table A4 gives the number of firms matched for each year. Apart from giving the
total number of firms, we also check the locations of these firms by information from both
data sets. Both data sets contain a variable indicating firms’ postcodes, although there are
quite a few missing values. The province information in the CASIF is the first two digits
of the administrative region code, and is the first two digits of firm code in the CCTS.6
The location check breaks the total number of firms matched into two parts: those with
inconsistent location (province or postcode) codes and the rest.7
A.4.2 Matching Approach II: by complete set of used firm names
We try to enhance the success rate of matching by exploring all names ever used by a firm
in both the CASIF and the CCTS. For example, if a firm has up to six different names in
the whole sample of the CASIF, and has up to five different names in the whole sample of
the CCTS, we then try thirty times (5×6 = 30) of matching to see if each of these names
can be matched to a name in the other data set.
This matching strategy is illustrated in Figure A2, and is adopted by Wang and Yu
6In fact the administrative region code in the CASIF contains at least six digits and the first four
digits of firm codes in the CCTS indicate location information, but these codes from the two data
sources are only consistent at the first two-digit level, that is, province level.
7We define two location codes are inconsistent if and only if (a) their original variables (admin-
istrative region codes) are not missing and of the right length, and (b) the two location codes are
different. Therefore location codes not identified as inconsistent are not necessarily consistent.
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Name:
ABCDEF6
Name:
ABCDEF1
Name:
ABCDEF2
Name:
ABCDEF3
Matched
CASIF firm
ID: 123456789
CCTS firm
ID: 9876543210
Name:
ABCDEF5
Name:
ABCDEF4
Name:
ABCDEF4
Name:
ABCDEF1
Matched
Fig A2. Matching Approach II
(forthcoming). Compared to Approach I, this approach allows the largest flexibility in
variations of firm names and reduce the possibility of dismatch simply due to changes in
firm names for whatever reason. In a simple word, by this matching method, a firm in the
CASIF can always be linked to itself in the CCTS (or the other way round) as long it used
a common name for at least once in both data sets. This approach does lead to more firms
matched, according to the result summarised in Table A5, even if we exclude firms with
inconsistent location information.
A.4.3 Matching Approach III: by complete set of telephone numbers plus contact
person’s names
In this matching, we combine telephone number (the primary telephone number of firm)
and contact person’s name together as the key to identify the common firms in both data
sets. This matching strategy is illustrated in Figure A3. Despite large numbers of missing
values and incorrectly reported formats8, the concurrent matches of contact person’s name
and telephone number potentially provides additional matched firms apart from the above
methods. Table A6 describes the matched result. Not surprisingly, much less firms are now
8For instance, some telephone numbers are reported with full numbers while some lack region
codes.
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Table A5. Number of firms matched:
by complete set of used firm names
Province
inconsistency
Postcode
inconsistency
Year 0 1 0 1 Total
2000 23,499 171 19,203 4,467 23,670
2001 27,623 150 22,372 5,401 27,773
2002 32,712 17 27,030 5,699 32,729
2003 38,731 26 32,680 6,077 38,757
2004 55,966 34 44,816 11,184 56,000
2005 56,758 24 44,581 12,201 56,782
2006 61,535 25 53,535 8,025 61,560
Notes. Here 1 indicates inconsistency and 0 otherwise.
matched because of the reasons explained above. However, they can expand our previous
matched result, albeit at a small degree.
A.4.4 Matching Approach IV: combination of Approaches II and III
Now we add the matched result of Approach III to the result of Approach II, drop repeti-
tions, and get a more comprehensive matched result. Also, we check the location informa-
tion from two different sources and report the result in Table A7.
A.5 Identification of Trading Agents
There exit a large number of firms in the CCTS, whose principal business is importing
and exporting goods, or temporarily storing or shipping goods, for other firms. Manova
and Zhang (2009, 2012) call these firms trading firms, while Ahn et al. (2011) name them
as intermediary firms. For convenience, we call these firms trading agents. Ignoring these
firms could cause problems if one wants to study the behaviour of production firms, because
these trading agents described above generally do not engage in production. Perfectly
identifying these trading agents is not easy as these are no official indicators for these
firms.
One practical method used by Manova and Zhang (2009, 2012) and Ahn et al. (2011) is
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Tel. No. : 88485723
Contact person: Ming Li
Matched
CASIF firm
ID: 123456789
CCTS firm
ID: 9876543210
Matched
Tel. No. : 01088485723
Contact person: M. Li
Tel. No. : 88485723
Contact person: Ming Li
Tel. No. : 88485723
Contact person: M. Li
Tel. No. : 01088485723
Contact person: M. Li
Tel. No. : 01088485723
Contact person: M. Li
Tel. No. : 88485723
Contact person: Ming Li
Tel. No. : 010-88485723
Contact person: Ming Li
Fig A3. Matching Approach III
Table A6. Number of firms matched:
by complete set of telephone numbers plus contact
person’s names
Province
inconsistency
Postcode
inconsistency
Year 0 1 0 1 Total
2000 196 0 156 40 196
2001 201 0 163 38 201
2002 201 0 160 41 201
2003 197 0 148 49 197
2004 310 0 242 68 310
2005 319 0 237 82 319
2006 284 0 214 70 284
Notes. Here 1 indicates inconsistency and 0 otherwise.
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Table A7. Number of firms matched:
by combination of complete set of used firm names and
complete set of telephone numbers plus contact person’s
names
Province
inconsistency
Postcode
inconsistency
Year 0 1 0 1 Total
2000 23,569 171 19,261 4,479 23,740
2001 27,679 150 22,422 5,407 27,829
2002 32,765 17 27,078 5,704 32,782
2003 38,776 26 32,717 6,085 38,802
2004 56,044 34 44,875 11,203 56,078
2005 56,840 24 44,635 12,229 56,864
2006 61,603 25 53,583 8,045 61,628
Notes. Here 1 indicates inconsistency and 0 otherwise.
to search some specific keywords in firms’ names to decide whether they are trading agents
or not. Manova and Zhang (2009, 2012) identified 23,073 such firms for the period of 2000
to 2005, but they did not mention what these keywords were. Ahn et al. (2011) used four
Chinese keywords to identify the “intermediary firms”: 䖯ߎষ,㒣䌌,䌌ᯧ,⾥䌌, and the
number of these firms for each year from 2000 to 2005 are 9,009 for 2000, 9,815 for 2001,
10,862 for 2002, 13,964 for 2003, 20,418 for 2004, and 22,099 for 2005. By contrast, we
use our own, more comprehensive list of keywords which are typically used by various
kinds of trading agents. The Chinese characters for these keywords we use are:
᳡ࡵˈ䌌ᯧˈᡩ䌘ˈ㒣থˈ㒣⌢থሩˈ䖤ټˈټ䖤ˈҧټˈ䖤䕧ˈ⠽䌘ˈ䋻
䖤ˈҷ⧚ˈ⠽䌘ˈ㒣䌌ˈ䖯ষˈߎষˈ⠽⌕ˈড়԰ˈ໪䌌ˈଚ⼒ˈկ䫔ˈ⾥䌌ˈ໪
㒣.
Table A8 lists the number of trading agents identified for each year. We finally identify
58,482 such firms for the period of 2000 to 2006, of which 31,021 firms are for the period
of 2003 to 2005, much more than the result of Manova and Zhang (2009, 2012). For each
year from 2000 to 2005, the numbers of these agents identified by us are also larger than
by those by Ahn et al. (2011).
183
APPENDIX A: DATA PREPARATION
Table A8. Number of trading
agents identified in the CCTS
Year Number of firms
2000 10,519
2001 11,680
2002 13,256
2003 17,071
2004 23,963
2005 22,834
2006 43,194
A.6 Identification of Intermediate Inputs in Ordinary Imports
Identifying imported intermediate inputs is important for computing vertical specialisation
in exports. It is already clear that all processing imports are used as intermediate inputs
as they could only be used for the purpose of processing exports. Another group of im-
ported intermediate inputs are in the category of ordinary imports. Since only some of
those ordinary imports are used as intermediate inputs in production, it is necessary to i-
dentify these intermediates from others (namely, consumption goods or capital goods) in
ordinary imports. Following Dean et al. (2007), we first use the detailed classification of
the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) to identify the BEC codes for intermediates as in
Table A9. Then, we employ the BEC-HS concordance table from the United Nations to
further identify intermediates in the HS system.
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Table A9. Intermediate goods classified under the Broad
Economic Categories (BEC) and the Harmonised Commodity
Description and Coding System (HS)
BEC code Description HS code
111 Primary food and beverages
mainly for industry
See the BEC Rev.3 - HS
2002 correspondence table
121 Processed food and beverages
mainly for industry
As above
21 Primary industrial supplies
not elsewhere specified
As above
22 Processed industrial supplies
not elsewhere specified
As above
31 Primary fuels and lubricants As above
322 Other processed fuels and lu-
bricants
As above
42 Parts and accessories of capi-
tal goods (except transport e-
quipment), and parts and ac-
cessories thereof
As above
53 Parts and accessories of trans-
port equipment, and parts and
accessories thereof
As above
Notes. The BEC classification of intermediate goods is from United Nations Statistics Division
(2003). The BEC Rev.3 - HS 2002 correspondence table can be downloaded on the UN Statis-
tics Division website, at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regdnld.
asp?Lg=1.
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Table B1. Chinese textile and clothing products exported to the U.S. and their
MFA/ATC status, 2004 (HS 50-63, the CCTS Data)
HS
chapter
Product
description
Number of
MFA/ATC
products
Number of
other
products
Value share of
MFA/ATC
products (%)
Value share of
other
products (%)
50 Silk 6 2 99.86 0.14
51 Wool, fine/coarse animal hair, horsehair yarn
& fabrics
14 3 92.59 7.41
52 Cotton 73 2 97.14 2.86
53 Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn &
woven fabrics
11 0 100.00 0.00
54 Man-made filaments 42 4 90.1 9.9
55 Man-made staple fibres 70 1 99.88 0.12
56 Wadding, felt & nonwoven; yarns; twine,
cordage, etc.
23 8 54.68 45.32
57 Carpets and other textile floor coverings 20 1 81.87 18.13
58 Special woven fabrics; tufted tex fabrics;
lace; tapestries etc.
35 2 99.23 0.77
59 Impregnated, coated, cover/laminated textile
fabric etc.
22 1 99.98 0.02
60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics 6 30 2.99 97.01
61 Art of apparel & clothing access, knitted or
crocheted
96 11 90.53 9.47
62 Art of apparel & clothing access, not knit-
ted/crocheted
110 6 96.28 3.72
63 Other made up textile articles; sets; worn
clothing etc.
52 7 88.08 11.92
50-63 All 580 78 91.63 8.37
Notes. Textile and clothing products here are six-digit products from chapter 50 to chapter 63 in the HS. MFA/ATC products:
products with their six-digit HS codes covered in the ATC Annex. Other products: products with their six-digit HS codes
not covered in the ATC Annex.
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Table B2. Full result of estimates from DD specifications with
different levels of fixed effects. Dependent variable: lnPi jt .
Without control for market share
No FE Firm FE Product FE
Product FE +
Firm FE
δ2000 0.251
∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016)
δ2001 0.252
∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
δ2002 0.048
∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.051∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
δ2004 −0.010 −0.035
∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
δ2005 −0.022 0.053
∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
δ2006 0.097
∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
ρ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ −0.815∗
(0.025) (0.019) (0.460)
λ2000 −0.290
∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗
(0.047) (0.036) (0.036) (0.029)
λ2001 −0.215
∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.119∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.046) (0.034) (0.036) (0.027)
λ2002 −0.039 0.045 0.002 0.053
∗∗
(0.040) (0.030) (0.031) (0.024)
λ2003 −0.034 0.011 0.008 0.027
(0.037) (0.027) (0.028) (0.022)
λ2005 −0.348
∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
λ2006 −0.374
∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
R2 0.146 0.644 0.494 0.774
Notes. Products are six-digit HS products. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively.
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Table B3. Full result of estimates of the price effect of quota with
different fixed effects. Dependent variable: lnPi jt .
With control for market share
No FE Firm FE Product FE
Product FE +
Firm FE
δ2000 0.231
∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017)
δ2001 0.234
∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
δ2002 0.041
∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.054∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
δ2003 −0.012 −0.036
∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
δ2005 −0.017 0.055
∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
δ2006 0.102
∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
ρ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ −0.780∗
(0.025) (0.019) (0.460)
λ2000 −0.279
∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗
(0.047) (0.036) (0.036) (0.029)
λ2001 −0.208
∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.112∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.046) (0.034) (0.036) (0.027)
λ2002 −0.038 0.045 0.003 0.053
∗∗
(0.040) (0.030) (0.031) (0.024)
λ2003 −0.034 0.010 0.008 0.026
(0.037) (0.027) (0.028) (0.022)
λ2005 −0.346
∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
λ2006 −0.371
∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
ω 0.394∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.031) (0.035) (0.028)
R2 0.147 0.645 0.495 0.774
Notes. Products are six-digit HS products. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively.
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Table B4. Estimates of changes in export product scope
(textile vs. non-textile firms)
Dependent variable: number of products
All
firms
(1)
Private
firms
(2)
State
firms
(3)
Foreign
firms
(4)
YR2002 0.071 0.040 0.482 −0.031
(0.169) (0.158) (1.827) (0.103)
YR2003 0.092 0.110 0.203 0.004
(0.153) (0.141) (1.702) (0.095)
YR2005 0.272∗∗ 0.285∗∗ −0.096 0.312∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.123) (1.586) (0.087)
YR2006 0.580∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.254 0.610∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.129) (1.684) (0.090)
Mixed 10.200∗∗∗ 8.217∗∗∗ 31.492∗∗∗ 4.282∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.189) (1.914) (0.163)
Textile −0.159 0.041 −0.552 −0.405
(0.378) (0.303) (4.829) (0.294)
YR2002*Mixed −0.259 −2.236∗∗∗ −1.624 −1.401∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.358) (2.978) (0.266)
YR2002*Textile 0.591 0.833 −0.754 0.463
(0.777) (0.641) (8.308) (0.594)
YR2003*Mixed 0.623∗ −0.591∗ 2.083 −0.501∗∗
(0.343) (0.308) (2.832) (0.246)
YR2003*Textile 0.449 0.552 0.585 0.190
(0.651) (0.531) (7.912) (0.495)
YR2005*Mixed 2.985∗∗∗ 3.648∗∗∗ 2.456 1.837∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.267) (2.707) (0.231)
YR2005*Textile 1.783∗∗∗ 1.608∗∗∗ 0.981 2.418∗∗∗
(0.534) (0.429) (6.829) (0.416)
YR2006*Mixed 1.574∗∗∗ 1.847∗∗∗ 0.424 1.813∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.280) (2.827) (0.235)
YR2006*Textile 1.741∗∗∗ 1.429∗∗∗ 0.656 2.783∗∗∗
(0.574) (0.462) (7.474) (0.443)
Constant 3.064∗∗∗ 2.876∗∗∗ 3.529∗∗∗ 3.260∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.087) (1.122) (0.062)
R2 0.078 0.120 0.110 0.081
No. of obs. 131,952 72,424 10,308 49,220
Notes. “YR” refers to years, with the omitted year being 2004. “Mixed” are those firms who ever
exported textile and other products, and “Textile” are those firms who exported only textile product-
s, with the omitted firms being those who only exported products other than textiles and clothing.
Textile products are those products included in the HS chapters 50-63. State firms are those re-
ported as state-owned enterprises, foreign firms are those reported as either wholly foreign-owned
enterprises or Sino-foreign joint ventures, while the rest are all roughly classified as (domestic) pri-
vate firms. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of coefficients estimated. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table B5. Estimates of proportional changes in export product
scope (textile vs. non-textile firms)
Dependent variable: log number of products
All
firms
(1)
Private
firms
(2)
State
firms
(3)
Foreign
firms
(4)
YR2002 0.028∗∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.039 0.015
(0.010) (0.013) (0.045) (0.014)
YR2003 0.030∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035 0.012
(0.009) (0.012) (0.042) (0.013)
YR2005 0.068∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ −0.017 0.074∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.039) (0.012)
YR2006 0.146∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.063 0.152∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.011) (0.041) (0.012)
Mixed 1.023∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 1.794∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.047) (0.022)
Textile −0.083∗∗∗ −0.034 −0.121 −0.149∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.026) (0.118) (0.040)
YR2002*Mixed −0.187∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗ −0.036 −0.235∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.030) (0.073) (0.036)
YR2002*Textile 0.124∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ −0.094 0.069
(0.045) (0.054) (0.203) (0.081)
YR2003*Mixed −0.051∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ 0.069 −0.079∗∗
(0.020) (0.026) (0.069) (0.034)
YR2003*Textile 0.122∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.293 0.037
(0.038) (0.045) (0.193) (0.068)
YR2005*Mixed 0.207∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.060 0.197∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.023) (0.066) (0.032)
YR2005*Textile 0.362∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.243 0.435∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.036) (0.167) (0.057)
YR2006*Mixed 0.080∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ −0.045 0.135∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.024) (0.069) (0.032)
YR2006*Textile 0.312∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.116 0.485∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.039) (0.182) (0.061)
Constant 0.755∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.027) (0.008)
R2 0.185 0.191 0.395 0.101
No. of obs. 131,952 72,424 10,308 49,220
Notes. “YR” refers to years, with the omitted year being 2004. “Mixed” are those firms who ever
exported textile and other products, and “Textile” are those firms who exported only textile product-
s, with the omitted firms being those who only exported products other than textiles and clothing.
Textile products are those products included in the HS chapters 50-63. State firms are those re-
ported as state-owned enterprises, foreign firms are those reported as either wholly foreign-owned
enterprises or Sino-foreign joint ventures, while the rest are all roughly classified as (domestic) pri-
vate firms. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of coefficients estimated. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table B6. Estimates of changes in export product scope
(quota vs. non-quota textile firms)
Dependent variable: log number of products
All
firms
(1)
Private
firms
(2)
State
firms
(3)
Foreign
firms
(4)
YR2002 0.040 −0.001 0.573 0.036
(0.532) (0.660) (1.894) (1.013)
YR2003 0.089 0.098 0.662 −0.034
(0.427) (0.510) (1.513) (0.882)
YR2005 0.144 0.133 0.182 0.170
(0.349) (0.411) (1.153) (0.752)
YR2006 0.161 0.171 0.273 0.104
(0.386) (0.453) (1.256) (0.851)
Mixed 2.364∗∗∗ 2.420∗∗∗ 2.273∗∗ 2.212∗∗∗
(0.296) (0.349) (1.046) (0.628)
Quota 0.741∗∗ 0.626 2.418∗∗ 0.562
(0.350) (0.415) (1.066) (0.760)
YR2002*Mixed 0.515 0.798 −1.358 0.250
(0.620) (0.763) (2.171) (1.210)
YR2002*Quota 0.843 0.855 −1.273 1.523
(0.799) (1.010) (2.207) (1.701)
YR2003*Mixed 0.506 0.686 −0.075 0.187
(0.507) (0.606) (1.831) (1.042)
YR2003*Quota 0.337 0.198 −0.044 0.382
(0.641) (0.786) (1.878) (1.334)
YR2005*Mixed 2.993∗∗∗ 2.766∗∗∗ 1.848 3.743∗∗∗
(0.418) (0.494) (1.479) (0.889)
YR2005*Quota 1.344∗∗∗ 1.231∗∗ −0.053 2.122∗∗
(0.495) (0.587) (1.507) (1.074)
YR2006*Mixed 2.999∗∗∗ 2.530∗∗∗ 3.269∗∗ 4.148∗∗∗
(0.456) (0.538) (1.617) (0.983)
YR2006*Quota 1.615∗∗∗ 1.487∗∗ −1.736 3.018∗∗
(0.548) (0.651) (1.647) (1.195)
Constant 1.469∗∗∗ 1.480∗∗∗ 1.227 1.490∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.291) (0.815) (0.532)
R2 0.139 0.132 0.153 0.167
No. of obs. 6,318 4,355 331 1,632
Notes. The sample here only contains pure textile firms, i.e., firms only exported textile products.
“YR” refers to years, with the omitted year being 2004. “Mixed” are those pure textile firms who
ever exported quota and and non-quota products, and “Quota” are those pure textile firms who ex-
ported only quota products, with the omitted firms being those pure textile firms who only exported
non-quota textile products. Textile products are those products included in the HS chapters 50-63.
State firms are those reported as state-owned enterprises, foreign firms are those reported as ei-
ther wholly foreign-owned enterprises or Sino-foreign joint ventures, while the rest are all roughly
classified as (domestic) private firms. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of coefficients
estimated. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table B7. Estimates of proportional changes in export product
scope (quota vs. non-quota textile firms)
Dependent variable: log number of products
All
firms
(1)
Private
firms
(2)
State
firms
(3)
Foreign
firms
(4)
YR2002 0.032 0.005 0.353 0.033
(0.085) (0.106) (0.365) (0.158)
YR2003 0.046 0.050 0.408 −0.027
(0.068) (0.082) (0.291) (0.137)
YR2005 0.071 0.070 0.100 0.065
(0.056) (0.066) (0.222) (0.117)
YR2006 0.085 0.091 0.115 0.059
(0.062) (0.073) (0.242) (0.133)
Mixed 0.624∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.056) (0.202) (0.098)
Quota 0.250∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.192
(0.056) (0.067) (0.205) (0.118)
YR2002*Mixed 0.079 0.173 −0.614 −0.010
(0.099) (0.122) (0.418) (0.188)
YR2002*Quota 0.192 0.219 −0.543 0.378
(0.128) (0.162) (0.425) (0.265)
YR2003*Mixed 0.113 0.150 −0.180 0.076
(0.081) (0.097) (0.353) (0.162)
YR2003*Quota 0.102 0.075 −0.155 0.114
(0.103) (0.126) (0.362) (0.208)
YR2005*Mixed 0.520∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.305 0.603∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.079) (0.285) (0.138)
YR2005*Quota 0.352∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.019 0.492∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.094) (0.290) (0.167)
YR2006*Mixed 0.463∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.497 0.664∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.086) (0.312) (0.153)
YR2006*Quota 0.402∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ −0.352 0.686∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.104) (0.317) (0.186)
Constant 0.280∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.144 0.299∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.047) (0.157) (0.083)
R2 0.217 0.214 0.237 0.243
No. of obs. 6,318 4,355 331 1,632
Notes. The sample here only contains pure textile firms, i.e., firms only exported textile products.
“YR” refers to years, with the omitted year being 2004. “Mixed” are those pure textile firms who
ever exported quota and and non-quota products, and “Quota” are those pure textile firms who ex-
ported only quota products, with the omitted firms being those pure textile firms who only exported
non-quota textile products. Textile products are those products included in the HS chapters 50-63.
State firms are those reported as state-owned enterprises, foreign firms are those reported as ei-
ther wholly foreign-owned enterprises or Sino-foreign joint ventures, while the rest are all roughly
classified as (domestic) private firms. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of coefficients
estimated. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table B8. Estimates of changes in export product concentration (textile vs. non-textile firms)
Dependent variable: sales share of top product
All products Continued products exported in 2004 and 2005
All
firms
(1)
Private
firms
(2)
State
firms
(3)
Foreign
firms
(4)
All
firms
(5)
Private
firms
(6)
State
firms
(7)
Foreign
firms
(8)
YR2002 −0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.001 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
YR2003 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
YR2005 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.010∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003)
YR2006 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.021∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003)
Mixed −0.196∗∗∗ −0.205∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005)
Textile −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.042 −0.021∗∗ −0.010∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.014 −0.005
(0.005) (0.007) (0.026) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.026) (0.010)
YR2002*Mixed 0.044∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ −0.001 0.041∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.021 0.040∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008)
YR2002*Textile −0.032∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ 0.062 −0.021 −0.020∗ −0.031∗∗ 0.026 −0.013
(0.011) (0.014) (0.044) (0.020) (0.011) (0.014) (0.049) (0.021)
YR2003*Mixed 0.012∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ −0.027∗ 0.013 0.027∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ −0.010 0.022∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008)
YR2003*Textile −0.038∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.056 −0.015 −0.010 −0.019∗ 0.013 0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.042) (0.017) (0.009) (0.011) (0.044) (0.017)
YR2005*Mixed −0.035∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.025∗ −0.025∗∗∗ 0.002 0.004 −0.009 0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007)
YR2005*Textile −0.083∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.048 −0.087∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.003 −0.013 0.015
(0.008) (0.009) (0.036) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.037) (0.014)
YR2006*Mixed −0.006 −0.007 0.001 −0.016∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.020 0.018∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007)
YR2006*Textile −0.075∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.109∗∗∗ 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.009
(0.008) (0.010) (0.040) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.042) (0.015)
Constant 0.849∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
R2 0.116 0.127 0.295 0.046 0.079 0.078 0.265 0.035
No. of obs. 13,1952 72,424 10,308 49,220 117,251 62,840 8,795 45,616
Notes. “YR” refers to years, with the omitted year being 2004. “Mixed” are those firms who ever exported textile and other products, and “Textile” are those firms who exported only textile
products, with the omitted firms being those who only exported products other than textiles and clothing. Textile products are those products included in the HS chapters 50-63. State firms are
those reported as state-owned enterprises, foreign firms are those reported as either wholly foreign-owned enterprises or Sino-foreign joint ventures, while the rest are all roughly classified as
(domestic) private firms. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of coefficients estimated. ∗ ,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table B9. Estimates of changes in export product concentration (quota vs. non-quota firms)
Dependent variable: sales share of top product
All products Continued products exported in 2004 and 2005
All
firms
(1)
Private
firms
(2)
State
firms
(3)
Foreign
firms
(4)
All
firms
(5)
Private
firms
(6)
State
firms
(7)
Foreign
firms
(8)
YR2002 −0.009 −0.001 −0.145 −0.007 0.010 0.007 −0.012 0.021
(0.024) (0.030) (0.110) (0.043) (0.021) (0.026) (0.100) (0.039)
YR2003 −0.016 −0.016 −0.110 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.027 0.006
(0.019) (0.023) (0.088) (0.038) (0.017) (0.020) (0.076) (0.033)
YR2005 −0.010 −0.010 −0.020 −0.008 0.002 0.002 −0.001 0.001
(0.016) (0.019) (0.067) (0.032) (0.013) (0.016) (0.055) (0.028)
YR2006 −0.011 −0.012 0.011 −0.014 0.001 −0.001 0.039 −0.001
(0.017) (0.021) (0.073) (0.036) (0.015) (0.018) (0.063) (0.033)
Mixed −0.156∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.061) (0.027) (0.012) (0.014) (0.053) (0.024)
Quota −0.077∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.055∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.084 −0.021
(0.016) (0.019) (0.062) (0.032) (0.014) (0.018) (0.054) (0.029)
YR2002*Mixed −0.011 −0.034 0.285∗∗ −0.004 0.008 0.002 0.148 −0.006
(0.028) (0.035) (0.126) (0.051) (0.026) (0.031) (0.117) (0.049)
YR2002*Quota −0.046 −0.079∗ 0.249∗ −0.082 −0.043 −0.057 0.076 −0.073
(0.036) (0.046) (0.128) (0.072) (0.036) (0.047) (0.122) (0.066)
YR2003*Mixed −0.025 −0.033 0.094 −0.021 0.002 −0.014 0.083 0.023
(0.023) (0.028) (0.106) (0.044) (0.021) (0.025) (0.094) (0.040)
YR2003*Quota −0.023 −0.032 0.074 −0.007 −0.021 −0.023 −0.028 −0.016
(0.029) (0.036) (0.109) (0.057) (0.027) (0.035) (0.098) (0.052)
YR2005*Mixed −0.111∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.032 −0.112∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.005 −0.013 0.022
(0.019) (0.022) (0.086) (0.038) (0.017) (0.020) (0.075) (0.034)
YR2005*Quota −0.091∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.024 −0.120∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.003 −0.008 0.014
(0.022) (0.027) (0.088) (0.046) (0.020) (0.025) (0.077) (0.041)
YR2006*Mixed −0.099∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.055 −0.116∗∗∗ 0.027 0.029 −0.029 0.034
(0.021) (0.024) (0.094) (0.042) (0.019) (0.022) (0.085) (0.039)
YR2006*Quota −0.098∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ 0.023 −0.182∗∗∗ 0.020 0.018 −0.009 0.028
(0.025) (0.030) (0.096) (0.051) (0.024) (0.029) (0.087) (0.047)
Constant 0.927∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.950∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.047) (0.023) (0.010) (0.011) (0.039) (0.020)
R2 0.155 0.152 0.176 0.175 0.080 0.086 0.110 0.075
No. of obs. 6,318 4,355 331 1,632 4,797 3,268 260 1,269
Notes. The sample here only contains pure textile firms, i.e., firms only exported textile products. Columns 1-4 present results for the sample of all products exported by pure textile firms,
while columns 5-8 present results for the sample of continued products exported by pure textile firms in both 2004 and 2005. “YR” refers to years, with the omitted year being 2004. “Mixed”
are those pure textile firms who ever exported quota and and non-quota products, and “Quota” are those pure textile firms who exported only quota products, with the omitted firms being those
pure textile firms who only exported non-quota textile products. Textile products are those products included in the HS chapters 50-63. State firms are those reported as state-owned enterprises,
foreign firms are those reported as either wholly foreign-owned enterprises or Sino-foreign joint ventures, while the rest are all roughly classified as (domestic) private firms. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors of coefficients estimated. ∗ ,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table B10. Estimates of changes in the export product scopes of pure textile firms
(U.S. market vs. Japanese market)
Dependent variable: number of products
All products Products exported to Japan in 2004
All
firms
(1)
Private
firms
(2)
State
firms
(3)
Foreign
firms
(4)
All
firms
(5)
Private
firms
(6)
State
firms
(7)
Foreign
firms
(8)
YR2002 0.038 0.554 −1.996∗ −0.537 −2.660∗∗∗ −2.381∗∗∗ −4.364∗∗∗ −2.740∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.483) (1.127) (0.695) (0.272) (0.306) (1.217) (0.587)
YR2003 −0.062 −0.137 −1.288 0.426 −2.184∗∗∗ −2.011∗∗∗ −3.588∗∗∗ −2.153∗∗∗
(0.303) (0.343) (1.228) (0.655) (0.222) (0.227) (1.148) (0.496)
YR2005 0.234 0.217 −0.400 0.500 −2.057∗∗∗ −2.024∗∗∗ −2.714∗∗∗ −1.910∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.292) (0.720) (0.312) (0.186) (0.233) (0.771) (0.322)
YR2006 0.079 0.437 −3.033∗∗ 0.349 −2.501∗∗∗ −2.301∗∗∗ −4.242∗∗∗ −2.367∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.390) (1.150) (0.454) (0.234) (0.287) (1.155) (0.368)
US −1.419∗∗∗ −1.124∗∗ −3.886∗ −1.290∗ −3.805∗∗∗ −3.651∗∗∗ −5.943∗∗∗ −3.440∗∗∗
(0.434) (0.536) (2.102) (0.679) (0.355) (0.418) (1.939) (0.568)
YR2002*US −1.262∗∗ −1.616∗ 0.347 −0.652 1.923∗∗∗ 1.769∗∗∗ 3.453∗∗ 1.983∗∗∗
(0.641) (0.952) (1.399) (0.964) (0.373) (0.510) (1.280) (0.695)
YR2003*US −0.182 −0.096 1.068 −0.667 2.005∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗∗ 3.420∗∗ 1.828∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.447) (1.709) (0.726) (0.251) (0.262) (1.428) (0.486)
YR2005*US 1.971∗∗∗ 1.667∗∗∗ 1.629 2.850∗∗∗ 2.552∗∗∗ 2.506∗∗∗ 3.029∗∗∗ 2.500∗∗∗
(0.335) (0.401) (1.187) (0.704) (0.242) (0.296) (1.108) (0.430)
YR2006*US 1.853∗∗∗ 1.291∗∗ 3.440∗∗ 2.568∗∗∗ 2.822∗∗∗ 2.645∗∗∗ 4.289∗∗∗ 2.712∗∗∗
(0.430) (0.551) (1.482) (0.764) (0.297) (0.373) (1.364) (0.464)
Constant 5.369∗∗∗ 5.197∗∗∗ 7.533∗∗∗ 5.034∗∗∗ 5.343∗∗∗ 5.123∗∗∗ 7.600∗∗∗ 5.073∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.303) (1.212) (0.428) (0.232) (0.271) (1.245) (0.389)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.574 0.590 0.540 0.562 0.681 0.708 0.608 0.661
No. of obs. 2,970 1,899 295 776 2,970 1,899 295 776
Notes. Columns 1-4 present results for the sample of all products exported by pure textile firms, while columns 5-8 present results for the
sample of products exported by pure textile firms, which had been previously exported to Japan by each firm in 2004. “YR” refers to years,
with the omitted year being 2004. “US” refers to the U.S., with the omitted destination market being Japan. Textile products are those products
included in the HS chapters 50-63. State firms are those reported as state-owned enterprises, foreign firms are those reported as either wholly
foreign-owned enterprises or Sino-foreign joint ventures, while the rest are all roughly classified as (domestic) private firms. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors of coefficients estimated, clustered within each firm. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively.
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Table B11. Estimates of proportional changes in the export product scopes of pure textile firms
(U.S. market vs. Japanese market)
Dependent variable: log number of products
All products Products exported to Japan in 2004
All
firms
(1)
Private
firms
(2)
State
firms
(3)
Foreign
firms
(4)
All
firms
(5)
Private
firms
(6)
State
firms
(7)
Foreign
firms
(8)
YR2002 0.019 0.055 −0.239 0.021 −0.510∗∗∗ −0.469∗∗∗ −0.656∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.072) (0.166) (0.108) (0.047) (0.057) (0.149) (0.100)
YR2003 −0.002 −0.035 −0.156 0.116 −0.414∗∗∗ −0.418∗∗∗ −0.460∗∗∗ −0.404∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.058) (0.146) (0.098) (0.037) (0.047) (0.099) (0.078)
YR2005 0.086∗∗ 0.078∗ −0.070 0.160∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.373∗∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗ −0.351∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.045) (0.086) (0.065) (0.027) (0.034) (0.071) (0.053)
YR2006 0.105∗∗ 0.140∗∗ −0.306∗ 0.165∗ −0.463∗∗∗ −0.443∗∗∗ −0.583∗∗∗ −0.469∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.055) (0.163) (0.087) (0.036) (0.043) (0.147) (0.072)
US −0.214∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗ −0.518∗∗ −0.199∗ −0.797∗∗∗ −0.775∗∗∗ −1.118∗∗∗ −0.727∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.080) (0.236) (0.114) (0.055) (0.064) (0.241) (0.103)
YR2002*US −0.207∗∗ −0.122 −0.092 −0.384∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.110) (0.208) (0.178) (0.079) (0.100) (0.233) (0.150)
YR2003*US −0.019 0.042 0.179 −0.214∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.081) (0.255) (0.127) (0.055) (0.066) (0.190) (0.122)
YR2005*US 0.315∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.334∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.068) (0.182) (0.107) (0.044) (0.051) (0.158) (0.097)
YR2006*US 0.266∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.407∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.080) (0.235) (0.119) (0.055) (0.064) (0.200) (0.118)
Constant 1.093∗∗∗ 1.070∗∗∗ 1.337∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 1.178∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗ 1.438∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.045) (0.122) (0.068) (0.027) (0.034) (0.108) (0.051)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.558 0.551 0.554 0.594 0.760 0.768 0.705 0.781
No. of obs. 2,970 1,899 295 776 2,440 1,551 244 645
Notes. Columns 1-4 present results for the sample of all products exported by pure textile firms, while columns 5-8 present results for the
sample of products exported by pure textile firms, which had been previously exported to Japan by each firm in 2004. “YR” refers to years,
with the omitted year being 2004. “US” refers to the U.S., with the omitted destination market being Japan. Textile products are those products
included in the HS chapters 50-63. State firms are those reported as state-owned enterprises, foreign firms are those reported as either wholly
foreign-owned enterprises or Sino-foreign joint ventures, while the rest are all roughly classified as (domestic) private firms. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors of coefficients estimated, clustered within each firm. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively.
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Table B12. Estimates of changes in the export product concentration of pure textile firms
(U.S. market vs. Japanese market)
Dependent variable: share of top product
All products Products exported in both 2004 and 2005
All
firms
(1)
Private
firms
(2)
State
firms
(3)
Foreign
firms
(4)
All
firms
(5)
Private
firms
(6)
State
firms
(7)
Foreign
firms
(8)
YR2002 0.002 −0.003 0.042 0.002 0.050∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.050∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.049) (0.030) (0.014) (0.018) (0.044) (0.030)
YR2003 0.002 0.011 0.008 −0.018 0.041∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.059∗ 0.032
(0.014) (0.018) (0.044) (0.027) (0.012) (0.015) (0.034) (0.025)
YR2005 −0.030∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ 0.022 −0.029 −0.008 −0.011 0.014 −0.007
(0.011) (0.014) (0.029) (0.022) (0.007) (0.010) (0.026) (0.011)
YR2006 −0.041∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.022 0.021∗ 0.016 0.042 0.028
(0.014) (0.018) (0.043) (0.027) (0.011) (0.013) (0.042) (0.021)
US 0.027 0.013 0.034 0.060∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.024 0.108∗ 0.062∗
(0.017) (0.022) (0.052) (0.029) (0.018) (0.022) (0.055) (0.036)
YR2002*US 0.046∗ 0.019 0.100 0.069 0.038 0.017 0.026 0.086∗∗
(0.025) (0.032) (0.069) (0.050) (0.024) (0.030) (0.070) (0.043)
YR2003*US 0.016 0.003 0.054 0.031 0.012 −0.018 0.081 0.053
(0.021) (0.027) (0.073) (0.037) (0.018) (0.023) (0.061) (0.033)
YR2005*US −0.036∗∗ −0.026 −0.067 −0.049 0.014 0.019 −0.032 0.018
(0.018) (0.023) (0.054) (0.031) (0.010) (0.014) (0.026) (0.017)
YR2006*US −0.017 0.016 0.012 −0.103∗∗∗ 0.021 0.027 0.004 0.013
(0.020) (0.027) (0.063) (0.036) (0.016) (0.020) (0.052) (0.030)
Constant 0.744∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.028) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.029) (0.020)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.491 0.480 0.492 0.537 0.593 0.609 0.575 0.580
No. of obs. 2,970 1,899 295 776 2,424 1,539 244 641
Notes. Columns 1-4 present results for the sample of all products exported by pure textile firms, while columns 5-8 present results for the sample
of products exported by pure textile firms, which were exported by each firm in both 2004 and 2005. “YR” refers to years, with the omitted
year being 2004. “US” refers to the U.S., with the omitted destination market being Japan. Textile products are those products included in the
HS chapters 50-63. State firms are those reported as state-owned enterprises, foreign firms are those reported as either wholly foreign-owned
enterprises or Sino-foreign joint ventures, while the rest are all roughly classified as (domestic) private firms. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors of coefficients estimated, clustered within each firm. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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